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Foreword. 
The Spitsbergen archipelago, which together with some minor 
islands, is now being called Svalbard, has a long and tangled history, 
of which some knowledge would be essential to an understanding of the 
situation obtaining today. But the events of the last two centuries have 
only been fragmentarily described in English, and the main purpose of 
this work is to remedy this shortcoming with regard to the part played 
by the archipelago in international politics. It may seem to be a rather 
specialized subject, but it should be remembered that not only population 
figures determine the international significance of a territory. The reader 
will soon become aware of the fact that a surprising number of states, 
including nearly all of the great powers, have at one time or another 
taken a keen interest in this matter, and the extensive rights accorded 
foreigners in the archipelago together with increasing strategic importance 
will probably prevent it from dropping entirely out of international poli­
tics in the near future. 
I have considered it sufficient to outline the complicated history of 
the islands in the 17th century, since it has been thoroughly dealt with 
by Dr. Samuel Muller, Sir Martin Conway, and Dr. Arnold R<estad. But 
the attempts to establish an international administration in the territory 
have been carefully treated. The political implications of the various 
plans have been evaluated, and the reasons why they failed to be adopted 
have been explained. The situation which led to Norway's acquisition 
of the archipelago has been described in detail, and an interpretation 
and appraisal of the final solution of the Svalbard problem have been 
attempted. 
The method applied in this study is on the whole descriptive and 
empirical, though I have tried to analyze the problems and evaluate the 
situations in the widest perspectives possible. Throughout the work I have 
endeavored to place the subject properly into a wider context of world 
affairs, and efforts have been made to trace the motive forces and inter­
ests bearing upon the various Foreign Ministries. 
Because of the nature of the subject I have had to examine sources 
from a considerable number of countries, and sometimes it has been a 
little difficult to determine the degree of reliability. Newspaper reports 
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and comments have been used to a considerable extent, but chiefly to 
indicate sentiments and opinions_ 
During my work on the history of Svalbard I have received assi­
stance from several persons whose names I have given in the Norwegian 
thesis entitled Svalbard i internasjonal politikk 1871-1925. Among 
those to whom I am indebted for help with this volume I particularly 
want to mention Mr. Ragnar 1. Christophersen, Lecturer in English at 
the University of Oslo, on whose linguistic competence I have relied. 
I also want to thank Mr. Carl F. Hovde, graduate student at Princeton 
University, for giving me valuable help with the manuscript. 
Although I have endeavored to accomplish the task thoroughly 
there will surely be shortcomings. But I hope that the facts presented 
may help to eradicate possible misconceptions of crucial problems in the 
history of the archipelago. It would in any case be wholly in accordance 
with the purpose of this work if it may contribute to understanding and 
square dealings in these far northern regions. 
TrYRve Matlzisen. 
The Periods of Whaling and Trapping. 
Who was the First to Discover Svalbard? 
The conquest of the Arctic by the people of Europe coincides with 
the great periods of expansion in European history. In the Viking Period 
the Norsemen were probably the only European people who frequented 
northern waters to any real degree. Their boats were not particularly well 
suited for manoeuvring in ice, yet what we know of their voyages calls 
forth our admiration. From their settlements in Greenland - which about 
the middle of the thirteenth century became a Norwegian dependency, 
subject to Norwegian taxation! "as far North as the North Star" - they 
set out on hunting and sealing expeditions far north along the east and 
west coasts.2 We have no accurate information as to how far east along 
the ice barrier they reached. They believed that there was a continent 
reaching from the south coast of Greenland to North Russia,3 a belief 
which it was quite reasonable for people to entertain in those days. They 
had very few possibilities of discovering what lay to the north of the ice 
barrier, and this region consequently became a land of myth. Northeast­
wards people from North Norway had already in the ninth century 
traveled as far as the regions round the White Sea.4 
If we study the voyages of the Norsemen during the years from the 
ninth to the fourteenth century, we shall come to the conclusion that they 
most probably visited Svalbard as well ;;"' and we have sources which to 
a certain extent confirm this view. In most of the Icelandic Annals we 
find an entry for the year 1194 stating that "Svalbaror" has been found.6 
Moreover, in an Icelandic book, which appears to have been written a 
few years after the date given in the Annals for the discovery of Svalbard. 
we find information about the course and sailing time from Langanes 
in Iceland to "Svalbaror, far north at the end of the sea"} On Icelandic 
maps from the seventeenth century8 the designation Svalbard is used for 
a territory which can only be the same as the one which the Dutchmen 
called Spitsbergen. The question is whether the Svalbard mentioned in 
the Icelandic Annals also is the group of islands to the north of Norway. 
Most experts believe that;9 and it is interesting to note that figures from 
the Norwegian sagas occur in Russian legends dealing with Svalbard.lO 
It is not surprising that the material available on this subject is scanty. 
As the culture and economy of the age made it impossible to settle in 
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the country, we cannot expect to find exhaustive material, even though 
the Norsemen may have visited the islands occasionally or hunted along 
their coasts.11 
In the Middie Ages the people of North Russia had considerably 
extended their seafaring activities. When English seamen began sailing 
to the White Sea about the middle of the sixteenth century, they noticed 
a great number of Russian smacks engaged in fishing and walrus hunt­
ing.12 Some students of Russian history have maintained that the Russians 
were acquainted with Svalbard as early as the sixteenth century, if not 
earlier.13 They base their belief on the information that Russian trappers 
at that time were familiar with a country called Grumant, a name which 
was later used to denote Svalbard. There is, however, every indication 
that Grumant is a corruption of Greenland; and at that time Greenland 
was believed to border on North Russia.14 There can therefore hardly be 
any doubt that the Grumant referred to by Russian trappers must be 
Novaya Zemlya, and possibly also the country east of the Bay of Ob. 
The old Norwegian conception of the geography of the Polar regions 
was not accepted by the explorers and geographers of the Age of Disco­
very. The possibility of finding a northern sea route to the Far East was 
already in the air. Dutch as well as English expeditions were sent out 
in the sixteenth century with the object of discovering a northeastern 
route to China, whose fabled wealth had stirred the imagination of the 
trader. 
In the middle of May, 1596, two ships set sail from Vlieland near 
Amsterdam, with instructions to find the North East Passage. Willem 
Barents, who had already taken part in two earlier expeditions with the 
same object, accompanied this expedition, too, in the capacity of a sort 
of expert adviser. His ship reached a land which was called Spitsbergen, 
i. e. "sharp mountains".15 The Dutchmen thought they had discovered a 
part of Greenland. Barents landed probably at Fuglesangen, an island 
on the northwestern coast of Vestspitsbergen, where he set up a stake 
with the Dutch coat of arms attached to it; it remained till the year 16 12, 
when it was removed by the English. But the States General never claimed 
that this was to be regarded as an occupation of the territory. 
The Dutch expedition was a failure in so far as it was unsuccessful 
in discovering the North East Passage; Barents died at Novaya Zemlya 
where the crew of his ship was forced to spend the winter. It was left 
to later generations to assess the real value of this expedition, which 
consisted among other things in turning the spotlight of history on 
Svalbard. 
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The English Occupation. 
When the explorer Henry Hudson returned to England in 1607 after 
a voyage which had hrought him to Svalbard, he related that he had 
seen a great quantity of whale and walrus in those parts. Whaling, how­
ever, was a difficult occupation and one in which the English had little 
experience. It was not until four years later that the Muscovite Company, 
which had previously been engaged in walrus hunting at Bj0rn0ya, sent 
a few vessels north. For this expedition the company had secured the 
services of Biscayan harpooners who were the acknowledged whaltng 
experts of that day. During the first few years it appeared that the 
English paid whaling dues to King Christian IV,1 as Svalbard was be­
lieved to be part of Greenland and therefore belonging to the Dano­
Norwegian dual monarchy. 
The English whalers soon encountered fierce competition; and in 
the summer of 16 13 there were sharp clashes between English and Dutch 
whalers.2 As the result of this it appears that the Muscovite Company 
persuaded the K ing of England to attempt to annex the country in some 
way or other, so that the company might carry out its whaling un­
disturbed. james I applied to Christian IV for the right to purchase 
sovereignty:3 over Greenland,4 a move which necessarily implied recogni­
tion of the Norwegian Crown's sovereignty over the territory. As no 
answer had been received from Christian IV by the start of the 16 14 
season, lames I confirmed in a Royal decree of April of that year the 
sole rights of the Muscovite Company to carry out whaling at Svalbard, 
the right of its men to defend themselves and maintain the sovereignty 
of the King of England over the country.'; 
In the course of the following summer the captains of the company's 
ships proclaimed the formal occupation of parts of Svalbard. In Magda­
lenefjorden, for example, a cross was set up, on the top of which the 
Royal arms were fixed, while a elated lead plaque bearing the company's 
trade mark was fixed below. Robert Fotherby, master of one of the 
whaling ships, who carried out the formal act of occupation, then took 
a piece of earth with him on board his ship. This, he declared, was to 
serve as a symbol of the legal occupation of "King lames' New Land", 
taken into possession by the Merchant Company called "Merchants of 
J'.:ew Trades and D iscoveries", for the use of their sovereign Lord King 
james, by the grace of God King of England, France and Ireland. His 
Royal arms were now set up so that his Royal prerogatives and title to 
the land and all its regions, might be clearly seen. "God save King 
james!" F otherby called out in conclusion.6 
This type of formal occupation which was used in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries was based on the Pope's alleged right to apportion the 
world by Papal bulls in conformity with his claim to ownership of all 
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the "islands" of the earth which the Emperor Constantine was said to 
have transferred to Pope Sylvester, and with the theory maintained by 
Augustine, that the earth was God's property, only used by man. The 
Pope, God's representative, was, therefore, entitled to dispose of terri­
tories which were not occupied by Christian princes. Already in the middle 
of the fifteenth century, however, the humanist Lorenzo Valla had proved 
that the Donatio Constantini was a forgery. Moreover, from a purely 
logical point of view, it was difficult to apply the old feudal rights, based 
on the one supreme power, in dealing with acquisitions of no state's land. 
The publicists of the Renaissance and their successors, therefore, sought 
to find new rules based on Roman Law to solve the territorial problems 
which the new discoveries had created. Gradually the practice of placing 
chief emphasis on the discovery was adopted; but this alone was not 
sufficient: a formal occupation was still necessary in order to achieve 
sovereignty over no state's territory.7 
On the basis of this conception the English occupation was inade­
quate. In order to have it recognized the English would also have to 
prove that they had discovered the islands; and they maintained that the 
explorer Sir Hugh Willoughby had discovered the archipelago on his 
voyage in 1553. This postulate was challenged by Dutch geographers, 
and subsequent investigations have proved that there was no real basis 
for the English c1aim.s The English also pointed out that they were the 
first to start whaling in the fjords of Svalbard. Formally the acquisition 
was thus in accordance with legal requirements, as the English claimed 
the discovery, the occupation and the exploitation of the territory. 
The occupation was, however, not recognized by England's rivals, 
and the English fleet was not strong enough to try conclusions with the 
Dutch.9 It was therefore necessary to attempt conciliation, and in 1618 
representatives of the two countries met to discuss the matter in London. 
James I formally maintained his right to sovereignty, but agreed to let 
the Dutch continue whaling operations for another three years.10 When 
this period was over, it was insisted in London that the Dutch must now 
be prevented from continuing whaling any longer in Svalbard. No action, 
however, was taken, as the English were not in a position to drive their 
competitors away. Recriminatory demands for compensation put forward 
by the English and Dutch companies also proved ineffective. The Muscovy 
Company was compelled to limit its whaling monopoly to a relatively 
small stretch of coast, but apart from the Dutch, whom they were not 
in a position to dislodge, and a few Dano-Norwegian ships which were 
generally allowed to pass unmolested, the company's ships attempted to 
drive all other nations away from Svalbard. Nor were they particularly 
well disposed to whalers from Hull o r  other English towns who failed 
to respect the company's monopoly. 
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The whaling conflict at Svalbard and their rivalry in the East Indies 
resulted in a state of tension between Holland and England; but their 
hostility to Spain obliged them to postpone the issue and join hands 
against the common foe. 
Towards the middle of the seventeenth century, the various English 
whaling companies agreed on a quota arrangement. At this time, how­
ever, English whaling was rapidly declining. Reduction in the stock of 
whales eventually resulted in the total cessation of whaling operations in 
the fjords. In the 1650's the whalers were forced to operate far off the 
coast. The English failed to reorganize their whaling industry to cope 
with this situation.ll To a large extent the stagnation in the English whal­
ing industry was due to internal conditions in England.12 Toward the 
end of the seventeenth century it was rare for English whalers to visit 
Svalbard, and the English King's claim to sovereignty was not maintained. 
Apart from whaling, the islands were of no importance. When the English 
whaling industry once more recovered its pristine efficiency sometime 
well into the eighteenth century, it turned its attention to Greenland and 
the Davis Strait. 
The Attitude of the Dutch Republic. 
The Dutch, who were the leading seafarers and traders of Western 
Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century, were quick to challenge 
English supremacy in Svalbard whaling. The Dutch whaling industry, 
in accordance with the custom of the time, was also in the hands of 
monopolies, and it was originally allotted to the Noordsche Compagnie. 
Competition to exploit the wealth of the sea was keen, not only 
among the various nations but also the various companies. It was a con­
flict carried on not only with the pen and between diplomats, but also 
with the accoutrements of war. The whaling fleets were often protected 
by naval vessels, and in some cases the whaling ships themselves were 
armed. Not infrequently, naval engagements would be fought, accom­
panied by acts of savage piracy. 
The States General never recognized the English occupation. Nego­
tiations on the Dutch side were led by Hugo Grotius.1 The Dutch Repub­
lic, however, did not lay claim to the territory. The Noordsche Compagnie 
did in fact assert that the Dutch had the sole right to undertake whaling 
operations at Svalbard, which had first been discovered and occupied 
by them; but the States General expressly dissociated themselves from 
this view.2 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were heavily 
committed in the struggle for colonies and naval supremacy. In the East 
Indies the Portuguese tried to put an end to their trading with the natives, 
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while the English tried to prevent them from catching herring off the east 
coast of England, which was of vital importance to the Dutch economy. 
At this time Hugo Grotius wrote Mare Liberum, in which he main­
tained, on the basis of Roman Law and Natural Law, that the Dutch 
could trade freely with all nations and could sail freely on all the seas. 
He challenged the Pope's right to decide which territories the various 
colonial powers should rule, as Alexander VI had done in his bulls, refer­
ring in support of his contention to the words of the Bible that the King­
dom of God is not of this earth.3 
In these circumstances it was not to be expected that the Dutch 
Republic should claim sovereignty over Svalbard on the basis of Barents' 
discovery, with a view to excluding other nations; but in conformity with 
their general policy and on the basis of the principles of international 
law maintained by Hugo Grotius, the States General demanded that the 
Dutch be allowed to carry out unrestricted whaling operations along the 
coast of Svalbard. In their dealings with the English they also maintained 
that the country had been discovered by a Dutchman. If WiIloughby had 
been there in 1553, then this event would not have been allowed to pass 
unchronicled.4 In their negotiations with Christian IV the States General 
declared that the Dutch carried out their whaling operations in accordance 
with ancient legal practice, and that they were unable to regard this as 
any infringement of the King's prerogative or in any way detrimental to 
his subjects.5 At any rate none of their rivals were strong enough to drive 
the Dutch away, even though their theories of international law were not 
yet accepted. 
The whalers themselves, arrived at a sort of division of the coast; 
thus the English were to be allowed to operate from Bellsund and north­
wards as far as and including Magdalenefjorden, while the Dutch were 
to operate to the south and to the north.6 These boundaries were not 
entirely observed, but on the whole the Dutch kept to the north-west 
coast while fjord whaling was going on. They had their main station, 
Smeerenburg, on Amsterdam0ya. Here they erected warehouses and 
blubber boilers. During the whaling season Smeerenburg had the appear­
ance of a little town.7 When the whalers returned home at the end of the 
summer season they locked the buildings, leaving behind such tools and 
equipment as there was no point in taking with them. Occasionally they 
would find on their return that some of their belongings had been re­
moved, but by and large this system seems to have worked well. In any 
case it was impossible to leave watchmen behind, as the difficulties in­
volved in spending a winter in these latitudes had not yet been overcome. 
Partly with the object of deterring Dano-Norwegian whalers who had 
settled on Amsterdam0ya close to the Dutch, and in part to protect the 
installations in Smeerenburg and the ships in the harbor against their 
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enemies in the Thirty Years War, the Dutch built a fort. This fortification 
was not, however, regarded as an occupation of the area. Smeerenburg 
only enjoyed a short existence. When fjord whaling ceased about the 
middle of the seventeenth century, it became impracticable to tow whales 
in to land, and the practice of flensing animals alongside the ship was 
adopted. To start with, the blubber was stowed in barrels and carried 
back to the home country, where the train oil was extracted.H Later on 
rendering apparatus was installed on the whaling ships. 
In the 1640's the whaling industry in the Netherlands was taken out 
of the hands of the monopolies. The monopoly system had created grave 
dissatisfaction; and there were so many people who circumvented it that 
the States General saw no reason to renew the privileges of the old com­
panies. In contrast to the English whaling industry, Dutch whaling in­
creased in the seventeenth century and came to play a really important 
role in the economy of the country. In time of war it was liable to grave 
interference by privateers and attacked by enemy naval forces, but it 
was rarely forced to close down entirely. After the Peace of Rijswijk, it 
extended considerably, apparently reaching its peak about the turn of 
the century with over 200 vessels engaged in a season. It was not until 
the days of the privateers and the blockade of the Napoleonic Wars that 
the Dutch whaling industry, as well as continental whaling generally, 
was ruined. After the middle of the seventeenth century, however, this 
whaling was little concerned with Svalbard, as land stations were no 
longer used, even though whaling often took place close to shore.9 Ves­
sels now only put into harbor to seek shelter from storms, or when they 
wished to break off operations for some reason or other. It may well be 
that the whalers when on shore indulged in a little reindeer hunting, in 
order to supplement their supplies, or the vessels would put in to renew 
their supplies of fresh water, which were bound to run out after long 
periods at sea. In war time vessels would assemble in the fjords of Sval­
bard in order to sail home in convoy; and sometimes Dutch merchant 
ships on their return voyage from Archangel would call at Svalbard in 
order to join a convoy.IO As the eighteenth century advanced, however, 
stocks of whales were so seriously reduced in the waters off Svalbard 
that the whaling ships were forced to find other areas of operation.!1 
The Dutch whaling captains acquired a good knowledge of large 
sections of the coast. It was mainly their maps and charts which were 
used, right up to the time when the Swedish scientific expeditions started 
exploring the archipelago in the second half of the nineteenth century.12 
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Norway's Sovereignty. 
The third main actor in the drama of Svalbard was Denmark­
Norway. Christian IV's claim to sovereignty, at first recognized, was 
based on the belief that Svalbard was part of the old Norwegian depen­
dency of Greenland, and on Norway's claim to sovereignty over the 
" Northern Sea", i. e. the ocean between Norway, Iceland and Greenland. 
It was generally assumed that a continuous belt of land stretched from 
the southern coast of Greenland eastward as far as Northern Russia, and 
that Svalbard was a southern promontory of this land mass. Christian IV 
claimed Norwegian sovereignty over this area as far as the borders of 
Russia.1 As the geographical facts were not known, there was naturally 
no very clear idea as to where this boundary ran. 
The claim of the Norwegian Crown to the sovereignty of the 
"Northern Sea" was based on the medieval conception of sovereignty 
over tracts of sea, and as late as the end of the sixteenth century it was, 
to a certain extent, recognized by England, in as far as she paid a small 
sum in dues on ships sailing past the coast of Finmark to North Russia.2 
The sovereignty over the "Northern Sea" did not, from a legal point of 
view, automatically entail the right to ownership of all islands in this 
ocean. But if the Norwegian kings enjoyed sovereignty over the " Northern 
Sea" they could, as it seems, by virtue of this sovereignty contest the 
validity of any occupation of islands in this sea which occurred without 
their sanction.3 As the principle of the freedom of the seas gradually won 
recognition, this claim ceased to have any reality. 
Christian IV's position was difficult, as the relations of the dual 
monarchy to England and the Netherlands were greatly influenced by 
increasing trade. The friendship between Christian IV and King james, 
which had commenced in the days when the latter was King of Scotland 
only, and which was strengthened by King james' marriage to Princess 
Anne of Denmark, was based on mutual political interests vis-a.-vis Eng­
land. It continued, however, after King lames had ascended the throne 
of England, and was of reciprocal advantage. But conflicting interests in 
the "Northern Sea" imposed a severe strain on this friendship. 
Christian IV recognized neither the English occupation of Svalbard 
nor the Dutch demand for the right to undertake whaling. He tried to 
maintain the sovereignty of the Norwegian Crown over the archipelago 
both by a show of force and by diplomatic activity. In 1650 he sent Ad­
miral Gabriel Kruse north with a number of naval units to demand dues 
of all whalers who were unable to produce a pass issued by the Dano­
Norwegian king, and to forbid them to undertake whaling in the future 
without a permit. If the whalers were unwilling to pay the tribute de­
manded, Kruse was empowered to use force.4 The opposition, however, 
proved too strong for him to be able to carry out his mission. 
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The next year Christian IV sent notes to the powers interested, for­
bidding all those who did not recognize his sovereignty the right to carry 
out whaling. James I of England rejected the demand, maintaining that 
the islands had been legally occupied on behalf of the English Crown. 
The States General did not strictly contest Christian IV's sovereignty, 
but insisted that Dutch whaling was perfectly legal.5 Christian IV sub­
mitted the answers to the Privy Council, which came to the conclusion 
that it would be best to leave things as they were. After notes had been 
sent to the interested powers, whaling by foreign expeditions took place 
as a fait accompli which could not prejudice the rights of the Norwegian 
Crown, and Dano-Norwegian whaling was not sufficiently extensive to 
make it worthwhile jeopardizing friendly relations with England and the 
Netherlands.6 
It was, in fact, impossible to expel foreign whalers from Svalbard 
by sheer force. Christian IV also attempted to exploit the rivalry between 
England and the Netherlands, but without any result. After protracted 
negotiations he formally recognized the right of these two powers to 
undertake whaling, though without renouncing his claim to sovereignty 
over the territory; and he delivered a very sharp protest to the States 
General when the Dutch erected a fort on Amsteram0ya. The States 
General answered to the effect that they knew nothing about the erection 
of a fort, but that gun emplacements had been dug for a battery which 
was to protect ships in the harbor against possible acts of aggression; 
and it was perfectly permissible, according to natural and international 
law, to defend oneself against attack. Furthermore, the States General 
undertook to inctruct the Noordsche Compagnie to abstain from any 
act injurious to Christian IV or his subjects.7 
Although both the English and the Dutch rejected Christian IV's 
claims, they accepted the fact that subjects of Denmark-Norway carried 
out whaling everywhere in the Svalbard waters, while other nations were 
turned away. In this respect it should be remembered, however, that 
Norwegian and Danish whaling was very limited compared with that of 
the other two nations mentioned. 
In the case of weaker naval powers, such as the North German cities, 
Christian IV was able to enforce his demand that whaling at Svalbard 
might be undertaken only by those who procured a pass issued by him­
self.8 Possession of a Dano-Norwegian pass, however, availed them 
little, as the Dutch and English drove away all other nationals except 
those of Denmark-Norway, irrespective of whether they had a pass or 
not. In the first half of the seventeenth century other nations were con­
sequently forced either to hunt the whale as interlopers or to fly the 
Dano-Norwegian flag. 
After fjord whaling died out about the middle of the seventeenth 
century the question of sovereignty over the islands was no longer of 
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such prime importance. This did not mean that the Svalbard question 
disappeared entirely from the arena of international politics. Treaties 
from the second half of the seventeenth century prove that Denmark­
Norway continued to claim sovereignty over this territory. This is appar­
ent in the Trade Agreement of 1663 between Denmark-Norway and 
France,9 and in the Lund Treaty of 1679,10 in which French and Swedish 
citizens respectively were granted the right to unrestricted whaling in the 
waters of Greenland, including Svalbard. After protracted negotiations, 
Hamburg was granted the same rights in 1692.11 Throughout the seven­
teenth century, therefore, the position seems to have been that Svalbard 
was regarded as belonging to Norway. We also find this conception ex­
pressed by contemporary geographers.12 During the wars at the end of 
the seventeenth century Dano-Norwegian whaling enjoyed comparatively 
favorable conditions, and was intensified in the 1690's. Ships flying the 
Dano-Norwegian flag were as a rule allowed to pass unmolested by the 
belligeren ts. 13 
In the eighteenth century the islands played an unimportant r()le in 
international politics. Yet we find Denmark-Norway, in the course of a 
dispute with the Netherlands concerning fishing off Iceland, continuing 
to claim sovereignty over them.14 And in some geography books from the 
middle of the century we also find the territory recorded as belonging to 
NorwayY; In the second half of the eighteenth century the authorities in 
Copenhagen began to show increased interest in whaling and sealing in 
the Polar seas. A subsidy was given to all vessels equipped for catching 
whale and walrus in the Greenland Sea and off Svalbard.l6 This provision 
was to hold good from 1784 and for the five subsequent years. When the 
trade monopoly in Finnmark, the most northern part of Norway, was 
abolished in 1787, and Troms0, Hammerfest and Vard0 were given the 
rights of trading towns, it was decided that the subsidies were to remain 
in force for a further ten years for ships which these towns equipped 
for whaling at Svalbard and on the Norwegian coast, and for seal and 
walrus hunting off Jan Mayen, Bj0rn0ya, and Hopen.17 The three new 
townships were, so to speak, given Arctic hunting rights as a birthday 
present. A few years later we find the people of Finmark not only hunt­
ing walrus and seal in summer, but also beginning to spend the winter on 
Svalbard in order to trap fur-bearing animals. When Denmark-Norway 
was involved in the Napoleonic Wars, Arctic hunting was probably re­
stricted. In any case we have only the scantiest reports of such activity 
during the war years, and it was not until the 1820's that it really got 
going again. But from now on the Norwegians operated on a large scale 
during the summer season, and considerable quantities of walrus were 
killed. About the middle of the century, however, stocks of walrus seemed 
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to have declined so markedly that hunting was hardly profitable. Many 
of the Norwegian vessels now turned to fish Greenland shark. 
The measures initiated by the authorities in Copenhagen proved that 
Svalbard was not a forgotten country; and it is obvious from the geo­
graphers at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century that the islands were, in Norway and Denmark at least, regarded 
as a Norwegian possession,18 even though they were no longer considered 
part of Greenland. But Norwegian sovereignty was not expressly mani­
fested. In the course of the seventeenth century the principle had devel­
oped that whaling and sealing off the islands were to be open to all 
nations; and as there was no permanent population, the rights and duties 
generally associated with the exercise of sovereignty over a territory did 
not apply in the case of Svalbard.19 
The Treaty of Kiel does not mention the islands. Article 4, however, 
lays down that the Dano-Norwegian king shall cede the whole of Nor­
way as well as all possessions belonging thereto except Greenland, the 
Faroes and Iceland. If Norway was to have any possession left after the 
three above-mentioned had been deducted, then it would have to be Sval­
bard. This interpretation of the wording of the Treaty will most likely 
hold good no matter what motive the negotiators in Kiel may have had in 
choosing it. The question was, however, never debated. The history of 
the islands was not investigated; and during the nineteenth century the 
general opinion gradually arose that Svalbard was a No Man's Land. 
Russia's Relations to Svalbard in Ancient Times. 
During the sixteenth century, people from the White Sea area went 
fishing and hunting along the coasts of Novaya Zemlya, Vaigach and 
Polyostrov Yamal. They probably also traded a little with the nomadic 
peoples of Western Siberia. On their voyages, in which they seem to have 
penetrated as far as the mouth of the Ob and the Yenisei rivers, they 
often had to spend the winter under severe and primitive conditions. 
In the 1620's the Russian authorities placed a number of restrictions 
on these activities.1 Control posts were established on Ostrov Matveev, on 
Yugorski Shar and on Yamal, where the fishermen, sealers and trappers 
had to pay dues to the Czar. This was probably the main reason why they 
turned wes:. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Pomorians 
appeared in considerable numbers along the coast of North Norway.2 
From this period, too, dates the first really reliable information of Rus­
sian wintering on Svalbard.3 The Russians never participated in whaling. 
They were fully alive to the possibilities of this industry, and in the first 
half of the eighteenth century the Czar awarded a whaling monopoly to 
certain noblemen and merchants in turn, but none of these seemed to 
2 
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have made anything out of it.4 The North Russian seafaring and hunting 
industries were of quite a different kind. The Russians continued to 
employ the methods which they had used from time immemorial on the 
coasts of Western Siberia and Novaya Zemlya. 
In July they would sail off in their vessels, the so-called lodj, with 
crews in some cases numbering more than twenty men. These Russian 
smacks were bad sailers, but of considerable tonnage. On the trip to 
Svalbard, where they would remain until the ensuing summer, the Rus­
sians would usually stop at Vard0 in Finnmark before setting off across 
the Barents Sea. \Vhen they reached their destination, the boats were 
hauled on land and large huts were erected which served as their main 
stations for the winter. In the vicinity, a number of smaller huts would 
he built where the crews could spend the night on their hunting trips. 
a sometimes happened that expeditions came back to the same spot 
several years in succession, but when the hunters noticed that stocks were 
decreasing in a particular region they would choose another ground next 
year. For this reason, in the first half of the nineteenth century and even 
later, the ruins or sites of abandoned huts could be found on a large 
number of spots along the coast, even though the number of expeditions 
per year can hardly have been more than three or four.5 
The Russians hunted reindeer, walrus, seal, fox and bear, as well 
as collected eider-down. Their hunting was carried on only as wintering 
expeditions which were quite different from the summer expeditions that 
the Norwegians developed later on. They seem to have stood up com­
paratively well to the severe climatic conditions, though there were prob­
ably frequent cases of frostbite. Their great enemy was scurvy. The 
hunters came from various places, such as Mezen, Archangel, Onega, 
etc.6 For many years the Soloviet and Sish monasteries despatched ex­
peditions to Svalbard; otherwise they were as a rule sent out by ship­
owners anci merchants. The crews were not paid a fixed sum, but had a 
share of the catch, a practice also common among the Norwegians. 
The bulk of the Russian activities at Svalbard took place from about 
1730 to 1830. The sources which have been investigated give no reliable 
informations as to the number of expeditions participating, or the eco­
nomic results. It is, however, probable that the numerous ruins of Russian 
huts found at Svalbard have led people to believe that the industry was 
more extensive than was in fact the case. 
The I�ussians probably did not visit Svalbard in the 1830's and 
1840's; after some unprofitable attempts to resume operations in the 
1850's their activities ceased altogether. The reason why they abandoned 
this industry may have been the great reduction in stocks of animals, 
especially in the case of the walrus, and the competition of the Nor­
wegians. 
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In the nineteenth century people were ignorant about the polirical 
position of Svalbard. Some authors assumed that the country belonged 
to Russia. In Marie-Nicolas Bouillet's well-known Dictionnaire U niver­
selle d'Histoire et de Geographie, which first appeared in 1842, Svalbard 
was described as Russian. But the large revised edition which appeared 
in 1864 stated that the islands were uninhabited and belonged geogra­
phically to Norway. 
Certain business circles apparently demanded that Russia should 
annex this territory,7 but there is no indication that the Russian autho­
rities ever seriously considered carrying out this suggestion. 
Terra Nullius. 
A Swedish Plan for Colonization. 
The urge to colonize and explore in distant parts of the world, which 
characterized the second half of the nineteenth century made itself felt 
in the Arctic as welI, where Svalbard above alI attracted attention. From 
the historical point of view conditions remind us of the tremendous show 
of energy which took place in the sixteenth and at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. 
Voyages and expeditions undertaken to these inhospitable regions 
were not merely prompted by economic motives. Man's desire to explore 
the unknown and to acquaint himself with the mysterious forces of nature 
- his craving for adventure and action - inspired him to chalIenge 
the Arctic. 
The Norwegian geologist Baltazar Keilhau's voyage in 1827 is 
usualIy, though not correctly, regarded as the forerunner of the modern 
exploration of Svalbard.1 He was, however, not followed by other Nor­
wegian explorers; in the next decades it was left to Swedish scientists to 
make Svalbard their sphere of operation. They organized a number of 
expeditions and carried out a great deal of pioneering work, especially in 
the field of geology and cartography.2 
Norway nevertheless made her con tribution. i'v\artin Conway has 
pointed out that polar expeditions have to a large extent taken the charac­
ter of the industries or the special aptitudes peculiar to the countries 
organizing them. Arctic exploration in the nineteenth century was to a 
very large extent based on the experiences and the seamanship which 
North Norwegian sealers and hunters had evolved after many long years 
of activity in the Arctic. The first Swedish expeditions were undertaken by 
Norwegian vessels with Norwegian crews. The sealers of North Norway 
deserve the highest praise, not only for the assistance they gave to the 
scientists, but above all for the geographical discoveries which they made 
themselves.3 
In the course of the nineteenth century sealing in the Arctic seas had 
become an industry of great importance to the population of Northern 
Norway. Summer expeditions to Svalbard to hunt and colIect eggs and 
eider-down, were a thrilling occupation which provided a welcome addi­
tion to the meager earnings of the men of Finnmark and Troms.4 Even 
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up in the Arctic Ocean the effects of the increasing industrialization 01 
Europe were not allowed to pass unheeded. In the 1850's and 1860's the 
price paid for the thick walrus skin, which was so admirably suited for 
making driving belts, increased considerably.:> New hunting grounds were 
discovered on the north coast and in the Hinlopen Strait. Arctic sealing and 
hunting, which had suffered a decline before the middle of the century, 
now enjoyed a boom period. On Svalbard the Norwegians were un­
disputed masters. But intensified hunting in a few years seriously reduced 
stocks of walrus.6 
The sea voyage from the Norwegian coast and north to Svalbard 
was often a hazardous and laborious undertaking for the smallest or least 
suitable vessels, and the season was a short one. The crews must fre­
quently have felt the need for a station or settlement to which they might 
put in for help, as accidents and cases of shipwreck were not infrequent. 
Some of them considered the possibility of settling on the islands, if only 
for a short period. In 1867 some families from the Norwegian town of 
Troms0 appealed to the King for a state grant for a boat and various 
items of equipment and provisions necessary for moving to Svalbard, 
where they intended to settle. They maintained that it would be of great 
advantage to the hunters and sealers if a colony was founded in the 
islands, to which they might turn for help in case of shipwreck or any 
oiher accident. And if they were given the necessary instructions in the 
methods of making observations, they might also be able to do work of 
importance to science. Above all, this venture would stimulate coloni­
zation of an area which, in the opinion of the applicants, would be capable 
of supporting a population of many thousands. If the King was unable 
to grant the necessary funds, they desired that the matter should be re­
ferred to the national assembly.7 But the application was turned down.8 
The plan for establishing a Norwegian colony on Svalbard was, 
however, not abandoned. It had often been discussed by scientists and 
hunters. The importance of investigating the climatic conditions of the 
Arctic was being considered at that time, and the Geographical Associa­
tion in Paris had mooted the idea of establishing a meteorological obser­
vatory in the archipelago. The scientist and explorer Adolf Erik Norden­
skiold was one of those who maintained that research into the climatology 
of the Polar Basin was necessary to create a permanent scientific founda­
tion for knowledge of weather conditions in Europe, and above all in 
Scandinavia; but he thought it necessary to winter in the polar regions 
if research in this field was to produce further results; and if wintering 
was to be successfully undertaken it would, in his opinion, have to rely 
on a permanent settlement. This principle was to be practiced by the 
American expedition, under the leadership of Charles F. Hall, which was 
fitted out in the winter of 1870-1871. Nordenskiold was acquainted with 
Captain Hall's project, and in Sweden some persons planned to establish 
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a colony in Svalbard. Amongst those who supported this plan, apart form 
Professor Nordenski6ld, may be mentioned the businessman, Oscar 
Dickson, from Gothenburg, who donated large sums to Swedish Polar 
exploration, and the naval officer, Frederik Wilhelm von Otter who sub­
sequently became Prime Minister; Prince Oscar was also interested in 
the project.9 
On his expedition in 1864, Professor Nordenski6ld had found copro­
lite deposits at Vestspitsbergen, which were later investigated with a view 
to economic exploitation.10 It was thought that the settlers could make a 
living by mining these deposits in addition to their hunting. There seem 
to have been several motives for establishing a colony. There was a chance 
of profitable production of phosphate, while with some persons scientific 
interests weighed most heavily. The plans for colonization must also be 
seen as a stage in the attempt to win Svalbard for Sweden or Norway, 
even though this might not have been the primary motive. In the eigh­
teenth century the conception had gained ground that effective appro­
priation of an area was a condition for acquisition, i. e. that the occup­
ation was to be effected by taking possession of, and establishing an 
administration over the territory in the name of, and for, the acquiring 
state. Later on in the nineteenth century this became general practice 
among the various nations.11Jf the islands remained uninhabited, it would 
be difficult to provide an acceptable reason for occupying them, nor 
would this be regarded as valid. Even though the intention might be to 
place Svalbard under Norwegian or Swedish sovereignty, after obtaining 
the consent of the various interested powers, a move of this nature ought, 
of course, to be motivated. 
Already in the spring of 1870 the occupation of Svalbard was being 
deliberated in Stockholm.12 The Swedish-Norwegian Minister in St. 
Petersburg was instructed to find out unofficially whether Russia claimed 
the islands, or whether the Russian Government considered that they 
belonged to some other power. After making certain inquiries the envoy 
got the impression that the latter was not the case,13 Professor Norden­
ski6ld now urged the King to place under his protection a settlement 
which he intended setting up to support scientific research. On the as­
sumption that the King would agree to his request he applied at the same 
time for a concession of 40 square miles of land on the promontory 
Kapp Thordsen in Isfjorden. He would choose the colonists from among 
the population of North Norway.14 
No attempt was made, either in the press or elsewhere, to solicit 
popular approval for this plan. There was possibly a desire to let the 
whole thing take place as quietly and as inconspicuously as possible. In 
the capitals of Europe attention was focussed on the Franco-Prussian 
War; there was a chance that little importance would be attached to the 
uninhabited group of islands in the Arctic, and that a Swedish or Nor-
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wegian occupation would be accepted without any real objections. At the 
end of February, 1871, the matter was submitted to the Prince Regent in 
a Cabinet Council. It seems that the object was expressly to deal with 
the matter while the King was ill, as Prince Oscar did his best to reach a 
settlement before the King once more resumed his seat in the Council.15 
The Foreign Minister, Count Carl Wachtmeister, gave an account of 
Professor Nordenskiold's application, and stated that if the King decided 
to occupy Svalbard, it would be inadvisable to attach the islands to both 
kingdoms: it should belong either to Sweden or Norway. Geographically 
the territory belonged to Norway. From ancient times people from North 
Norway had visited these areas in order to hunt and fish. The Foreign 
Minister reminded the Council of the plans for colonization which people 
from Troms0 had submitted three years previously, and pointed out that 
it was from among people in this part of Norway that Nordenskiold 
intended to choose his colonists. For these reasons he recommended that 
the islands should be placed under Norwegian territorial sovereignty. 
Before proceding any further with this matter, however, he considered it 
necessary to inquire of the Governments in Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, 
Copenhagen, London, Paris and St. Petersburg, to find out if any of 
these laid claims to the islands. The various questions had been thoroughly 
discussed in advance, and the proposal was approved without soliciting 
any objections of note. The matter was now submitted to the Government 
in Os10,16 
The reasons adduced by the Foreign Minister for placing the islands 
under Norway seemed in themselves convincing. Some of the Swedish 
Cabinet Ministers were nevertheless of the opinion that Svalbard ought 
to become a part of Sweden owing to the contributions made by Swedes 
to scientific research. But this matter presented little difficulty, possibly 
because of its bearing upon the questions of Swedish-Norwegian rela­
tions. At this very time a proposition for a new Act of Union was to be 
dealt with by the Storting, and it is not improbable that it was considered 
in Stockholm that a gift such as Svalbard might have a favorable reaction. 
At any rate, it could be used as an argument. If, on the other hand, the 
islands were taken by Sweden, there was reason to believe that it would 
cause severe irritation in Norway. 
The Government in Oslo showed no enthusiasm for the idea. It de­
clared that it did not consider it especially important to Norway that the 
status quo should be altered. Norwegians had for many years caught 
walrus, seal and white whale, hunted polar bear and reindeer, and also 
collected eider-down, but these occupations did not really require any 
change in the political status of the islands; and Norwegian capital was 
not interested in Nordenskiold's project. It was, moreover, possible that 
the acquisition of Svalbard would involve expense, and result in disputes 
with foreign powers. On the other hand, it would conflict with Norwegian 
-24-
interests and be a blow to Norwegian national prestige, if Norwegians 
should be prevented from continuing these activities by any foreign sover­
eignty. If, therefore, Svalbard had to be occupied by any one state, then 
that state would have to be Norway; and this arrangement was perfectly 
natural also from a geographical point of view. Norway must, however, 
reserve the right to abandon an occupation at any time, should it entail 
any disadvantages.17 
The Government made no reference whatever to Norwegian sover­
eignty over Svalbard in former times, though this might have been ex­
pected. Norway's claims had admittedly been disputed and it seemed to 
be more than a century and a half since it was asserted in negotiations 
with other powers, but it had never been formally abandoned. Nor had 
any claim been laid to the islands by any other power since England had 
dune so in the first half of the seventeenth century. Even though one 
might assume that Norway's sovereignty had elapsed by dereliction,18 
historical factors could certainly be exploited in Norway's favor, should 
she once more attempt to acquire the territory. But the Government took 
for granted that Svalbard was a no man's land, without bothering about 
its history or suspecting that conditions had previously been otherwise. 
Despite the reservation of the Norwegian Government, it was decided 
at a Cabinet Council in Stockholm to make an application to the interested 
powers.10 In this application the intended action was motivated by Pro­
fessor Nordenskii:ild's request for protection of his colony, and it was 
pointed out that Swedish scientists had already carried out work of great 
importance in Svalbard. These islands, it was maintained, which by their 
nature and geographical position seemed to belong to the Norwegian 
mainland, whose inhabitants had fished in their waters since time im­
memorial, had never, as far as one had been able to find out, been con­
sidered as belonging to any power. But before the King committed him­
self to the occupation, he was desirous of assuring himself that no power 
had any objection.20 
The Foreign Ministry not only omitted the question of Norway's 
sovereignty over the islands in former days, but dismissed it entirely with 
the statement that the islands had never been considered as belonging to 
any power. It was perhaps to be expected that the Foreign Ministry would 
not mention this matter, in view of the fact that it had not been touched 
on by the Government in Oslo. But had Great Britain - the only power 
apart from Norway to claim sovereignty over the islands - tried to 
submit her former claim, the above-mentioned passage in the note might 
have proved unfortunate for Norway. 
The Danish Government answered immediately that it had no objec­
tions to make; nor would the Dutch Government make any objections if 
no other power did. The French and the German Government also adopted 
a favorable attitude. They made it, however, a condition to their re-
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cog11ltlon of t he plan, t hat t he commonly accepted practices in fishing 
and s hipping in t hose territories s hould continue to hold good. T he 
British reply was t hat, provided t he Joint Kingdoms would conclude an 
agreement guaranteeing Britis h fis hermen t he same right as t hey had 
previously enjoyed in pursuing t heir occupation along t he coasts and in 
t he fjords, t hey would not oppose t he plan. An arrangement of t his nature 
would, in t he opinion of t he British Government, be an advantage to 
t hose visiting t he islands, and would be calculated to promote t he ex­
ploitation of t heir natural resources. None of t he Governments mentioned 
raised any objections to t he arguments w hich had been put forward in 
t he Swedish- Norwegian note as a basis for t he intended acquisition.21 
In Russia, however, t he plan received a somewhat different reception. 
T he first investigations made gave grounds for optimism; and w hen 
asked officially t he Deputy Foreign Minister promised t hat t he answer 
would be favorable, provided Russian subjects were allowed to retain 
t heir old hunting and fishing rights.22 
Events, however, now took a new turn. In Russian business circles 
interested in trade and s hipping in t he polar regions a campaign was set 
afoot w hich ran counter to Professor Nordenskiold's project. Michail 
Sidorov, a zoologist with business interests in North Russia, delivered 
a lecture on t he subject of Svalbard before t he Geographical Society in 
St. Petersburg, in w hich he declared t hat it was a historical fact t hat t he 
islands belonged to Russia, and t hat it would be a great loss for her to 
lose t his territory.23 At his re quest t he association sent a petition to t he 
Ministry of t he Interior, demanding t hat Svalbard s hould not be ceded to 
any other power.24 
T he Swedish- Norwegian Minister in St. Petersburg countered Sido­
rov's arguments in an article in t he "Journal de St. Petersbourg", t he 
organ of t he Russian Academy of Sciences. But t he campaign and t he 
ensuing press publicity apparently combined to make t he Russian Govern­
ment reserved. In its answer, given after a committee had dealt with t he 
matter, it stated t hat t he legal facts w hich might provide a basis for an 
effective occupation of Svalbard, by one of the powers recognized as 
having participated in t he discovery of t he islands, or as having at various 
times tried to set up establishments t here, were so vague, t hat it was 
very difficult to qualify t hem. In t he opinion of t he Russian Government 
it would be advisable to retain t he arrangement w hich so far had been 
maintained by tacit agreement between the interested governments, viz. 
t hat t he territory s hould be regarded as a no man's land, accessible to 
nationals of all powers anxious to exploit t he natural resources of t he 
islands. T his arrangement established a sort of parity between t he states 
w hose nationals were in t he habit of visiting t he territory, w hich t he 
� illperial Government could not renounce without offending Russian na­
t;, "lal feelings, in view of t he fact t hat Russian subjects had from time 
-26-
immemorial v isited t his territory, and at t he end of t he eighteeenth and 
t he beg inning of t he n ineteenth century had set up etablishments t here. 
T h is had created a general impression amongst t he Russian people t hat 
t he Russians had just as uncontroversial r ig hts as other nations t here. 
T he Russian Government saw no reason for c hang ing t he state of affairs 
which had been accepted for several centuries, especially as it seemed 
entirely compatible w ith the colonization plans w hich t he Swedish Govern­
ment wished to put into practice. By the arrangement which had in fact 
been created by mutual consent. every state whose nationals vis ited t he 
islands and hunted and fished t here freely, had an opportunity to establish 
a colony on the spot it considered most suitable. T his situat ion would, 
however, be essentially changed by an exclusive appropr iation of t he 
entire area. The Russian Government had never maintained t hat the 
establishments whic h Russian citizens had formerly built on t he islands, 
and of w hich traces could still be found, constituted a basis for a claim 
to sovereignty over the archipelago. 
In deference to t he desire of Sweden-Norway to protect t he projected 
colony, w hile retaining the rights of other powers to set up similar 
establishments, t he Russian Government considered it sufficient for the 
interested states to respect such colonies every time t hey were founded, 
and as long as they s hould continue to exist, without t hereby prejudicing 
the right of nationals of ot her states to settle in other parts of t he archi­
pelago, or freely explo it the various resources whic h t he country offered. 
The Russian Government was willing to undertake an obligation of 
t his nature, and was of t he opinion that settlements founded under t hese 
conditions and guaranteed by mutual goodwill on the part of the inter­
ested states, would offer more effective and practical advantages in this 
in hospitable region - not only as far as sc ientif ic researc h was con­
cerned, but also for commerce and industry - than any exclusive appro­
priation. T he latter might, in time and under certain conditions, apart 
from t he insolvable legal problems it would raise, result in a clash of 
in terests. 25 
Viewed against t he background of the agitation whic h had been seT 
a foot, t he reply was possibly better than anticipated. It did at least con­
ta in an une qu ivocal denial of the untenable statement whic h appeared 
in t he Russian press, to t he effect that Svalbard had from ancient times 
been Russian territory. 
T he standpoint of the Russian Government may to some extent have 
been conditioned by events in Eu rope . The news of t he rapid German 
v ictory had been received with amazement in many quarters, and t he 
Russian press expressed the fear that t he Frenc h war indemnity mig ht 
be used to increase t he German fleet. so that it would soon be in a posi­
tion to control and bottle up the Baltic. The influential newspaper 
Moskovskya Vjedomosti wrote that under those circumstances Russia had 
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to consider expanding her own fleet, and to procure a port on the ocean 
seaboard. Varangerfjorden in North Norway was just the sort of terri­
tory Russia needed. England had always been opposed to any Russian 
expansion in this direction, but it was to be expected that Germany would 
be favorably disposed towards a Russian move of this nature; if not, 
little reliance could be placed on the German assurances of friendship. 
The paper maintained that Russia had been cheated of ice-free harbors 
at the frontier settlement of 1826, and went on to suggest that the Rus­
sian Government should submit claims for such harbors, before giving 
its consent to the Swedish- Norwegian colonization project in Svalbard.26 
These views had probably been considered in the Russian Foreign 
Ministry and it was reasonable to argue that if the German fleet was in 
a position to close or even control the Baltic, North Russian waters would 
have increased strategic importance. Under such circumstances there 
might be reasons for preventing the joint Kingdoms from extending their 
influence in the North. 
The Swedish-Norwegian Minister in yet another article in the 
"journal de St. Petersbourg" countered the unfounded assertions which 
appeared in the Russian press regarding the history of Svalbard. He like­
wise opposed the statement that Russian interests had not been taken 
into account at the frontier settlement in 1826, and reminded his readers 
that the territory which had been given to Norway on that occasion was 
only a small part of a district which had formerly been common to both 
states. Russia had so much valuable territory in this area that she had 
no reason to be dissatisfied.27 
In view of the attitude of the Russian Government, it was decided 
at a Cabinet Council to abandon the plan of placing Svalbard under 
Norwegian sovereignty.28 Instead the Foreign Minister submitted a pro­
posal that the King should declare his willingness to take under his pro­
tection the establishments which Norwegian and Swedish nationals might 
ultimately set up in Svalbard, including the one projected by Professor 
Nordenski6ld, and that a request should be sent to the interested powers 
to recognize the colony. The King, who was now present in person, did 
not cherish the same interest in the proposed venture in the Arctic as had 
his brother. He considered it inadvisable to promise protection to any 
settlement, as long as the joint Kingdoms lacked sufficient sea power 
to defend them. But it was agreed to submit the matter to the Govern­
ment in Os10.29 
In its statement, the Government in Oslo agreed that the plan to 
place Svalbard under Norwegian territorial sovereignty would have to 
be dropped - at any rate for the time being. With regard to the proposal 
that the King should take Nordenski6ld's colony under his protection, 
the Government was of the opinion that it might entail disadvantages 
which could not be clearly foreseen. If Svalbard was to continue to be 
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regarded as a no man's land, it seemed inconsistent for a monarch to 
take any installation or settlement in t he islands under his protection. 
An action of t his sort seemed to involve the question of sovereignty. The 
situation would be a very different one if a government under certain 
conditions deemed it expedient to protect its subjects, w hile they were 
staying in suc h an unclaimed territory. T hat would depend on t he circum­
stances prevailing at t he moment protection was to be given. But promises 
of protection might entail undesirable obligations. S hould the King give 
a general promise of protection, the same would probably be done on 
t he part of other sovereigns. Colonization, entailing a great number o f  
difficult pn,lblems, might t hen be expected. For t hose reasons t he Govern­
ment t hought it necessary to advise against the plan.30 
The main argument of t he Norwegian Government was t hus, t hat 
t he King, by placing installations or colonies in Svalbard under his pro­
tection, would involve t he monarchies in obligations, t he consequences of 
w hich it was difficult to foresee. T he Government in all probability also 
had another motive in advising against t he adoption of this plan, and one 
t hat did not find expression in its recommendation; for at t he end of its 
report t he Government declared t hat it considered it superfluous to add 
that the right to hunt in Svalbard must not be restricted because of the 
installations t here. It is a moot point w hether this declaration touches 
upon t he basic reason for the Government's reserved attitude. Only Nor­
wegians at t hat time went hunting in Svalbard, and any colonization 
w hich resulted in occupation of part of t he coast might well jeopardize 
Norwegian economic activities. Future events were to prove that the 
Government's fears were well founded. 
After t his it was agreed in Stockholm to drop t he matter.31 T he King 
himself feared, apparently, t hat t he activity in Svalbard might lead to 
disputes with foreign powers, which might endanger the safety of the 
two countries or expose them to the mortification o f  an affront. 
T he colonization project, however, was not abandoned. The inter­
ested parties formed the limited liability company Isfjorden, t he aims of 
which were to be partly economic, partly scientific. In fact it was 
merely t he old plan of colonization w hich now assumed a more definite 
form. In April, 1872, t he company requested the Government to acquaint 
foreign powers with t he project, and to procure for the colony t he protec­
tion of international law. 
Already in t he summer of that year the company sent an expedition 
north which proceeded to make preparations for exploiting the coprolite 
deposits. T hey proved, however, too scattered to be mined easily; and 
preparations were not sufficiently advanced to keep mining operations 
going t hrough t he winter. T he bulk of t he company's capital was used 
in covering t he expenses of t he first expedition. The following winter a 
regrettable accident occurred which subsequently reduced people's enthu-
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siasm for wintering. In September, 1872, six Norwegian vessels were 
caught in the ice off the north coast of Vestspitsbergen. The crews made 
their way to Nordenskiold's expedition, whic h was to spend the winter 
at Polhem in Mosselbukta. As the supplies would in any case prove 
insufficient to feed so many people for one winter, it was agreed that 17 
men of the crews should try to cross the island and reach t he company's 
house at Kapp Thordsen. They succeeded in reaching their destination, 
but in the course of the winter they all perished. In t he summer of 1873 
Isfjorden Company Limited was dissolved. T hough t he plan to exploit 
coprolite was not abandoned for good, no workings were started for 
many years. 
The exchange of notes in 1871-72 had nevertheless clarified Sval­
bard's political position. It now had to be definitely assumed t hat the 
archipelago was to be regarded as a no man's land, accessible to subjects 
of any state anxious to exploit its natural resources. Norway and Eng­
land, which had claimed sovereignty over t he territory during the whaling 
period, did not restate t heir old claims. The West European powers 
adopted t he attitude which t he Net herlands had formerly maintained, viz. 
to demand t he right to exploit freely t he riches of t he coastal waters. 
T hey evinced less interest in t he land. T his standpoint and practice were 
t he result of a long development, and t he economic and geographical 
reasons for t his attitude seemed to be that t he country had come to be 
regarded as practically uninhabitable and as offering no promise o f  
economic gain. It was primarily t he wealth of the sea for w hich men had 
striven in t hese in hospita ble regions. During the first period of w haling 
t he land stations had, of course, played an important role, but in time 
t heir signi ficance, too, ceased. In t he nineteenth century a certain amount 
of competition admittedly arose between Norwegian and Russian trap­
pers, but it never resulted in any conflict of importance or involved diplo­
matic negotiations. 
The Russians, w ho had never taken any part in w haling, now made 
t heir appearance for the first time in the diplomatic negotiations for t he 
archipelago; but t heir activities, which had principally consisted of trap­
ping and hunting in t he eigteent h and nineteenth century, resulted in t he 
Russians being more interested in t he land t han had t he nations w hic h 
had only participated in whaling. It is true t hat Russian hunters and 
trappers had ceased to operate in Svalbard, but t he traditions already 
establis hed led t he Russian Government - encouraged by certain busines s 
circles - to regard it as a matter of national importance to secure un­
restricted rights for Russian nationals to exploit t he economic resources 
of the territory at any time in t he future. 
Light had also been thrown on another question. T he installations at 
Kapp Thordsen, w hich had been accepted by all interested powers, created 
a precedent. It seemed to be established that private ac quisition of minor 
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areas and colonization were permitted, but not all the problems which 
would arise under an arrangement of this kind had been foreseen. 
As compare d with the negotiations in the seventeenth century, several 
new factors had emerged: the geographical proximity of the archipelago 
to Norway, on which previously no emphasis had been laid; the activities 
of Norwegian and Russian trappers and hunters, and Swedish scientific 
research had become elements of the political situation. 
The Norwegian Government had shown re markably little interest in 
t he idea of extending Norway's sovereignty to include Svalbard, fearing 
that this might involve the State in additional expenditure, and that it 
would sooner or later lead to disputes with other powers. For the time 
being Norwegian interests were best served, the Government reasoned, 
if these Arctic islands were to remain a no man's land. But should it 
prove impossible to maintain a situation of this kind, and imperative to 
place the islands under the sovereignty of one single state, then that 
state would have to be Norway. 
It is not surprising that the Norwegian Government was reserved 
with regard to the question of partial colonization. It would probably be 
an advantage to the hunters and trappers if there were a small number 
of minor colonies, but if considerable areas of land were appropriated, 
the situation would be far different. That Nordenskiold's colony was a 
Swedish undertaking, supported only by Swedis h capital, may also help 
to explain the Norwegian point of view. Nevertheless, one is tempted to 
ask whether the attitude of the Norwegian Government was tenable. True 
enough, Norwegian economic interests in the Arctic were, for the time 
being, not threatened from any quarter; but the moment such a situation 
occurre d it might be too late to incorporate Svalbard with Norway. In 
any case this would entail a greater risk of conflict. As things turned out, 
however, the reservation of the Government was not destined to have 
any importance. 
Norway Adopts a More Active Policy. 
When the stocks of walrus at Svalbard began to be seriously re­
duced, Norwegian vessels turned east towards Novaya Zemlya and West 
Siberia.! By degrees, sealing became the principal act ivity, and it was 
carried on along the ice rim between Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya and 
southwards off the Russian coast or in the " East Ice", as the sealers call 
it, and before the end of the century it was extended into the White Sea. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century sealers from Nort h Norway 
also turne d their attention to the Greenland Sea or the "West Ice", in 
the language of the sealers, where vessels from ports in South Norway 
ha d engaged in sealing from about the middle of the century. The sealing 
fleet increased in number and, as far as the town of Hammerfest was 
concerned, it reached peak figures at the end of the 1880's. Several 
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factors probably contributed to the change in Arctic hunting. Stocks of 
walrus were gradually becoming seriously depleted, and it was no longer 
possible to find new hunting grounds. Moreover, the price of walrus hide 
fell because balata was now being llsed for making driving belts. The 
increase in the use of rifles also played a certain r{)le. \Vhen the vvalrus 
was on land, it could be killed fairly easily with a harpoon, while rifles 
were more essential for shooting seal along the edge of the ice. However, 
sealing and walrus hunting at Sva!bard did not stop altogether, while 
egg and eider-dovm collecting and reindeer and bear hunting continued. 
For these pursuits smaller vessels, with a crew of three or four hands, 
were generally used. 
At the beginning of the 1870's catching of the white whale - another 
form of activity - was considerably extended.? This small Arctic whale 
was hunted for its tough thick hide, well suited for making belts and 
other leather articles, though this hide is not quite as good as that of the 
walrus. This form of catching took place inside the fjords. It was under­
taken partly by the regular sealers, carrying the necessary nets for catch·� 
ing the white whale, and partly by vessels which were equipped solely 
for this purpose. It is, however, difficult to arrive at a closer picture of 
the economic importance of these activities. It was certainly only carried 
on by Norwegians, but statistics of Arctic sealing and hunting do not 
give figures for the various fields of operation.3 
In the middle of the 1870's an unusual cod fishery took place along 
the west coast. It was carried on in four fishing grounds, from Bellsund 
in the south to Raudfjorden in the north. To start with the fish appeared in 
dense shoals, frequently just off shore, in eight to ten fathoms of water. 
They followed the limacina arctica which floated about in great masses, 
and fishermen using only handlines were able to make considerable 
catches. After a few years the fish moved further off shore and had to 
be caught out on the banks, and in 1883 it suddenly disappeared. 
The vessels which sailed north were forced to return emptyhanded. This 
remarkable fishing must, however, have increased the knowledge of. and 
interest in, Svalbard among fishing experts all over Norway. 
No other country had participated in the fisheries to any notable 
degree. Norwegians continued to predominate in the fishing grounds and 
sealing places of the far North. There wc re nevertheless signs that they 
would not enjoy this privilege for very long. The use of trawls had dcci­
sively changed fishing and increased catches considerably. North Sea 
fishing banks were so overfished that British and German trawlers soon 
had to look for new fishing grounds. The Norwegians' former rivals in 
the Arctic, the Russians, were not, however, particularly active. It seems 
that Russian authorities were not very interested in the Arctic regions, 
and this is confirmed by the fact that the naval base at Archangel was 
dismantled in 1887. 
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The scientific exploration of Svalbard continued, though somewhat 
reduced in scope. After Nordenski()ld's expedition of 1872- 1873, 
SW'edish polar exploration turned principally to the Kara Sea and the 
North East Passage. In the 1870's and 1880's few important scientific 
expeditions were sent north. On the other hand, several wealthy gentle­
men visited the islands in their yachts, some of them carrying out valu­
able research.4 
In the spring of 1892 the Norwegian Government took up anew the 
question of Svalbard's political position. In a confidential note to the 
Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior pointed out that the 
Norwegian Government had, in 187 1, maintained that if the question of 
placing Svalbard under the sovereignty of a single state should be 
seriously considered, then that state would have to be Norway. Several 
European powers were now seeking to extend their possessions in distant 
parts of the world, and they seemed especially to be in terested in the 
fishing grounds in the North. It was therefore unlikely that Svalbard's 
status as a no state's land could be maintained much longer. It would be 
of very real importance to the population of North Norway, who were 
increasingly engaged in hunting and fishing on the islands and in the 
adjoining seas, that the territory was not placed under foreign sovereignty, 
with consequent restrictions on the activities of Norwegian nationals. As 
there was reason to fear that some such move was afoot or was being 
privately fomented, the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden should take 
steps to prevent an occurrence of this nature by an ac quisition of the 
islands. The Secretary was, however, of the opinion that Russia was 
hardly considering taking possession of the archipelago, and in the event 
of another great power attempting to do so, it was not unlikely that the 
Russian Government would back up Norway and support a Norwegian 
claim in order to bar the way for a more dangerous rivaJ.5 But the import 
of the Foreign Secretary's reply was that there was no evidence that the 
alternative mentioned actually existed, and that the situation had not 
noticeably changed since the question was dealt with ip 187 1-1872.b 
The matter is explained by the eagerness of the Liberal Ministry of Johan­
nes Steen, then in power, to further Norway's foreign interests. There 
might perhaps also have been some grounds for anxiety. The fact that 
the great powers occasionally sent naval vessels to the waters concerned 
could at any rate be taken as a sign of increased interest in the area! 
Several conferences which had been held in recent years to work out 
regulations for sealing might also tend to focus the attention of the powers 
on the Arctic. 
In the 1890's tourist ships started to go north, and scientific ex­
peditions to Svalbard became more fre quent. Some of them were given 
great prominence in the press, thus contributing twofold to making the 
country known. 
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In the summer of 1895 the Norwegian papers contained a great deal 
of material calculated to call public attention to t he Arctic. Andrce's 
attempt to reach the North Pole by balloon was eagerly followed. A Nor­
wegian steamship company established a tourist station at Adventpynten 
in Isfjorden, and organized weekly tourist sailings between Troms0 and 
Svalbard, which proved a success. In the middle of August Fridtjof 
Nansen returned from his voyage in the " Fram" and received a splendid 
reception. 
T hese considerations should largely explain why in September de­
mands appeared in the press - especially in t he Liberal press - that 
Norway should occupy Sval bard. The c hief organ of the moderate Liberals 
suggested that the islands should become Norwegian territory, as they 
belonged geographically to Norway, and it might soon be necessary to 
provide t hem wit h police supervision. Foreign powers should, however, 
be allowed to hunt and fish along the shores and to set up hunting stations 
with the consent of the Norwegian Government. During the discussions 
which ensued, various opinions were expressed. Those who were opposed 
to a step of this nature declared that t he expenses would be so consider­
a ble that what was "won on the swings" would be "lost on t he round­
a bouts"; and there was a danger that the occupation of t he islands might 
result in disputes with other powers, especially Russia. Nor were there 
any grounds to fear an occupation "sans phrase"; a power w hich con­
sidered taking a step of this nature, would in all probability make in­
quiries in advance among t he interested states, and Norway would then 
be in a position to make a strong protest. 
Those in favor of acquiring the islands maintained t hat the situation 
could change. T here was no guarantee t hat Norwegian activities in Sval­
bard might not one fine day be forced to close down owing to foreign 
sovereignty; and one should not exaggerate the expenses that police 
supervision might involve. This could be organized in a cheap way. 
Besides, it should be borne in mind t hat protection would increase stocks 
of game and thus make hunting more profitable. It was especially im­
portant to preserve the reindeer stocks, as tourists were slaughtering 
them ruthlessly. It was also intimated that by acquiring the territory 
Norway would stand her ground as an independent state. If, on the other 
hand, another power was allowed to forestall her, it might have unfor­
tunate national consequences. Now that Norway's contribution to polar 
exploration was generally recognized, with Nansen's voyage a household 
word, the time would be appropriate.8 
A number of applications for government grants were received from 
people anxious to settle in the archipelago,9 but these were turned down, 
and for the time being the Norwegian state authorities allowed the 
question of Svalbard's political status to lapse; but the matter had been 
3 
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given new at tentiun by discussions in the press, and acquired a broader 
position in the national consciousness. 
The Russian Foreign A1inistry had not failed to notice the ar ticles 
and letters ahou t Svalbard which had appeared in the ]\;orwegian papers 
and were in sOl11e doub t as to how they could he interpreted. The Russian 
Legatiun in Stockholm was therefore requested to investiga te the ma tter 
and to inform the Foreign Minister of the Joint Kingdoms tha t the Russian 
Governmen t s till maintained the a t ti tude it had adopted in 1871, viz. 
that it considered i t  necessary to maintain the status of the archipelago 
as that of a no man's land.10 The Foreign '/\1inister was, however, in a 
position to give a reassuring answer, and the Russian envoy was able 
to inform his Government t hat in Stockholm there was no confirmation 
of the rumor that the Norwegians intended to occupy Svalbard. But af ter 
Fridtjof Nansen's successful expedition many people in Norway were 
beginning to think t hat the Norwegians should take the led in all ma t ters 
relating to the polar territories. There was talk of set ting up a permanent 
station in Svalbard to assist future expeditions, and of building a tourist 
hotel. But at t he moment these were mere projec ts.l1 
However, some of the plans were allowed to pass beyond the purely 
speculative stage. In t he summer of 1897 the Norwegian Post Office 
established a branch post office in the archipelago, which catered parti­
cularly for tourists; it was situated in the tourist station at Adventpynten, 
where a sort of newspaper, t he Spitsbergen Gazette, was issued the same 
year. That a Norwegian state institution such as the Post Office should 
extend its activity to t he archipelago - t hough on a very modest scale -
might have a certain significance, and could be interpreted as something 
like "penetration pacifique". But the a ttemp t was not successful; af ter 
the end of the season the tourist s ta tion was abandoned, and t he house 
was used in the winter of 1898--99 by a few families from N orth Norway, 
who wished to settle in the Archipelago. This was apparently the firs t 
a ttempt made to set tle wi th women and children, but the colonists were 
forced to abandon their projec t and re turn to Norway after spending but 
one winter up t here.12 
A German-Russian Episode in the Arctic. 
In the 1890's the Russians once more began to show increased in­
teres t in the Arctic, and a great deal was written in the press about an 
ice-free port in the North. In Archangel Governor A. Engelhardt did a 
lot to improve his province. He had the support of, amongst o thers, Count 
Sergej Witte who a t  that time played an important r(lle in Russian politics. 
Of the military leaders, Admiral Stefan Makarov, commander of the 
Baltic fleet and subsequently commandan t at Kronstadt, at tached great 
importance to the northern regions. Alexander III had, at Witte's recom­
mendation, decided to develop Yekatarina Por t on the Murmansk coast, 
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as a naval base instead of Libau which had been suggested. The matter 
was, however, not settled before he died, and those in favor of the Libau 
project triumphed.1 
Nevertheless, tile development of the North Russian territories pro­
ceeded. In 1895 the construction of a new harbor was started in the 
Kola fjord; a telegraphic cable was laid across Kem and Kandaiakska 
to Kola, and the work of extending the railway to Archangel was ac­
celerated. A railway line was also proposed from St. Petersburg via 
Petrosavodsk and Kem to the Kola fjord, but this was turned down. 
In the Arctic a system of loo k-outs was esta blished in order to keep 
Norwegian fishermen and sealers at a respectable distance from the 
Russian coast. From now on, the Russians also participa ted in the 
scientific exploration of Svalbard. 
Interest in the Arctic regions was mainly due to the desire to estab­
lish a sea route north of Siberia. Those specially engaged on this problem 
were the well-known scientist Dimitri Mendeleyev, at this time director 
of the Russian Institute of Weights and Measures, and Admiral Makarov. 
The latter had the powerful icebreaker "Jermak" built, c hiefly with a 
view to open the planned northern sea route to the Far East.2 The project 
was now arousing interest because of the Russian expansionist policy in 
the Far East. It was foreseen that this might lead to war with Japan, 
which would create unusually difficult transport proble ms. 
In the summer of 1899 Alexandrovsk, the new ice-free harbor in 
the Kola fjord, was completed, and the formal opening ceremony took 
place in July, with the Grand Duke Vladimir and a number of other 
distinguished persons present. Norwegian authorities had also been in­
vited and arrived in a naval vessel. The Baltic might be bottled up by 
Germany, the Black Sea by Turkey and Great Britain, Vladivostok by 
Japan, but now at last Russia was to have an ice-free harbor with access 
to the open sea, the Russian papers commented.3 But while preparations 
were being made for the inaugural ceremony disquieting news was 
reported. 
The Germans were also turning their attention to Arctic waters; they 
were among the first to avail themselves of the tourist traffic to Svalbard, 
though their interests were not entirely confined to sight-seeing. The 
desire for a strong navy and for increased activity at sea generally helped 
to increase German interest in the fishing industry. As in Great Britain, 
a rapid modernization of the fishing fleet took place. The scientific in­
vestigations which were related to the fishing industry were conducted 
by the "Deutsche Seefischerei- Verein". This association did not restrict 
its activities only to the North Sea and the Baltic, but also explored the 
ocean outside the German colonies. The development of the German 
fisheries fitted in well with the attempt to make Germany a great sea­
power,4 and there seemed to be a connection between t he Sea Fisheries 
Association and the Naval Association which was formed in 1898. J n the 
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Arctic Ocan, German sailors had certain traditions;� and the Sea Fisheries 
Association investigated the possibilities of finding new German fishing 
grounds in these waters. In the summer of 1898 the naval vessel " Olga" 
undertook a cruise to the Arctic. At the instigation of the Sea Fisheries 
Association the ship was e quipped to carry out extensive marine research 
which gave favorable results. In the same year a couple of German firms 
sent out an expedition commanded by a former journalist and reserve 
officier, Theodor Lerner, to Bj0rn0ya where the little bay called S0r­
hamna was occupied, with a view to set up a whaling station. 
In the winter of 1899 both the Sea Fisheries Association and Lerner 
made preparations for a new expedition. The German press contained 
statements which caused the Norwegian Government some uneasiness.6 
The Secretary of the Interior therefore re quested the Foreign Secretary 
to investigate privately the aims of the expeditions.7 The answer he re­
ceived was of such a nature that he saw no reason to proceed further.s 
A few days later, however, the leading conservative paper, the Kreutz­
zeitung, wrote in its weekly survey that "we also regard the occupation 
of Bj0rn0ya between the North Cape and Spitsbergen as a shrewd and 
useful political act".9 In answer to the question of the Swedish-Norwegian 
Minister in Berlin as to whether it was Germany's intention to establish 
herself at Bj0rn0ya, or possibly to undertake a formal occupation, the 
Under Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry gave an evasive 
reply. The envoy declared that he would request more detailed informa­
tion regarding the aims of the German Government, although there could 
hardly be any further doubt on this poinpo Nevertheless, in Oslo the 
matter was taken calmly, as the opinion was that in any case this was only 
a question of a partial occupation, which was permissible according to the 
views expressed during the exchange of notes in 187 1-72; and it was 
assumed that the Russians would be on the alert. 
The Sea Fisheries Association's expedition set out at the end of April, 
but it took two months to reach its destination. Its chief task was to 
ascertain whether it was possible to carry out whaling and fishing from 
stations on Bj0rn0ya; furthermore, to investigate whether the coal de­
posits could be used for coaling fishing vessels. The expedition was also 
to carry out hydrographich and meteorological investigations for See­
warte. Before the expedition set out from Germany its leader was in­
structed to avoid clashes with other nations, in so far as this was com­
patible with German national prestige.!1 Nordhamna on Bj0rn0ya had 
been chosen as the main station, and here they set about establishing a 
whaling station and installations for processing fish. 
Lerner reached Bj0r110ya at the end of May. He brought with him 
wire and stakes which he used for fencing in the most important coal­
fields and harbor areas on the south and east coast, as a sign that they 
were occupied. Although there was no cooperation between the two ex-
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peditions it seems nevertheless t hat dif ferent districts on t he island hall 
been deliberately c hosen as spheres o f  operation. 
German activity in t he Arctic Ocean was followed with keen interest 
by t he Russian Government. The Russian press published articles de­
manding that a German occupation of Bjornoya be prevented. T he 
" Novoye Vremya" wrote t hat Bjornoya was very suitable as an Arctic 
o bservation post, w hich could likewise t hreaten t he sea routes to North 
Russia. Besides, German trawl fishing would be a source o f  insecurity to 
t he Pomorians, w ho would not be in a position to compete.12 It was 
o bvious t hat a German station in t he Arctic would be looked at askance 
in Russia. T he naval vessel " Svetlana", w hich had taken Grand Duke 
Vladimir to Alexandrovsk on t he occasion of t he inaugural ceremonies 
was accordingly sent north, with instructions to find out precisely w hat 
t he Germans were doing, protest against Lerner's occupation, trace the re­
mains o f  Russian property, and indicate claims to ownership t hereof.l3 T he 
captain and some o f  t he crew landed at a place called Russehamna, 
w here t hey intended to hoist a flag over the remains of a Russian hunting 
station. Lerner protested against t his on t he grounds t hat t he soil t hey 
were on was German national property. The " Svetlana"s captain satisfied 
himsel f on t his occasion by protesting against Lerner's occupation. After 
t his clash Lerner sent his s hip, t he "Tersc heling", to Tromso with some 
o f  t he members o f  his expedition, to wire t he Reichskanzler as to 
w hat had happened and ask for instructions. T he C hancellor, however, 
answered t hat Lerner could not in t he event o f  a unilateral s how of force 
reckon with t he support of t he German Governmenf.14 
Two days later t he Russians arrived at Nordhamna, w here t hey were 
well received by t he German expedition. On t he site o f  a Russian house 
w hich had once stood on a spit of land, t he Russians erected a wooden 
tablet with t he inscription: " Belongs to Russia. Appartient a la Russie. 
Capitaine A baza, Croiseur Svetlana." A lit tle beyond t hey set up a mast 
flying t he flag o f  t he Russian Merchant Marine. In the evening t he Ger­
mans were invited a board t he Russian ship, w here t here was a cordial 
atmosphere with toast to t he Czar and to t he senior admiral o f  t he Rus­
sian fleet, Kaiser Wilhelm I I.15 Next morning t he " Sve tlana" steamed 
away. Thus there was no question of an occupation of the island, either 
from t he German or t he Russian side, and rumors to t his e f fect were, as 
far as t he Germans were concerned, of ficially denied in t he press.16 
One might never t heless ask w ha t  motives had prompted t he German 
expedition. As far as t he Sea fisheries Association's expedition was 
concerned, economic and scien ti fic motives may have been decisive. 
Lerner was little better t han an adventurer, w hom neither t he aut horities 
nor any respectable institution would acknowledge,17 But it might be a 
good t hing to let an irrespons ible person o f  t his sort lead t he way; a 
retreat would then entail no loss of prestige. I f  the harbors and coalfields 
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on Bj0rn0ya had been occupied by German nationals without incurring 
the objections of any other power, it is hard to tell what step the Germans 
would have taken next. Franco-Russian political and military cooperation 
had at that time been well established. Far-sighted German strategists 
might already then have foreseen conflict and would not disregard the 
importance of the Arctic in a war against Russia and France, especially 
if the Russians should succeed in opening a sea-route north of Siberia. 
In any case it was remarkable that this German move at Bj0rn0ya coin­
cided with the Russian inauguration on an ice-free harbor on the Mur­
mansk coast. The affair had no real bearing on the relations between the 
two powers. According to an official German press statement the matter 
was settled by an exchange of notes. The Germans declared that they did 
not wish to occupy the island, while the Russians on their side accepted 
private occupations of certain areas, on the line suggested by the Russian 
Government during the exchange of notes about Svalbard in 1871-
1872.18 The press in the two countries nevertheless used rather strong 
language.19 
The plan to use Bj0rn0ya as a base for German fishing and whaling 
operations was not implemented, as the attempts which were made did 
not produce any satisfactory results.20 The Sea Fisheries Association did, 
in fact, send an expedition north the next year, but it did not stay long; 
after that, only Lerner continued for some years. 
The events on Bj0rn0ya gave greater importance to the Svalbard 
problem. In Norway the history of the archipelago was investigated and 
short accounts given in the press, but there was little feeling in favor of re­
newing old Norwegian claims to sovereignty.:?1 A recognized authority 
told a correspondent that it had been, so to speak, settled that Svalbard 
should remain no man's land. This theory, that no one had any parti­
cular right to the Arctic islands, was based on the fact that they were 
unsuitable for permanent habitation by civilized people, and that the 
climate was too severe to permit a permanent occupation. Norway 
ought to keep her hands off. The government had been right in 1871 in 
refusing to undertake the considerable obligations and great respon­
sibility which an occupation involved.22 
It is, however, clear that in Oslo at that time considerable importance 
was attached to developments in the Arctic. The Norwegians were wont 
to read of the struggle of the great powers for new possessions with all 
the smug security of outside spectators, wrote the liberal paper Dag­
bladet. Accustomed as they were to concentrate exclusively on their 
own domestic affairs, few of them, perhaps, had ever considered that 
their country had a sphere of interest, whose position was such that they 
could not tolerate any foreign power settling there willy-nilly. The paper 
suggested that by international agreement Svalbard should be declared 
a neutral no man's land, whose economic resources anyone might exploit 
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under the supervision and guarantee of all powers concerned.23 This 
was a solution which was also favorably received in conservative quarters. 
It was in harmony with the idea of neutrality widely accepted in Norway. 
In British papers it was suggested that Norway should occupy Sval­
bard, and it was hinted that this had practically already taken place, as 
far as the southern side of Isfjorden was concerned, where a Norwegian 
post office had been set up, and where a steamship company, subsidized 
by the Norwegian Government, had built a hotel and was running weekly 
steamship sailings in summer.2 4 But the Norwegian press disassociated 
itself from these views. In the Swedish press - apparently for the first 
time - the suggestion was made that the islands should be placed under 
the supervision of Sweden, Norway and Russia, but continue to be a no 
man's land.25 This solution was possibly primarily suggested by the 
Swedish-Russian scientific cooperation then going on in Svalbard. The 
proposal received no support in Norwegian quarters, where it was feared 
that Russia would be the dominating partner in a joint undertaking of 
this nature.26 It seemed, moreover, to be the general opinion in Sweden 
that something must be done to secure the neutrality of the archipelago.2' 
It is not quite clear how the problem was viewed in official quarters 
in Russia. Russian hunting on the archipelago had ceased half a century 
earlier. It is possible that some were in favor of pushing Norway's claims, 
in the event one of the great powers was interested in an occupation. 
If Russia herself did not at the moment seem it opportune to take posses­
sion of the archipelago, then it would be an advantage for her to let it 
pass to a weak power which was not in a position to threaten Russia 
from this quarter. Among those who shared these views was Governor 
A. Engelhardt in Archangel. He stated that, in his opinion, Norway 
was the only state which could be said to have a limited right to Sval­
bard. It is possible that the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovitch held 
similar views, but they were hardly those generally entertained in the 
Russian capital.2 8• 
After the Bj0rn0ya affair the Government in Oslo wished to review 
Norway's attitude with respect to Svalbard. It considered it unsafe to 
ignore the statement in the Russian press that the archipelago was situ­
ated within the Russian sphere of interest and should therefore belong 
to Russia. As far as Germany was concerned, one could not merely accept 
the fact that the German Government was unwilling to defend Lerner's 
occupation. Examples from other parts of the world showed that when 
German nationals had established themselves, the necessity for protecting 
them would soon arise. The attitude that rivalry between several great 
powers would guarantee the status quo was quite untenable; it might 
easily develop into a race, with one party seeking a quid pro quo to 
balance what the other had taken, to the detriment of Norway's interests.29 
The Norwegian Secretary of the Interior therefore suggested to the 
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Foreign Secretary that an international agreement be drawn up to prevent 
a conflict before any great power had committed itself too deeply. Apart 
from the material advantages involved, if foreign sovereignty was to 
exclude the Norwegians, no one should fail to appreciate that the Nor­
wegian Government desired a clear definition of the Norwegian rights 
and duties in a territory which stood in such close relations to Norway. 
The Government considered it a disadvantage - if not a danger - that 
the political status of the islands in the Arctic should not have been settled 
on an internal basis, and it held the opinion that the best solution would 
be to declare the area international neutral territory.3o The application 
was, however, not answered, presumably owing to the growing tension 
between the two kingdoms and the Foreign Minister's rather stiff attitude 
to Norway.:ll 
The attitud e adopted by the Norwegian Government in 1871 and 
1892 was that, if the status quo could no longer be maintained, and the 
time had come to place Svalbard under the sovereignty of one individual 
state, then that state would have to be Norway. It was now feared in 
Oslo that one or other of the great powers might seize the territory. The 
expedient suggested to counter this was not, however, a Norwegian occu­
pation but a third alternative, namely an international agreement which 
made Svalbard neutral common territory. In this way Norwegian eco­
nomic interests would be secured, and a great power race for the islands, 
which might have unfortunate political consequences for Norway, would 
be prevented. In fact there was no great difference between the attitude 
adopted by the Government in 1871 and the one now adopted, but the 
situation was different; and as there was still no particular enthusiasm 
for the idea of a Norwegian occupation, this third solution, which aimed 
to preserve the status quo to the greatest extent possible, was adopted. 
Thus we see that at the turn of the century various alternatives were 
being discussed in the press of the nations most closely concerned, with 
a view to settling Svalbard's political status. The solution which received 
the greatest support in the Norwegian press was to make the archipelago 
neutral common territory by international agreement. But there were also 
many who maintained that Svalbard, which was Norwegian territory in 
former days, should once more be placed under Norwegian sovereignty. 
This alternative received a certain measure of support in other states as 
well, especially in Great Britain. In Swed en the idea of placing the archi­
pelago under joint Norwegian-Swedish-Russian supervision had been 
mooted, while a few Russian papers from time to time demanded that 
Russia should secure this territory. It is probable, however, that the rival­
ry and mutual distrust of the great powers would cause them to prefer a 
little nation like Norway acquiring the archipelago rather than letting it 
fall to one of themselves. 
Norwegian-Swedish Rivalry. 
A New Epoch in the History of the Archipelago. 
After the turn of the century Svalbard acquired greater economic 
significance. Coal mining now started, and at the same time hunting in­
creased. In several places Svalbard has surface coal deposits; some of 
the deposits were known to the whalers as early as at the beginning of 
the 17th century, and names from that period such as Coalhaven are a 
reminder of this. In the nineteenth century Norwegian crews brought some 
coal over to Norway from these open seam casts. Professor Keilhau 
pointed out that there were considerable deposits in the islands. Later on 
in the nineteenth century explorers discovered a great number of coal 
fields, but no regular workings were started. 
In the summer of 1899 the Norwegian sealing skipper S0ren Zacha­
riassen sailed to Svalbard and brought home from the open seam casts 
a cargo of coal. This was the start of coal mining in Vestspitsbergen. 
Zachariassen's initiative attracted considerable interest, and in the follow­
ing year several companies were formed in Norway for the purpose of 
starting mining operations in Svalbard.1 Upon application to the Nor­
wegian Government they were informed that only private occupations 
of land were allowed. Coal fields would have to be demarcated, and an 
exact definition of the area, together with a map, deposited with the 
Ministry of the Interior. Probably in imitation of the methods employed 
by the Germans on Bj0rn0ya, the expeditions which the companies sent 
north to prospect took with them wire, rope and iron stakes, which they 
used in some places to mark the boundaries of their areas, and they 
erected occupation placards bearing the names of the companies. A small 
amount of experimental working was done, but the Norwegians had no 
experience in this field, and it was difficult to raise the necessary capita\. 
They found it imposible to develop what had been started, and the best 
coal fields were soon in the hands of British and American business 
interests. A Bergen firm sold its claims in 1903 to an English company, 
the Spitsbergen Coal and Trading Company. The following year the 
richest coal fields on Adventfjorden, where a Trondheim Company had 
started experimental workings, was sold to an American financier John 
M. Longyear, an international mining speculator who had visited the is-
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lands in 1903 as a tourist. Together with Frederick Ayer from Boston, 
who had made a fortune from telephone companies, he formed the Arctic 
Coal Company with its head .office in Boston. A seventh part of the share 
capital, which totalled 100,000 dollars, was in Norwegian hands. 
The Spitsbergen Coal and Trading Company had its mines on the 
north side of Adventfjorden. The deposits here were not particularly good 
and harbor conditions were bad. After three years of experimental opera­
tion the company, which also had some difficulty with its workmen,2 had 
to cease working. On the south side of the fjord, where the Arctic Coal 
Company had its mines, conditions were more suitable, and here mining 
was continued. But it took four years before any export of note was 
achieved, and it proved necessary to use a great amount of capital before 
working became profitable. 
Most of the workmen in the British and American mines were Nor­
wegians, though there were also a number of Swedes and Fins. Engineers 
and foremen were usually of the same nationality as the companies. In 
these inhospitable regions coal mining was faced with many problems: 
working conditions were bad, and many disputes tended to arise between 
the companies and their employees. In the unfavorable climatic conditions 
it was difficult to compete with British coal, and there were many who 
believed that coal mining in Svalbard would not survive for long. Trans­
port costs to North Scandinavia and North Russia would, however, be 
lower for Svalbard coal than for the British product. These regions used 
considerable quantities, North Norway alone requiring 300,000 tons 
a year. 
The mining aroused great interest, and many expeditions came pro­
specting. In seven or eight years most of the coal-bearing areas were 
occupied.:3 Many new companies were formed, but only a very few got 
beyond the stage of experimental working, and some not even so far. 
Several interested parties approached the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
with inquiries as to how they should proceed in order to acquire property 
rights to land. In reply the Ministry stated that no definite laws for 
acquiring rights in no man's land had been laid down.4 However, certain 
common laws developed.5 The procedure followed was that placards were 
erected bearing the companies· names and the date of occupation, as well 
as specifying the area claimed. These placards were often signed by 
attesting witnesses; but they might easily be removed, and the area 
occupied anew by people who sometimes acted in good faith. In time 
it was demanded that there should be working going on in the occupied 
area, or at any rate that the occupation should be renewed at certain 
intervals, i. e. one would write the word "renewed" on the occupation 
placard, give the date and year, and have it signed by attesting witnesses. 
In some places a sort of fencing would be used, especially in the first 
period, to mark the boundaries of the various coal fields. The occupation 
was registered with the Foreign Ministry in the country of the occupying 
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party. This arrangement, however, was not very satisfactory. As the 
number of companies increased, disputes would arise regarding the 
boundaries between the various coal fields, with several people claiming 
the same area. The need for statutes for the acquisition of land, and an 
authority to settle disputes and register and notify appropriations, soon 
arose. 6 
After the turn of the century the number of Norwegians wintering 
in the archipelago increased.7 Hunters started to make considerable use 
of strychnine. This unpleasant method of hunting was not easily stopped, 
even after the Norwegian Government had forbidden the sale of poison 
for use in Svalbard. Stocks of animals decreased, and hunters had to 
venture far afield in order to find game. They soon fell foul of the mining 
companies, who claimed large areas of land, where they banned hunting. 
The hunters appealed to the authorities, demanding that Norway take the 
initiative in putting these matters right. But this proved no easy task. 
After a few years the tourist traffic also revived. It was now run 
mainly by Norwegian and German ships, though occasionally French and 
British ships also arrived. The tourists showed little regard for the fauna 
of the archipelago: a great number of reindeer were frequently shot 
merely for sport, the antlers being carried off as trophies and the carcass 
left to rot, to the annoyance of those who made a living by hunting. 
Norwegians still continued - though admittedly to a far smaller 
extent than before - to undertake hunting expeditions in the summer. 
There is no doubt that they often acted in a manner detrimental to the 
fauna and consequently to their own livelihood. As there were no hunting 
restrictions, hunters and trappers could easily be led to believe that there 
was no point in showing consideration, as others were hardly likely to 
do so. But it became obvious that if things were to continue as before, 
there was a danger that stocks of game would be seriously reduced. 
There were still a few Greenland whales left, and there were also 
certain species of whale in the Arctic Ocean which were too swift for 
the whalers to catch with the tackle used in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. When the harpoon came into use, considerable whaling activity 
developed off the coasts of Finnmark and Svalbard. In 1904 it was for­
bidden to shoot whale off the Norwegian coast. In the following years, 
whaling was therefore concentrated in the waters round Svalbard. 8 Both 
floating factories and land-based stations were used. Sometimes disputes 
arose as to harbor areas, and the whalers were accused -- as a rule with 
some justification - of indiscriminate hunting and egg gathering. 
The results, then, were that as human activities increased, so did 
disputes and acts of encroachment, and urgent need arose for a set of 
laws and regulations for the little community which was growing up. 
It was not sufficient that the people in Svalbard all belonged to some 
legally constituted state or other, and could be held responsible when they 
infringed the laws of their home country. 
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Opportunity for Norwegian Occupation. 
In view of the developments in Svalbard, one of the: first tasks of 
the newly organized Norwegian Foreign Service was to deal with this 
question. During the autumn of 1906 an exchange of views occurred both 
in the Norwegian press and in that of other interested states, as to what 
ought to be done to put right the utenable legal situation prevailing in 
the archipelago. Now, as previously, there were many Norwegians who 
considered that a Norwegian occupation would be the best and simplest 
arrangement. Others - and they represented possibly a larger and more 
influential body of opinion - preferred some form of international solu­
tion. Those who were interested in hunting and fishing would willingly 
have acquiesced in a Norwegian occupation of the archipelago. But the 
whalers, who might possibly exercise a greater influence, wanted con­
ditions to remain as they were. They feared, no doubt, that if Svalbard 
became Norwegian territory, their activity would be subject to regula­
tions - or even banned - as had happened in Norway. Scientists who 
were familiar with the conditions prevailing, however, stressed the neces­
sity of arriving at a settlement which would secure more ordered legal 
conditions and protect the fauna against ruthless exploitation; they 
recommended that a Norwegian occupation would be the best solution. 
There were probably also many people who adopted this attitude chiefly 
on patriotic grounds.! The sections of the press who represented business 
circles showed the greatest interest in the matter, which might suggest 
that it was primarily mining investments which caused the Svalbard 
question to be raised. This was indeed the case, and on this occasion 
the idea of a Norwegian occupation originated in Great Britain.2 
The mining of coal in Svalbard was still only in the experimental 
stage. The difficult and con fused conditions under which employers and 
employees alike were forced to work, could easily result in strikes and 
disturbances. The coal mining companies lacked the authority capahle of 
preserving the peace in a reassuring manner, and of settling disputes 
between the companies and the employees. In the summer of 1906 strikes 
occurred at both the British and American mines. The Spitsbergen Coal 
and Trading Company appealed to the Foreign Office with the request 
that the British Government take under its protection the area occupied 
by the company. If this were done, the simplest solution would be to 
appoint the works manager a representative of the state endowed with 
police authority. But the Foreign Office replied that it was not in a posi­
tion to accede to this request, as Svalbard was outside British jurisdiction. 
The company also applied to the Norwegian envoy in London, Fridtjof 
N ansen, to persuade him to get the Norwegian Government to undertake 
to preserve the peace in the archipelago, hut without success.:] The British 
company was supported by the leading conservative paper, the Morning 
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Post, which wrote in an editorial that Svalbard was an anomaly capable 
of creating international complication s. A glance at the map showed how 
n atural it was that it should belong to Norway. Anarchy reigned on the 
archipelago, and it was quite n atural for those who had economic in­
terests there to wish to submit to the govern ment of their Norwegian 
n eighbor, seeing that this n eighbor was a peaceful and well-organized 
state. There was considerable evidence to suggest that the archipelago 
was rich in useful minerals, and this should be reason enough for Norway 
to undertake this honorable burden, and to accede to a wish which was 
so general.4 
It was not surprisin g that those circles in Great Britain which were 
interested in coal mining in Svalbard should prefer a Norwegian occup­
ation to the condition s obtaining. Though the economic possibilities 
were considered favorable, there was every reason to thin k twice about 
investin g capital in mining ventures, as long as the political status of the 
archipelago was so uncertain an d law an d order so insecure. 
The Swedish press n ow disassociated itself, in marked contrast to 
its earlier attitude, from the idea that Svalbard should be placed un der 
Norway. Attention was drawn to the great work which Swedish explorers 
had done in Svalbard, an d it was stated that Sweden could n ot agree to 
the archipelago being occupied either by Norway or any other state. Some 
papers even went so far as to assert that Sweden , owing to her contri­
butions in the field of exploration, was the on ly state entitled to lay claim 
to the territory.5 
Viewed against the background of the unfavorable relation s obtain­
ing between the two countries after the dissolution of the union , it is n ot 
surprisin g that the Swedes were averse to the idea of Norway gaining 
an y advantages in the realm of foreign politics. The union had just 
foundered on the rock of Norway's demands for her own foreign service. 
It is thus easy to imagine that there were people in Sweden who regarded 
it as a matter of prestige to make certain that Norway did n ot en joy 
un due advantages in this field - least of all in question s affecting 
Swedish interests. Added to this was the fact that in circles connected 
with Swedish Arctic exploration , there was a very real interest in Sval­
bard, and a desire for the archipelago to continue as a no man's land, 
if it could not be allotted to Sweden , of which there was little or no 
possibility. 
The Russian press, too, disassociated itself from the idea of an y 
Norwegian occupation, but opposition appeared primarily to emanate 
from business circles, as was the case when the question was raised 
in 187 1.6 
Already several months before these views were aired in the press 
the Russian envoy in Oslo - admittedly only on his own initiative -
raised the question of Svalbard. On the basis of reports that British and 
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American capital had been invested in mInIng in the archipelago, he 
wished to know what attitude the Norwegian Government adopted, now 
that Norway was conducting an independent foreign policy.7 The answer 
he received seems to have been more than sufficiently favorable. He was 
able to report to his Government that, "The Foreign Minister has the 
honor of assuring the Imperial Legation that the Norwegian Government 
has always considered itself bound by the interpretation contained in the 
notes exchanged in 187 1 and 1872 on this subject, and that it will at all 
times continue to be bound by it".H 
On the occasion of the exchange of opinion about Svalbard in the 
press, the Swedish Minister in Oslo inquired of the Norwegian Govern­
ment what its attitude was in this question. But the Norwegian Govern­
ment had not yet properly discussed the matter; and the Minister was 
informed that an occupation had no actuality; if that possibility were to 
arise the powers interested would be informed.9 The Norwegian envoy 
in Stockholm was also instructed to give the same information to the 
Swedish Foreign Minister.lO 
Foreign Minister Lovland seems to have been in some doubt as to 
how far the Government should deal with this matter. As it had acquired 
so much interest, he considered it nevertheless necessary to summon a 
number of experts, so as to ascertain clearly what material interests Nor­
wegian nationals had in Svalbard. At this meeting it was agreed neces­
sary to draw up suitable penal and police regulations, as well as rules 
guaranteeing civilian rights, and it was considered of particular import­
ance to regulate hunting and land appropriations. The idea of setting up 
Norwegian police authority was mooted, but it was considered that this 
would be too expensive, and entail difficulties, owing to Svalbard's posi­
tion in international law. The idea of an occupation was also discussed, 
but it was agreed that this solution was not advisable for Norway, since 
it might lead to disagreement with other powers and would be expensive. 
But Norway ought to take the initiative in establishing an international 
settlement which would lay down certain rules, especially for mining, 
hunting and the occupation of land. If a settlement of this nature were 
arrived at, it should also include Bjornoya.l1 
The Norwegian Government seems to have shared the opinion which 
was expressed at the meeting. In the middle of February, 1907, it appro­
ached the powers which had participated in the exchange of notes about 
Svalbard in 187 1- 1872, and maintained that the lack of an established 
system of law and order, both in civil and criminal matters, had resulted in 
complaints being lodged both by Norwegians and nationals of other 
states. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, it would be an 
advantage to try to put right these unfortunate conditions by means of 
an international agreement; and it would like to hear the views of the 
other interested powers with regard to this question. It was expressly 
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stated that in making this appruach :'\of\\ay did not intend to raise the 
question of the position of the archipelagu as terra Ilullius, accessible to 
nationals of all states.12 
All the powers concerned , declared themselves willing to examine 
a proposal for an international settlement. and to cooperate in establish­
ing ip3 The Swedish Government, huw('\"er, made the reservation that 
any future system of control would have to be arranged internationally, 
so that no power acquired a paramount influence in the archipelago; 14 
and the Russian Government considered that it would be an ad vantage 
if the question could be postponed until the negotiations proceed ing for 
Norway's integrity and neutrality had been concluded.15 
During the summer of 1907 an event occurred which once more 
brought the question of occupation into the limelight. During the winter 
the British company had about sixty men, chiefly Norwegians, but also 
some Swedes, in the mines. The works manager was a former army 
officer who had difficulties in dealing \vith his workmen. Unfamiliar as 
he was with Scandinavian ways, he permitted the sale of beer and spirits 
at the plant, with the result that the workmen spent nearly all their 
earnings on drink. Quarrels and strikes ensued; the most important issue 
was the fare.16When the works manager, in an attempt to re-establish 
law and order, threatened to use armed force, the result was that he 
had to take refuge in his own house. 
Under such conditions it was impossible to get much work done. 
As the time approached when the company's ship was expected to sail 
north, the workers gave the works manager to understand that they 
would seize the ship and take everyone back to Norway, where they 
would charge him in a court of law with failure to pay their wages. The 
works manager, however, managed to send a letter to his American 
colleague, who delivered it on board to the directors of the British com­
pany when their ship arrived at the beginning of June. They immediately 
returned to Norway17 and requested the British envoy in Oslo to have 
a naval vessel sent north. But he was on ly in a position to inform the 
British Government of what had occurred . Through the British Consul 
at Troms0 the directors also appealed to the Norwegian Government to 
send troops or police to maintain order among the workers on the trip 
back to Norway. But it was found that there were no grounds for acced­
ing to the company's request. 
The company then approached the foreign Office, but the British 
Government was in no case willing to do more than dispatch a naval 
vessel to take off British subjects. foreign Secretary Grey d iscussd 
the question with Nansen, and suggested that Norway should send a 
naval vessel or troops north to re-establish law and order. Norway was, 
in his opinion, the right country to undertake a step of this nature, be­
cause it lay nearest geographically. Great Britain would if necessary 
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support Norway, should any state, e. g. Russia, make objections. Nansen 
says in his report: "The interpretation I was forced to put on Sir Edward 
Grey's words was that, if we were interested in linking Spitsbergen more 
closely to Norway, then this was an opportunity of which we might pos­
sibly take ad vantage , and one in which we could, in case of difficulty, rely 
on England's support. He repeated several times that England had no 
interest in claiming jurisdiction over Spitsbergen, and that Norway was 
geographically closest".18 
The company meanwhile managed to transport its people to Norway, 
where the contracts had been entered into, and where the question of 
breach of contract could be decided. The Norwegian courts were, how­
ever, unable to decide the question of mutiny, as the incident had occurred 
outside Norwegian territory, and the dispute was between Norwegian, 
Swedish and British citizens. 
The British reluctance to act was partly due to fear of provoking 
Russia. British foreign policy had in recent years aimed at coming to 
terms with Russia,19 and so much progress had now been made in this 
direction, that negotiations were going on for an agreement respecting 
Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. It is possible that a British move in Sval­
bard at this time would have had unfortunate consequences, and it is not 
likely that the British Government would have gone far in its support of 
Norway, should a Norwegian occupation have led to a Russian protest. 
No difficulties, however, were to be expected as far as Russia was 
concerned, and of this the Norwegian Government was informed. In the 
Russian Foreign Ministry it had been clearly stated that a Norwegian 
occupation of the archipelago would be the best and simplest solution. 
But in this event Norway would have to be a neutral country, in which 
case the archipelago would also be neutral territory. For that reason the 
Russian Foreign Ministry had suggested that Svalbard should be included 
in the neutrality negotiations. The Norwegian envoy in St. Petersburg, 
however, advised against this, giving as his reasons that it would com­
plicate negotiations, and provide an opportunity for those parties, anxious 
to defeat their ends, to make objections.20 The Russians acquiesced to 
this view, and as it was considered that the above-mentioned solution of 
the Svalbard question would be rendered easier if Norway's neutrality 
was a fact, the Russian Government suggested that the matter be post­
poned until the neutrality negotiations had been concluded.21 The Russian 
Minister in Oslo also made it clear to Foreign Secretary L0vland that his 
Government had no objection to Norway acquiring Svalbard.22 
The war with Japan and the domestic crisis which ensued had 
greatly weakened Russia. For that reason she was for the moment pur­
suing a cautious foreign policy, also in the Arctic. While at the same 
time conscious of their own weakness, the Russians seemed to fear that 
the investment of British and American capital in Svalbard might have 
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political consequences.23 Viewed against this background the attitude of 
the Russian Government is understandable. Moreover, if the Russians 
were anxious to drive a wedge between Norway and Sweden it might 
be expedient to encourage an active Norwegian policy on the archipelago. 
France followed Russia's lead in the Svalbard question,24 and would 
most probably have adopted a similar attitude with regard to a Nor­
wegian occupation. 
If the Norwegian Government already at this juncture had kept the 
United States informed of the matter - which might have been reason­
able, in view of the American mining activities - there is reason to 
believe that this country would also have recommended, or consented to, 
the archipelago being placed under Norway. In any case the American 
envoy in Oslo considered that this would be the best solution.25 And if 
the American mining companies had been given certain guarantees for 
their working, they were not likely to raise serious objections.26 With 
regard to the attitude of the Danish, Dutch and German Governments 
to a Norwegian occupation, there is little material on which to base an 
opinion, as there is no evidence that these Governments had given the 
question any consideration at this time. At best, Norway might have 
expected them to adopt an attitude similar to the one they had taken 
in 1871. 
All things considered, Norway seems to have had a very good 
opportunity of acquiring the archipelago on this occasion, but this could 
only have been achieved at the cost of deterioration in her relations with 
Sweden. These had now become very strained in the course of the nego­
tiations Norway was conducting with the European great powers for a 
treaty of neutrality and integrity, to which Sweden was opposed. 
The Norwegian Government, however, did not wish to acquire the 
islands, partly in view of the expenses involved, partly in view of possible 
conflicts with other states. Foreign Minister L0vland planned to submit 
a proposal for an international settlement to the effect that each of the 
powers concerned was to enforce and maintain, as far as its own nationals 
was concerned, regulations agreed upon.27 But he subscribed to the views, 
which had originally been expressed by the Norwegian envoy in St. 
Petersburg that the matter should be postponed until negotiations for a 
treaty of neutrality and integrity had been concluded. 
Mining had created a new situation with an increased need for a 
system of law and order, and this was the first problem which faced the 
Norwegian Government. Otherwise it seemed to wish to continue the Arc­
tic policy which Norway had adopted at the end of the 1890's, and, on the 
whole, it was hardly reasonable to expect a more active policy. It was 
still uncertain whether mining would prove profitable, and there were 
reasons to doubt whether Norway would enjoy any advantages in acquir­
ing the archipelago. The Government had always feared that a Nor-
4 
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wegian regime in Svalbard might involve d isputes with other states. This 
possibility would have to be given serious consideration at a time when 
a foreign policy had been adopted, which aimed to have the country's 
neutrality and integrity guaranteed, and subsequently to limit Norway's 
participation in international politics as much as possible, with a view 
to avoiding d isputes with other powers and to prevent the country being 
used as a pawn in power politics.2 8 If Norway at this juncture had laid 
claim to sovereignty over Svalbard, it would have conflicted with the 
main principles of the foreign policy which the Government had adopted .  
Yet Norway was interested i n  her nationals being allowed t o  retain their 
right to carry on their traditional occupations in the Arctic, as these 
played an important role, especially for the more northerly parts of the 
country. Norway was further interested in seeing that the Arctic island s 
should not become a bone of contention among the great powers. These 
possibilities had been considered by the Government in 1892 and 1899, 
and steps had been taken - admittedly of various kinds - to prevent 
their occurrence. Foreign Secretary L0vland also seems to have reckoned 
with the possibility of a great power attempting to occupy the archipe­
lago, and he considered that Norway ought to protest if this ever occurred. 
By and large he maintained the traditional Norwegian attitude that either 
the status quo should be retained as far as possible, or that Svalbard 
should be allotted to Norway.2 9 He d id not seem to realize that a Nor­
wegian protest would hardly carry much weight if one of the great powers 
d ecided to seize the archipelago. On the whole one is left with the im­
pression that the Government had not weighed the problem very 
thoroughly. 
Norwegian Proposal for International Arrangement. 
In March, 1908, there was a change of government in Norway, and 
Consul-General Wilhelm Christophersen became Foreign Minister. He 
was a man with long experience in the Foreign Service. It is possible 
that he was not persona grata in Swed en, though as Foreign Minister, 
Sweden was the country with which he was to d eal most. But there are 
no ground s for believing that he d id not d esire good relations and a 
measure of cooperation between the Nordic countries, provided this was 
d one in a way that brought no dishonor to Norway. 
A few months after the new Government had taken power it ap­
proached the other interested states suggesting that they should give their 
d iplomatic representatives in Oslo instructions to d iscuss with the Nor­
wegian Government the measures which should be taken in order to put 
right the unfavorable conditions in Svalbard , and to work out a proposal 
for an international agreement. This could then be submitted to the 
Government of the various countries. It believed that the conference 
would have to d elimit the geographical area subject to the agreement, and 
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declare that area a no man's land open to nationals of all countries. 
It would further have to decide on civil law and rules of procedure; an 
arrangement for punishing crimes and misdemeanors and rules for police 
supervision would also have to be worked out, and finally regulations 
for covering the expenses of the administration must be agreed on.1 
All the states declared themselves willing to participate in a con­
ference of this nature in Os10.2 In the Russian Foreign Ministry, how­
ever, it was felt that the program which the Norwegian Government had 
submitted was too general. In order to arrive at a solution of the problem 
mentioned, the Conference would probably have to sit for a long time, 
possibly for a whole year. Many problems would arise which the dele­
gates would have to report to their own governments for clarification, 
before making a decision.3 And in its answer the Russian Government 
stated that the program was so complicated that it would require a detailed 
study. It desired, therefore, that the Norwegian Government should submit 
a more detailed program for the questions that were to be dealt with, and 
propose a solution. Not until this was done would the Russian Govern­
ment be in a position to give its envoy in Oslo the necessary instructions.4 
The German Government considered that the conferences should con­
centrate on an investigation into conditions in Svalbard, and then submit 
proposals as to what might be done to improve the situation. These could 
then be studied in detail by the respective governments.5 The Swedish 
Foreign Minister was not particularly interested in a conference, which 
in his opinion would be unable to achieve much.6 The Swedish answer 
otherwise contained points of view similar to those of the German reply, 
and in essence suggested that the conference should only be preliminary.i 
In Oslo it was feared that the Swedish Government was working against 
the conference and trying to influence the German Government;8 and the 
possibility was entertained that these two governments had conferred 
with one another before replying to the Norwegian invitation. 
At this juncture the United States also joined in the negotiations. 
The Norwegian Government had omitted to apply to Washington, despite 
the fact that the Americans were interested in mining in Svalbard, because 
it considered it most appropriate to approach the states which had for­
merly negotiated about the archipelago, and it regarded the Svalbard 
question a European problem which the American Government might 
not wish to become involved in.9 But the American Government would 
have appreciated being approached in this matter at the same time as 
the other interested powers,10 and at the instigation of the American 
company which mined coal in Svalbard, it made a request to Norway in 
the autumn of 1908 for participation in any conference that might be 
held. The attitude of the United States was expressed as follows: "The 
attitude of the United States towards the matter rests solely upon the 
apparent preponderance of actual American interests in the islands which 
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seem to justify its participation so far as to ensure equal respect for 
their interests on the same footing as the interests of any other nation­
ality. Following its general precedent with regard to political and admini­
strative questions of a non-American geographical character the Govern­
ment of the United States could not be a party to any arrangement in­
volving responsibility for the administration of the islands, and has no 
suggestion to make in that regard either as to the constitution of some 
scheme of local control or as to the delegation of supervision to a man­
datory. In short the attitude of the United States rests upon the prin­
ciple which so far appears to find favor with other governments, of 
treating the islands as logically and in fact terra nullius."l1 
The Norwegian Government immediately approached the other in­
terested powers to find out whether they had any objection to the United 
States being party to the negotiations, and when they had all given their 
consent,12 Norway sent an official invitation to Washington. In its answer 
the American Government declared that it could only participate in nego­
tations on condition that the United States did not become a conventional 
signatory to any arrangement, made by European Governments, which 
would imply contributory participation in any obligation or responsibility 
for the enforcement of whatsoever scheme of administration of the islands. 
The sole object of the Government of the United States was the reser­
vation and assurance of whatever legitimate rights possessed by American 
citiens in the Islands and the same opportunities therein for Americans 
as other nationals might enjoy.13 
The Russian Minister in Oslo repeated to Foreign Minister Christo­
phersen what he had previously said to Mr. L0vland, viz. that Russia would 
have no objection to Svalbard being placed under Norway. But the 
Knudsen Government, which was now in power, does not seem to have 
considered this possibility. Like its predecessor it continued to maintain 
that the archipelago should remain terra nullius, and the Russian Minister 
began to express himself with greater caution.14 
The Norwegian Government was now faced with a choice between 
the procedure suggested by the Swedish and German Governments -
viz. that the conference should only be of a preliminary nature - and 
compliance with the Russian request for a more detailed program for the 
negotiations. The latter alternative was chosen, thus keeping the initiative 
in Norway's hands. 
It was soon apparent that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had 
undertaken a very exacting task. Attempts were made to find models in 
the agreements for condominium which had been concluded in recent 
years,15 but there were few points which could be adapted to the peculiar 
conditions obtaining in Svalbard. 
In the spring of 1909, however, a result had been achieved, and it 
was possible to issue a memoire on the subject. In this the questions which 
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the Norwegian Government had previously suggested as a basis for nego­
tiations, had been subjected to a more detailed investigation. It was 
suggested that the geographical area to be dealt with should include all 
islands between 10° and 35° longitude East and 74° and 8 10 latitude 
North, and that in order to promote the economic exploitation of these 
islands, and out of humanitarian considerations for the people resident 
there, the interested powers should set up a system of law based on the 
presumption that the archipelago remained no man's land. This legal 
system should be based on the principle that subjects of all states should 
have the same right to stay in the islands, exploit their natural resources 
and carry out scientific research. In the opinion of the Norwegian Govern­
ment one could not apply the laws of all the various states whose natio­
nals frequented Svalbard. Nearly every single case might then have to 
be judged differently. On the other hand, there seemed little point in 
drawing up special laws for the area. The best solution would be to 
choose the laws of one single state, with the amendments and additions 
which might be rendered necessary by the special conditions obtaining in 
Svalbard. 
With regard to judicial procedures two methods were suggested: 
The first was to use the law courts in the home country of the defendant, 
the second was to use the courts of one single state. These two alterna·· 
tives were discussed in greater detail in the memoire, and the Norwegian 
Government reached the conclusion that it would be best to entrust judi­
cial procedures to a single state.16 
It was furthermore pointed out that it would be necessary to establish 
a police authority in the area. This, it was assumed, should be organized 
on an international basis. The memoire contained, in addition, detailed 
regulations for the acquiring of landj17 and the need for working out 
protective rules for game was emphasized as well as certain regulations 
with regard to health, working conditions, and postal service. The ex­
pense of an arrangement should be covered by taxes, dues and fines. 
Any sum thus not covered could be apportioned among the powers on an 
agreed scale. 
By a detailed study of the case, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
came to the conclusion that an alternative, whereby the powers under­
took jointly the organization of a legal system in Svalbard, would entail 
considerable difficulties. Nor would a solution of this nature be parti­
cularly satisfactory to Norway. As far as the Arctic expeditions were 
concerned, there was no need to create a legal system, as there were no 
grounds to fear that these expeditions would clash with other interests 
in the archipelago. The same could be said of the tourists who only 
stayed a short time in the area. It was primarily the circumstance that a 
number of people exploited Svalbard's natural resources, or lived there 
for economic purposes, which would be decisive in the deliberations of 
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the powers. In the previous 50 or 60 years only Norwegian nationals hau 
made a livelihood by hunting in the territory, or had carried on fishing 
or whaling in the adjoining waters, with stations on land. Most of the 
mine-workers, too, were Norwegians, and North Norway was geographic­
ally closest to Svalbard. It could therefore be assumed that mainly Nor­
wegians would make use of a legal system in the archipelago. The best 
code of laws for their purpose would be one which was based on the 
principles of Norwegian law, used their own language and was admi­
nistered from Norway. In certain cases it would be an advantage for 
everyone staying in Svalbard to have access to the law courts in the state 
which was closest to the archipelago. In consideration of the above­
mentioned circumstances, the Norwegian Government stated that it re­
garded it as its duty to declare itself willing to undertake the j uris­
diction of the territory, if it should be agreed to entrust this task to one 
single state.IS 
Shortly after the Norwegian proposal had been handed to the in­
terested powers, the Swedish Government protested against the clause 
in which Norway offered to undertake the jurisdiction, and referred to 
earlier correspondence in this matter. It was also a bad omen that the 
British envoy in Oslo requested the Norwegian Government not to fix 
any date for the conference for the time being.19 
The Swedish Government Takes the Initiative. 
Four years after the dissolution of the union there was apparently 
still some bitterness felt in Sweden, particularly among conservative 
circles in the upper classes, a bitterness which had been increased by the 
treaty of integrity which Norway had concluded, and the negotiations 
leading up to it. The press in the two countries, especially in Sweden, was 
not prepared to bury the hatchet and strike a more friendly note,l and 
it was not until 1909-10, under the impact of the threatening world 
situation, that a change for the better was discernible.2 
In Norway there were many people who did not feel secure, even 
though the leading great powers had guaranteed the integrity of the 
country.:3 In the spring of 1908 a pamphlet was published which em­
phasized the necessity for fortifying the west bank of the river Glomma, 
and this view aroused considerable attention. The pamphlet had been 
submitted to the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence before being 
published, and there is no doubt that it was sanctioned on Government 
level.4 Under the circumstances it was difficult to establish good colla­
boration between the two countries, even though many people realized 
that from the practical point of view this was both necessary and 
desirable.5 
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As far as the Svalbard negotiations were concerned, they were bound 
to be complicated by the number of participants. The international 
situation was marked to a great extent by an armaments race, and mutual 
distrust.6 No wonder that the international tension made itself felt in some 
form or another in this question too, even though none of the great 
powers, with the possible exception of Russia, was particularly interested 
in Svalbard. On the other hand it would appear that the great powers 
participating in the negotiations were anxious to give it as little promi­
nence as possible, and it was soon evident that the greatest difficulty 
would be to achieve agreement between Norway and Sweden. 
In 1871 it had been agreed that Svalbard should be given to Norway, 
because the archipelago geographically belonged to Norway, many of 
whose people were in the habit of frequenting the arctic regions, and had 
from time immemorial been engaged in fishing, hunting and sealing in 
Svalbard. Since those times Norwegian interests in the archipelago had 
increased, and for that reason the attitude which had been adopted in 
1871 still seemed to hold good. It is easy, however, to understand that 
other points of view were given prominence in Sweden after the dis­
solution of the union. Swedish explorers had also done a good deal work 
in Svalbard in the years which had elapsed since the exchange of notes 
in 1871-72. But apart from a few men working in the mines, Swedish 
nationals had as yet no economic interests in the area, and there was no 
denying that, from a political and strategic point of view, Svalbard was 
more important to Norway than to Sweden. Sweden's interests in the 
archipelago were based first and foremost on the fact that no other nation 
had to date undertaken such extensive scientific research, and the Swedes 
naturally enough did not fail to emphasize this in newspapers and 
periodicals. i 
When Arvid Lindman reconstructed his government in March, 1909, 
the Swedish envoy in Berlin, Count Arvid Taube, was appointed Foreign 
Minister. Taube was a man in the late 50's. Apart from his civilian 
profession, he had also undergone military training and held the rank 
of major. In his social and political views he was conservative. In foreign 
policy he was a germanophile, and was consequently eager to proI1lote 
closer cooperation between Germany and Sweden; and while he was 
envoy in Berlin he became good friends with Foreign Minister Wilhelm 
von Schoen. Count Taube had not forgotten the events of 1905; they 
constituted a grave reduction of Sweden's might, and a great measure 
of compliance to Norway. In view of these circumstances, he considered 
it improper that the Norwegians set aside Swedish interests in the Arctic. 
by taking the lead in negotiations about Svalbard, where the Swedes, 
above all other nations, had made an outstanding contribution to scientific 
research - Svalhard, which was linked to the proudest traditions of 
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Swedish Polar exploration - no, that honor should and must belong to 
Sweden.8 As Foreign Minister, his immediate task was to ensure that the 
initiative passed into the hands of the Swedish Government; and he re­
ceived some support, especially from certain scientific circles, in pursuing 
an energetic policy.9 
The standpoint adopted by Foreign Minister Taube was in essence 
that it would be impossible for Swedish opinion to accept an arrangement 
whereby the jurisdiction of Svalbard was handed over to Norway. This 
was not merely an argument. It would have created a little irritation in 
Sweden, but it was after all only one of the two alternatives Norway had 
proposed. Perhaps Taube feared that if a conference were convened with 
the aim of reaching a settlement on the basis of the Norwegian proposal, 
then the majority of the representatives would find it most expedient to 
hand jurisdiction over to Norway. He suggested that Norway and Sweden 
should in advance agree on a proposal for a settlement. If they reached 
an agreement, the other states would not raise any objections to it. As 
far as Russia was concerned, King Gustaf could discuss the matter with 
the Czar when he paid a return visit to the Russian capita\. This proce­
dure would obviously give Sweden the greatest chance, because the 
Swedish Government would be able to make its influence felt more 
strongly in the negotiations with Norway alone, that at an international 
conference attended by several great powers. Moreover, Taube intended, 
according to his own statement, to exploit this matter so as to establish 
cooperation between Norway and Sweden in the field of foreign politics.tO 
The Swedish plan was submitted to or perhaps worked out in con­
sultation with the British Minister in Stockholm, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 
who tried to persuade his colleagues in Stockholm to suggest a similar 
procedure to their Governments. The British envoy was primarily con­
cerned with the increasing tension between Great Britain and Germany. 
He believed that the Swedes were definitely germanophile, and at the 
same time he was inclined to attach considerable importance to their 
bitterness towards Norway.ll In view of this, Spring Rice would be in­
clined to fear that, in the event of a world war, Sweden would side with 
Germany in order to strengthen her position. The most favorable alter­
native as far as Great Britain was concerned would then be to work 
toward effecting good cooperation between the Scandinavian countries, 
and as far as possible to seek to wean them from Germany, with a view 
to achieving Swedish neutrality in the event of a future conflict. 
The Spitsbergen Coal and Trading Company, the only British com­
pany which had undertaken mining in Svalbard, stopped working in the 
autumn of 1908 and tried to sell its mines. Great Britain therefore had 
only negligible interests on the archipelago, and in these circumstances it 
was natural for the British Government to try to avoid a conference in 
Oslo, where the enmity between Norway and Sweden might be increased, 
and where Germany might possibly increase her prestige.12 For similar 
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reasons Great Britain had declined to participate in a Balkan conference 
in the autumn of 1908. Moreover, it seemed that within the ranks of 
European diplomacy there was at that time little faith in conferences, if 
the question to be debated had not been more or less decided before the 
participants assembled. For this reason it is easy to understand why the 
British Government wanted the states most interested - Norway, Sweden 
and Russia -- to reach an agreement before any conference was convened. 
The attitude of the German Government to the actual question was, 
in essence, that the matter was of no particular importance to Germany. 
The German Foreign Ministry was apparently inclined to accept the 
Norwegian plan. It was hoped that the arrangement would be as simple 
as possible, and give rise to few difficulties, and that the costs should 
be kept down to a minimum. The German views coincided in this respect 
with the British. A rumor that Germany supported Sweden was denied 
by the German Minister in Oslo, who declared that his instructions were 
to remain neutral in any conflict which might arise between Norway and 
Sweden.13 At the Russian Legation in Oslo the Norwegian memoire was 
well received, but before it was studied in St. Petersburg an incident 
occurred which created annoyance in the Russian Foreign Ministry. 
In order to manoeuvre the negotiations along the lines he wanted, 
Foreign Minister Taube suggested that Norway and Sweden should 
jointly request the British and German Governments to instruct the ship­
ping companies which sent tourist ships to Svalbard to see to it that 
their passengers abstained from indiscriminate hunting. Before he appro­
ached the Norwegian Government he had made inquiries in London and 
Berlin, and had been informed that the plan would be favorably received.14 
Taube motivated this move vis-a-vis the Norwegian Government by stat­
ing that it would in any case take some time before answers to the Nor­
wegian memorandum could be expected. It would therefore be necessary 
to arrive at a temporary arrangement which would put an end to the 
indiscriminate slaughter of game of which the tourists were guilty, as 
many Swedish scientists were anxious to see something done to preserve 
the fauna of the archipelago.15 
Even though Foreign Minister Christophersen had entertained suspi­
cions that neither humanitarian regard for the fauna nor considerations 
of good neighborliness were Count Taube's main motives, the question 
was a delicate one, and a refusal might easily cause criticism of the 
Norwegian Government. On the other hand, Norway was on uncertain 
ground in thus forestalling one of the main problems to be discussed at 
the conference while the other states were studying the Norwegian 
memorandum. The Norwegian Government decided nevertheless to 
acquiesce in the Swedish suggestion, and at the same time gave instruc­
tions to Norwegian shipping lines that they were to see that tourists 
.-:bstained from indiscriminate hunting. As expected, both the German and 
the British Government replied favorably. Foreign Secretary Grey seemed 
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in fact to be especially pleased, for he remarked when the Norwegian 
an the Swedish envoys came together to hand him their governments' 
notes: "I am very pleased to see both of you coming here together for 
the first time".16 Whether the Swedish envoy, Count Herman Wrangel, 
was equally pleased is another question. Sometime later, however, the 
British Government stated that the extermination of game was due to 
Norwegian trappers using poison. The Norwegian Government had al­
ready investigated these circumstances, and in the autumn of 1909 
measures were enforced which prevented the sale of poison for hunting. 
The Russian Government. however, felt that it had been neglected, 
and protested against the steps Norway and Sweden had taken.1i The 
Russian envoy in Oslo declared that Norway and Russia had agreed not 
to take any action in the Svalbard case without having discussed it be­
tween themselves in advance. But the Norwegian Government knew of 
no such agreement: a conversation had taken place between Foreign 
Minister J0rgen L0vland and Nlinister Anatol Kroupensky, in which the 
two gentlemen seem to have misunderstood one another.18 Kroupensky 
had moreover expressed himself so ambiguously on this matter to his 
Swedish colleague Baron Gustav Falkenberg, that in Stockholm, Norway 
was suspected of collusion with Russia behind Sweden's back, and it was 
believed that the two powers had jointly worked out the memorandum 
which the Norwegian Government had issued.19 This misunderstanding 
was now cleared up. 
Foreign Minister Taube was anxious lest the Norwegian Government 
be disinclined for further cooperation, and suggested that Norway and 
Sweden should act openly, and inform one another of the steps they took. 
Foreign Minister Christophersen agreed to this; but he made the reser­
vation that his statement must not be interpreted as an agreement to any 
form of collusion between Norway and Sweden. The Norwegian Govern­
ment must remain loyal to all the interested powers, keep them all equally 
informed, and formally adopt the same attitude in its dealings with all 
of them.20 Moreover, the procedure adopted by Foreign Minister Taube, 
first approaching Great Britain and then Norway in the question of pro­
tecting fauna, tended to show a certain disparity between theory and 
practice. Taube repeatedly stated that in this case it was not so much a 
question of the actual issue at stake, as the desire to initiate cooperation 
between the two countries,2! but he surely wanted to see Sweden as the 
leading partner. 
The annoyance which had been felt in the Russian Foreign Ministry 
was assuaged when Norway and Sweden sent notes explaining the matter 
in greater detail. There is, nevertheless, reason to believe that Norway 
had been somewhat discredited for her demarche in Berlin and London. 
In the Russian Foreign Ministry the matter came under the Director of 
the Second Bureau, Alfred Bentkovsky, and he was decidedly less friendly 
after the affair. whatever the reaS'Jn for this might have been.22 
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A Diplomatic Tug-of-War. 
In international politics it is perhaps more important than in any 
other sphere to distinguish between the actual motives for an action and 
those officially given. When expressions are toned down, and selfish 
motives are disguised so as to acquire a more acceptable form from the 
legal and the humanitarian point of view, it is possible initially to recon­
cile contraries. In this way one can win sympathy for one's cause and the 
support of public opinion, but when the real motives are revealed, a proce­
dure of this nature is apt to create a mistrust that renders further colla­
boration more difficult. Diplomacy often proceeds by circuitous paths, 
and to a certain extent this also is true in this case. 
The procedure of the Swedish Government seems to have been 
essentially conditioned by the fact that it was unwilling to grant Norway 
any special position as far as the jurisdiction and the administration of 
the archipelago was concerned. It was possibly also believed that, should 
the interested states once choose Norway as the administrator, then it 
would not be long before the archipelago became Norwegian territory. 
After Taube had become Foreign Minister, it was fairly soon clear that 
Sweden was endeavoring to take the lead in the negotiations, and was 
keen to have the conference held in Stockholm.! When the first steps in 
this direction were made with the demarche concerning the fauna, Taube 
decided to submit a Swedish proposal. But the game affair showed that 
it was necessary to include Russia.2 The procedure would then be that 
Norway and Sweden should first agree, and afterwards approach Russia 
jointly. When these three states had reached an agreement about a pro­
posal, this should be submitted to the other interested powers at a con­
ference. Foreign Minister Taube's preparations were well laid. During 
the Czar's visit to Stockholm in the summer of 1909, he explained his 
views to Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky, who accompanied the 
monarch.3 As the Swedish suggestion appealed more to Russia than the 
Norwegian one did, it was not surprising that the Russian Foreign 
Minister preferred to support Sweden. 
There was no opposition to be feared from the other interested 
parties - so much Taube had ascertained. He now informed Foreign 
Minister Christophersen that he would immediately submit a proposal 
which the Norwegian and Swedish Governments could discuss. At the 
same time he emphasized that his main concern in taking this step was 
to promote good relations between Norway and Sweden. Christophersen 
was incautious enough to declare that the Norwegian Government would 
deal with the Swedish proposal on the basis of a desire for good relations. 
This seems to have given Taube the impression that Norway was willing 
to allow Sweden to take the initiative in this matter. The Norwegian 
Government also remained inactive for some time, while the Swedes 
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prepared their case in London and Berlin, where the argument could be 
used that the Norwegian Government had already declared itself willing 
to accept the Swedish proposal. 
In a memorandum to Norway, Sweden declared that it would ad­
mittedly be simplest for one state to assume and exercise jurisdiction, as 
though Svalbard were a part of its own territory, but that an arrangement 
of this nature was incompatible with the status of the archipelago as no 
man's land, while for practical purposes it was not necessary to establish 
a detailed organization. What was needed was a legal set-up which would 
guarantee protection for human life and property. In addition, hunting 
and fishing must be controled. It should be possible to arrange these 
matters on an international basis. Norway, Sweden and Russia, on the 
grounds of their geographical position and their participation in the ex­
ploration and economic exploitation of the archipelago, would be most 
capable of working out an arrangement. The Swedish Government con­
sidered that the legal questions arising in the archipelago should as far 
as possible be settled according to the laws of the country of origin of 
the interested parties, and by their courts of law. Only in cases where 
this was not possible, should special laws be drawn up and a special 
court of law be set up for civil jurisdiction. To this end a court could 
be set up at the Norwegian town Troms0 with one Norwegian, one 
Swedish and one Russian member, who could meet in the summer, each 
member taking it in turn to preside over the court. One of the members 
would be entrusted with the task of registration. The tribunal should be 
competent in matters respecting the appropriation of land. The rules for 
this and also for hunting and fishing should be laid down on an inter­
national basis. Crimes should be tried by the courts in the country of 
origin of the accused, and minor offenses by a police authority on the 
spot, the latter to be appointed by the Svalbard tribunal and be an agency 
thereof. In this way the police would have an international character. 
The expenses incurred by the organization would be covered by dues and 
fines, if necessary by grants from Norway, Sweden and Russia. The eco­
nomic administration would be placed under the Svalbard tribunal.4 Thus 
the reply of the Swedish Government to the Norwegian plan took the 
form of a counter-proposal. 
No answers were received from the other powers. The British 
Government announced that it did not intend to submit a reply, and 
demanded unconditionally that the three states most interested should 
reach an arrangement before a conference was convened, otherwise no 
results would be achieved by a conference. It would only lead to increased 
tension among the powers.5 There might also be another reason for the 
British attitude. It appears as if some Swedes suspected the British of 
pursuing a policy vis-a-vis Norway which had been uRfavorable to 
Swedish interests. In this respect it might be sufficient to recall the atti-
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tude of the Swedish press - especially the Conservative press6 - to 
Great Britain during the negotiations on Norway's Treaty of Integrity. 
It is possible therefore that the British Government wished to some extent 
to put this right by supporting Sweden against Norway in the impending 
caseJ Moreover, if negotiations between Sweden, Norway and Russia did 
produce a favorable result, this cooperation might contribute to creating 
better understanding between the three states, and this might in turn 
influence Sweden's attitude to Russia.s 
The Norwegian envoy in Berlin got the impression that Foreign 
Minister von Schoen was not particularly enthusiastic about the Swedish 
proposal, even though he had accepted it at the urgent request of the 
Swedish Government. It is improbable that Germany favored Russian 
participation in the administration of Svalbard, or foresaw any advantage 
in Scandinavian-Russian cooperation. On the whole the German Govern­
ment showed less interest in the matter than did the British. But in Berlin, 
too, it was possible to view Norwegian-Swedish cooperation with appro­
val. Taube's desire for close political cooperation between Sweden and 
Germany was well-known; and there was the possibility that Sweden, in 
the event of Scandinavian cooperation, might be able to draw Norway 
in the same direction. Foreign Minister von Schoen stated on several 
occasions that his Government was anxious to avoid offending anyone, 
and merely wished to assist in solving the problem, as Germany had 
little interest in Svalbard. Personally he was of the opinion that Sweden 
was being unduly insistent, and he believed that there was some dissatis­
faction in Stockholm at the lead Norway had taken in this matter.9 
The Russian Government agreed with the Swedish proposal; the 
Norwegian Government could not expect any support for its own pro­
posal in those quarters. In view of the strong position which Russia as a 
great power would have on the Svalbard tribunal, she might, in fact, 
derive the greatest advantage from the Swedish proposal.!o 
Belgium, Denmark and Holland adopted apparently a passive and 
neutral attitude. So did France, as long as this could be done without 
antagonizing Russia.!! 
Foreign Minister Taube's emphatic statement, that he wished above 
all to promote good relations between Norway and Sweden, won approval 
both in London and Berlin, because it appeared that both Great Britain 
and Germany, probably from differing evaluations and reasons, were 
anxious for good relations between Norway and Sweden. It would there­
fore be unfortunate if the Norwegian Government acted in a way that 
might suggest stubbornness. 
Besides, as the smaller powers, in view of the increasing inter­
national tension, had every reason to stick together, it was neither in 
Norway's nor in Sweden's interest to preserve a stiff attitude to one an­
other, and cooperation with Norway was an old idea in Swedish policy. 
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In the impending situation, Sweden would thus with greater confidence 
be able to face the situation in the east, where the Aland problem was 
still unsolved; and in some quarters it was believed that Russia would 
not view with displeasure a cleavage between Norway and Sweden.12 
There is therefore little reason to doubt that Foreign Minister Taube 
really desired better relations between the two countries. But whether 
that was the primary motive for the energy he displayed in this matter, 
may be questioned. From a Norwegian point of view, there was reason 
to examine how a cooperation of the kind envisaged by Count Taube 
would work - whether it would take into consideration who had the 
greatest material interests in Svalbard, and be based on equality and 
mutual respect, or whether it would reflect the difference in size of 
population and strength between the two countries. 
In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry there seems to have been a 
certain inclination to give a favorable reply to the Swedish proposal.13 
But objections could be raised to this step. The idea of letting the Swedish 
Government take the initiative out of the hands of the Norwegian Govern­
ment at this stage of the negotiations had little to recommend it. On the 
other hand it was clear that the alternative proposed - that Norway 
should occupy the more prominent position in the administration and 
jurisdiction of the islands - could not be realized now against Sweden's 
wishes. The choice lay between an arrangement with Norway, Sweden 
and Russia as participating states, and a more international solution, in 
which several interested powers were represented. To put into effect the 
latter alternative would entail certain difficulties, but it might offer the 
advantage that no great power would be in a position to play a dominat­
ing role. 
In reply to the Swedish proposal it might be pointed out that, as 
Norway was the only one of the three states economically committed in 
Svalbard, Russia and Sweden would be able to make decisions which ran 
counter to Norwegian interests. From a political point of view, too, there 
were certain objections to two small states such as Norway and Sweden 
cooperating with Russia in this matter. Quite naturally cooperation in a 
commission of this nature would be conditioned by the intentions of the 
participating powers. If Russia, in view of the international situation or 
otherwise, desired good relations with the two Scandinavian states, the 
commission would be the means of creating better contact, but if on the 
contrary Russia were inspired by unfriendly feelings, then the commission 
would be a means of creating strife and a pretext for aggressive action. 
The advantage of accepting the Swedish proposal was prospects of 
settling conditions in Svalbard fairly quickly. Norway was particularly 
interested in this. To turn down the proposal was also undesirable from 
the point of view of the relations between. the two countries. 
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The Norwegian Minister in Stockholm strongly advised the Govern­
ment to adopt a positive attitude. The Minister in Berlin, von Ditten, 
who had the definite impression that the German Government was not 
particularly in favor of the Swedish proposal, held the opposite opinion. 
He came to Oslo to discuss the question with the Foreign Minister, and 
the views which found expression in the Norwegian answer were to a 
marked degree representative of these two. The attitude which the Nor­
wegian Government chose to adopt was in essence that there were other 
powers besides Norway, Russian and Sweden with interests in Svalbard, 
which could regard themselves as entitled to participate in the working 
out of an administration. The Swedish Government had formerly stated 
that any control should be arranged on an international basis, so that no 
power would acquire greater influence than any other. It also seemed 
most appropriate to let all powers participate in the negotiations from 
the very first, so that the organization which was created - if it were to 
be international - could really express the opinion of, and represent all 
the interested powers. At the conference one could decide whether, in 
order to accelerate the solution, it might be useful to entrust a committee 
of representatives from certain countries with the task of working out 
a draft. This could then be discussed by representatives of all the powers 
jointly. The Norwegian Government therefore felt bound to adhere to the 
opinion that the first step necessary to arrive at a settlement should be 
to convene representatives of all the powers concerned.14 Foreign Minister 
Taube was very annoyed at the Norwegian refusal, and declared that it 
would affect the future relations between the two countries. His proposal, 
he said, had been intended as a proffered hand, and his chief concern 
had been to achieve cooperation between Sweden and Norway.15 
In London, too, the rejection caused disappointment, and the Nor­
wegian Governmentwas clearly given to understand this. "I wish to express 
the regret of His Majesty's Government that the Norwegian Government 
should have apparently, by refusing to come to a preliminary agree­
ment, closed the door to further discussion between the powers more 
nearly interested, and to express the hope that means still may be found 
to proceed on lines of such discussion."16 These were the words the 
British Charge d'Affaires in Oslo used in this matter. At the Foreign 
Office there was no doubt agreement with the Norwegian suggestion that 
all powers interested should be all owed to express themselves before the 
question was discussed by a smaller committee. It was also admitted that 
Russia and Sweden at the moment had no material interests in Svalbard. 
Yet Great Britain, it was stated, could not undertake to refute such asser­
tions from Sweden and Russia. The British Government was in practice 
prepared to accept any settlement to which the three countries might 
agree.n During his visit to London King Haakon had an opportunity of 
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discussing the question with Sir Charles Hardinge, the Permanent U nder­
Secretary, but the latter could only confirm that the Foreign Office did 
not consider it possible to change its attitude.18 
The only power that backed the Norwegian proposal was the United 
States. In 1906 the Arctic Coal Company had submitted details of its 
claims in the archipelago to the Department of States which was sub­
sequently kept informed of its activities through annual reports and 
through the company's lawyer in Washington. From the autumn of 1908 
it was the only one to continue mining; and it was very concerned with 
the outcome of the negotiations about the islands. The company was 
anxious that an authority be established capable of maintaining law and 
order, and of creating settled conditions with regard to the acquisition 
of land. But on the other hand it considered itself as being the only tax 
payer, and it was keen to prevent the establishment of a set-up which 
would impose unreasonable taxes and restrictions. This was made clear 
to the State Departmenf.19 
In the autumn of 1909 the American envoy in Oslo returned to Wash­
ington where the Svalbard question was discussed, and the attitude to 
be adopted by the American Government clarified. The position of the 
United States was essentially different from that of the other powers. 
American nationals had, together with the Norwegians, the greatest eco­
nomic interests in Svalbard. These the State Department felt it had a 
right and a duty to protect. On the other hand the American Government, 
by reason of its traditional policy of non-intervention in European affairs, 
could not easily undertake any obligations or responsibility for the ad­
ministration of the archipelago.20 In fact it was a somewhat complicated 
problem, and it is a question whether the American Government 
strictly adhered to the Monroe Doctrine as it had been conceived and 
practized.21 It regarded Svalbard - no doubt quite rightly - as a 
European territory.22 Nevertheless, it made certain claims with regard to 
the political status of this area, viz. that it should remain a no man's 
land. And even if the American Government was not prepared to under­
take political obligations or sign a convention regarding Svalbard, thus 
in theory pursuing a policy of non-intervention, it acted not only as an 
adviser or arbiter but as an interested party intervening in the question 
of the government of the archipelago. 
From the American point of view, the Swedish proposal had little 
to commend it, and a conference at which the United States would from 
the very first have an opportunity of protecting its interests, would be 
preferable. For that reason the Norwegian proposal was supported in 
Washington and the Swedish one rejected, on the grounds that the date 
for a conference was so close at hand, that any proposals Sweden might 
wish to make ought rather to be submitted to the conference.2'l 
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The attitude which the American Government decided to adopt was 
bound to be essentially dictated by American interests in Svalbard coal 
mining. I t maintained as the basic principle that the archipelago should 
remain terra nullius. This term was defined as follows: Svalbard should 
not belong to any state, or be placed under any state's jurisdiction and 
should be open to nationals of all states. Next it required that the pro­
perty rights of American nationals to the land they had claimed in Sval­
bard, and registered with the State Department, should be recognized. 
A set of laws for the appropriation and possession of landed and other 
property should be worked out. In addition, simple rules were required 
for the relations between employer and employee. A criminal code was 
also necessary to prevent misdemeanors being committed in the archi­
pelago, as well as regulations for applying these rules. The American 
Government also admitted the need for rules protecting the fauna, but 
would abstain from making suggestions with respect to these. As far as 
the ownership of property and working conditions were concerned, a new 
system of simple laws should be worked out, rather than adapting and 
using those of any one state, as in Svalbard there was a new community 
where the same complicated conditions as in densely populated areas did 
not obtain. Besides, the laws of older societies were more or less com­
plicated, owing to modifications arising out of changed conditions. With 
regard to penal laws and the exercise of penal law, the American Govern­
ment was of the opinion that a police court, with competency to try mis­
demeanors and to arrest and send accused persons to their country of 
origin, would be sufficient. The Swedish Government was informed of 
these views in the middle of December 1909.24 The British Government 
supported Sweden in Washington,25 but the American Government was 
not willing to change its standpoint, although some efforts were made 
to persuade it to agree to a postponement of the conference.26 
Negotiations had now reached an unfortunate phase. On the one 
side stood Norway, supported by the United States, and on the other 
Sweden, which appeared to have all the other more or less interested 
great powers on her side. But there was activity behind the scene, and 
certain rumors current in the Swedish press were among the indications 
of this.27 
When Norway rejected the Swedish proposal, the door was not 
altogether closed to further discussion. Foreign Minister Christophersen 
declared in a conversation with the Swedish Charge d'Affaires in Oslo 
that the Government which was about to retire could not adopt a new 
attitude in the matter and thus commit its successors. But there was a 
possibility that the new government would find a solution. 
In Norway there were signs of disapproval at the way the Foreign 
Minister had conducted the matter, though it was not easy to put one's 
finger on any essential mistake. When the Government took up the ques-
s 
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tion in 1907 it did so primarily to comply with the demands of people 
with economic interests in Svalbard. Even though it might have been 
possible on that occasion to pursue a more active Norwegian policy, it 
preferred an international solution in which all more or less interested 
parties were given an opportunity of expressing their opinions. This 
procedure was in all probability right, once the government had let slip 
the opportunity of a Norwegian occupation. What the outcome would 
have been, if Norway had initiated confidential negotiations with Sweden 
- as seems to have been expected in Stockholm - the outcome of the 
game affair should indicate. 
As the matter dragged on, however, Norway's position weakened as 
compared with that of Sweden. The tense international situation caused 
Great Britain and Germany to place increasing emphasis on their rela­
tions with Sweden and on the mutual relations existing between the Scan­
dinavian countries, which overshadowed the real problem involved. The 
fact that English mining in Svalbard ceased in 1908 had a parallel effect, 
in that British interests in the archipelago became insignificant. 
Looking back one might say that it would have been prudent had 
the Norwegian Government refused to agree to Russia's request for a 
detailed proposal before all the interested powers had agreed on the 
main principles for a settlement. The Norwegian plan, moreover, was 
probably too comprehensive and too complicated. To what extent the 
Norwegian Government should have been more modest, and refrained 
from offering to take over the jurisdiction, seems to be a matter of 
opinion. From Count Taube's point of view the Norwegian plan was 
unacceptable to Sweden; but he left he Norwegian Government no 
chance of making an honorable retreat. Handing over the initiative to 
Sweden at this stage of negotiations was an obvious humiliation. When 
the Norwegian Government raised the question, it wanted the interested 
parties to make suggestions for a settlement, but the Swedish Govern­
ment merely stated that any control should be international, so that no 
power would acquire more influence than another; and it declared itself 
willing to participate in a conference in Oslo. 
Although there was a desire both on the Norwegian and on the 
Swedish side to promote harmonious cooperation, in view of the fact 
that this would be an advantage to both states, it was not only a question 
of good or i\I will, but also a question of the conception and appreciation 
of several factors. And the parties were reluctant to concede any ad­
vantages in this question simply in order to achieve cooperation. Possibly 
neither Taube nor Christophersen was the right man, and maybe it was 
too soon after 1905 for good results to be achieved. Count Taube may 
have desired cooperation. But he repeated it so often, and emphasized 
it is strongly, that it almost appeared hypocritical in view of his actions; 
and the cooperation he desired would have to take place on his terms 
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and conditions. His attitude was hardly realistic, and he seems to have 
imagined that the formal dissolution of the union should not prevent 
relations between Norway and Sweden in many spheres continuing more 
or less along the old lines -- at any rate the two countries ought, in his 
opinion, to be able to steer the same course in their foreign policy. Other­
wise, Taube was inclined to practise the methods of secret diplomacy, 
although he strongly recommended frankness and honesty, at least to 
the Norwegian Government. He was a calculating diplomat, but some 
doubt might exist as to whether he was a man of foresight - whether 
he was not a little too heavy-handed, if his main object was to achieve 
some measure of coordination in the foreign policy of the two countries. 
His predecessor had, however, been criticized for being too complacent 
to the Norwegians during the negotiations leading up to the treaty of in­
tegrity, and when Taube was made Foreign Minister he was perhaps 
expected to adopt a less conciliatory policy. 
His Norwegian colleague, Mr. Christophersen, was an old man, and 
this may explain why he appeared rather rigid, in fact almost bureau­
cratic. He gave the impression of treading warily, yet always acting cor­
rectly and conscientiously. He was reluctant to enter into separate nego­
tiations with any single one of the interested powers. In his opinion the 
Norwegian Government ought to adopt the same attitude to all parties, 
otherwise one might risk offending someone. He seemed to overlook the 
fact that not all parties had equally great interests in Svalbard. After 
the unfortunate outcome of the game protection affair, he was even less 
inclined to commit himself to separate negotiations. Possibly, he feared 
that Count Taube's motives were not always honorable and that he would 
like to compromise those responsible for Norway's foreign policy, as the 
Russian envoy in Oslo had hinted with regard to the game matter. 
When the union was dissolved there were many people in Sweden, 
who hoped for continued cooperation in matters of defense and foreign 
policy between the two countries. One of the main objectives of the union 
had in fact been considerations of defense. The optimists were dis­
appointed when Norway concluded a treaty of integrity.28 This was one 
of the reasons for the disfavor it encountered in Sweden;29 but it seems 
that some people had still not given up hope for a certain measure of co­
operation in matters of foreign policy. Taube was one of these. With 
British support the germanophile Swedish Foreign Minister tried to use 
the Svalbard affair to initiate Norwegian-Swedish cooperation in the 
field of foreign policy -- the first attempt made after the dissolution of 
the union. This ostensibly selfcontradictory fact invested the Svalbard 
question with an interest far beyond anything it deserved in itself alone. 
But whatever the reasons may have been, it had as yet not resulted in 
cooperation, but a diplomatic tug-of-war, with prestige factors playing 
an ever larger and more unfortunate role. 
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American Occupation Contemplated. 
In the middle of the last century the American Congress passed an 
Act aimed at protecting American guano collectors in the Chincha Islands 
off Peru, because the Peruvian Government subjected them to a heavy 
export duty. It was called the Guano Islands Act, and establishes that 
when an American national discovers guano deposits on an island, atoll 
or reef which does not legally belong to any other state, or has not been 
occupied in advance by the nationals of any other state, then such land 
may at the discretion of the President be regarded as belonging to the 
United States, and the President can use the armed forces of the United 
States to protect the rights of the discoverer. When the guano deposits 
have been removed, the occupation may cease.1 In respect of this law 
a number of islands were temporarily occupied by the United States, and 
in the course of a few decades all important guano islands in the West 
Indies and the Western Pacific were exploited. In 1909 there were only 
a couple of islands left which were still occupied. 
When Longyear heard about the guano deposits at bird cliffs in 
Vestspitsbergen he remembered the Guano Island Act, and wondered 
whether it might be applied to Svalbard. He conferred with the American 
Minister in Oslo, and came to the conclusion that it might be worth 
trying to have the act extended to include coal deposits. When Longyear 
returned to the United States in the autumn of 1909, he referred the 
matter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge from Massachusetts, then serving 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He submitted a proposal that 
the act should be extended to apply to cases where American nationals 
discovered phosphates, coal or other minerals on land of the above­
mentioned kind - and particularly important in this connection was the 
addition of the phrase: or on parts of an island, atoll or reef of this 
nature. The bill was immediately passed by the Senate,2 and was sent 
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,3 which demanded the opinion 
of the State Department. The essence of the State Department's reply 
was that, in the case of the islands which the United States had already 
occupied in respect of the Guano Island Act, the proposal did not present 
any serious difficulties, and it was moreover doubtful whether one could 
expect to discover new islands. The addition "or on parts of an island, 
atoll or reef" had, in the nature of things, no particular interest as far 
as the guano islands were concerned, as these could not be made the 
objects of partial occupation, and an attempt to apply the clauses of the 
act to parts of islands which by international agreement were regarded 
as neutral common territory, would create difficult problems which could 
only be solved by international compact.4 It was incontrovertible that the 
above-mentioned phrase applied to Svalbard, but the State Department 
had to make another statement in which the archipelago was expressly 
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mentioned. "As this Government", it declared, "is pledged by its declara­
tion to all the North Sea Powers to the position that Spitsbergen is a 
no-man's land, in the welfare of which all the interested nations are 
concerned, but over which no one power can claim territorial control, 
it would not seem practicable to advance any claim on the part of the 
United States under the provisions of the proposed Amendment."5 The 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs shared this view, and the matter 
was dropped on the grounds that the Guano Islands Act could not be 
applied to coal deposits in Svalbard, because these were not recent dis­
coveries. Furthermore, the American Government had already recognized 
Svalbard's status as no man's land, and lastly it was unwilling to risk 
reducing the Government's chance of reaching a modus vivendi at the 
coming conference.6 
Longyear went in person to Washington to confer with the politicians 
involved in the case, Edwin Denby, who was the chairman of the com­
mittee dealing with the matter, and Senator Lodge. But they made it 
clear to him that even if the proposal was accepted it would not be pos­
sible to apply the Guano Islands Act to Svalbard. Moreover, further 
attempts to force it through Congress might impair rather than promote 
American interests in the archipelago. It is nevertheless possible that the 
matter was of advantage to Longyear. The State authorities had now 
acquired greater knowledge of, and possibly greater interest in, his 
enterprise. 
The proposed bill was discussed in the American press, where it 
was not only subject to praise. In Europe it seems to have been best 
known through an announcement in the "Petermanns Geographische Mit­
theilungen", which was regarded as very reliable. The Oslo paper, "Aften­
posten", interviewed the American Minister in Oslo, but he was able to 
make the reassuring statement that he knew nothing about any bill which 
aimed at an occupation of Svalbard, and he referred to the President's 
message to Congress. "From well informed circles, in close touch with 
the American Coal Mining Company" the same article gave a detailed 
account of the standpoint of the company and of the American authorities, 
concluding with the President's message which made no reference to an 
occupation,; but the proposed Bill was not mentioned. The following 
day, however, the same paper was in a position to state that the Senate 
had accepted the proposal to amend the Guano Island Act, and that all 
American papers which mentioned it had declared that the intention was 
the occupation of Svalbard. "Aftenposten" reproduced an article from the 
"Buffalo Express", in which it was stated that the United States, in taking 
such a step, would get into a diplomatic mess, and that other methods of 
guaranteeing American interest would have to be found.8 
The diplomatic representative of the interested powers in Wash­
ington naturally followed the matter and inquired in the State Department 
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about its development. This was bound to give the American Government 
- if indeed it had had any doubts - a clear impression that any attempt 
to apply the Guano Islands Act to Svalbard would prove a highly com­
plicated business. In answer to the inquiry from the Norwegian Minister 
whether the American authorities were considering a step such as that 
mentioned in the press, Secretary of State Philander Knox replied that it 
would not be a very easy matter to carry through. "Everybody seems to 
have a finger in the pie", he said, and related that the German Ambas­
sador and the Swedish Minister had recently come to the State Depart­
ment to inquire about the attitude of the United States. The Secretary 
of State on the whole gave the Norwegian envoy a completely satisfactory 
explatlation. "I have absolutely dismissed the thing from my mind", he 
declared, "When we speak about it here in the Department it is always 
in the form of a joke", and he assured him that the Government of the 
United States would stand by the attitude which it had formerly ac­
knowledged.9 
Whether or not the affair was unfortunate for Norway, as far as 
the tug-of-war with Sweden was concerned, is another question. The 
fact that the United States - the only country which actively supported 
Norway - now showed an alarming pushfulness, might easily lead 
to Russia giving more active support to the Swedish proposal. It was in 
fact clear that in the Russian Foreign Ministry there was a certain amount 
of irritation at the turn the matter had taken, and i was hinted that 
Norway had complicated a solution of the Svalbard problem by im­
plicating too many parties. 
Out of the Deadlock. 
Johannes irgens, Foreign Minister in the new Norwegian Govern­
ment which took office in February 19 10, was also a diplomat, and had 
been Norwegian envoy in London. Unlike his predecessor he was ex­
ceptionally young, being 40 years old. He was rather energetic, perhaps 
a little too rapid in making decisions. From the Norwegian side negotia­
tions were now carried on with greater initiative than previously. 
Hardly any of the interested parties were satisfied with the situation 
which had arisen after the Norwegian Government had rejected the 
Swedish proposal. In the British Foreign Office, at any rate, one was 
not averse to proceedings getting under way. It was admitted that there 
might be certain points in the Swedish proposal, which were not entirely 
agreeable to Norway,1 but in London there seemed to be little interest 
in the actual facts of the case. The main thing was to prevent relations 
between the various states developing in a way which might be unfavor­
able to British foreign policy. So far, the British had more or less ad­
vised Norway to show compliance to Sweden, but after the American 
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Government had supported the Norwegian standpoint the matter had 
become still more complicated, for it was not advisable to adopt an 
attitude which might provoke the United States. 
Immediately after Irgens had become Foreign Minister, there was 
a discussion of the Svalbard question between him and the British 
Minister in Oslo. The latter submitted a "private" memorandum, the 
essence of which was that individuals who had committed crimes in 
Svalbard should be sent to their country of origin for trial. In the event 
of disputes about land each of the parties should choose an arbiter of 
his own nationality; these should then choose a third arbiter and their 
decision should be final. An international commission of e. g. three mem­
bers could be sent to Svalbard to register all claims which were not 
disputed.2 In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry the proposal was altered 
so that Sweden, too, was accorded a special position,3 and Foreign 
Minister Irgens went to London to discuss it with Sir Edward Grey and 
Sir Charles Hardinge, neither of whom had any particular remarks 
to make.4 
The Norwegian Government was dealt another good card. The 
American Minister in Oslo forwarded a note in which the standpoint of 
the United States was set forth. It concluded with the hope that the 
intended conference would be held as soon as possible. The Arctic Coal 
Company wished to extend its working, but before taking this step it was 
anxious to know what sort of administration and laws were to apply on 
the archipelago.5 This gave the Norwegian Government the opportunity 
of accelerating the matter, and it decided to invite the powers to a con­
ference in Oslo, where the new proposal could be made the basis for 
discussion. 
In Stockholm much time had been spent in working out a detailed 
proposal, based on the main principles which the Swedish Government 
had previously set forth, and Foreign Minister Taube again took up the 
question of preliminary discussions between Norway, Sweden and Russia. 
He referred to Foreign Minister Christophersen's statement to the effect 
that his government was not in a position to change its attitude in this 
matter, thus committing the new government which was about to take 
office.6 It is of course possible that Taube had got wind of the plan 
which was being worked out in Oslo, and that he was eager to prevent 
the Norwegian Government taking a new step which might thwart him. 
He gave the impression of being very conciliatory, and admitted that he 
had been wrong in first approaching the great powers in the game pro­
tection case. If the Norwegians would negotiate with Sweden, he could 
assure them of compliance. Once Norway and Sweden had removed the 
stumbling block between them, it would not be difficult to reach agree­
ment with Russia, he declared. Should Norway on the other hand adopt 
an altogether uncompromising attitude, he would be forced to start co-
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operation with Russia, and he strongly emphasized the political con­
sequences which non-acceptance would entail.7 The Norwegian Minister 
in Stockholm, Benjamin Vogt, appealed to the Government to accede to 
the Swedes. "There are some Norwegians", he wrote, "who find the fruits 
of Norwegian political victory especially sweet if it is the result of a 
Swedish defeat. For four years I have been forced to accept daily Swedis:1 
misunderstanding, bitterness, at times even hatred in various forms. It 
has, at the time, but not in the long run, blinded me to the real value 
to us of reasonable relations with Sweden."8 The Government, however, 
came to the conclusion that it would have to stick to its decision. If one 
were to accede to the Swedish wish, the plan of submitting a new pro­
posal would have to be abandoned. Foreign Minister Irgens was unwilling 
to do this, now that he felt he had the support of the British Government. 
In addition there was the United States to consider. To give prominence 
to American interests in a European concern was not without its risks, 
but at any rate the United States supported Norway. Above all it was 
considered important for Norway to retain the initiative. The Govern­
ment had probably never conferred with the Storting on the matter, and 
now too it made its decision on its own. Sweden was informed that 
time was so short that, if anything was to be achieved in the course of 
the coming summer, the conference would have to be convened as soon 
as possible. Furthermore, it was empasized that negotiations had pre­
viously been undertaken with all the interested powers at once, and if 
the Norwegian Government now committed itself to separate negotiations, 
the United States would certainly object. The opportunity was not lost in 
pointing out that, according to the terms of the Norwegian proposal, 
Sweden would enjoy a special position beside Norway, both with regard 
to the composition of the registration commission and the arbitration 
court. 9 
At the same time as invitations were sent to the powers to meet for 
a conference in Oslo, Foreign Minister Irgens informed Count Taube that 
he was willing to participate in private preliminary discussions before the 
conference was convened. When he received the message Count Taube 
cabled to the Swedish Minister in Oslo, instructing him to get Irgens to 
confirm his offer. Taube's intention is not quite clear. There was a danger 
here that the Norwegian Foreign Minister might compromise himself 
vis-a.-vis Russia, and the result would be a parallel to the game affair. 
Irgens, however, took things calmly and made a similar offer to the 
Russian envoy. It now appeared that Count Taube - as might be ex­
pected - was indignant at the step the Norwegian Government had 
taken, and he was by no means willing to agree to preliminary discussions 
on these terms. The Norwegian procedure was interpreted as an attempt 
to face Sweden with a fait accompli. Taube now approached the Russian 
Government with the suggestion that Sweden and Russia should jointly 
reject the Norwegian invitation, and demand that his plan for preliminary 
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discussions should be put into operation. In his attitude to the Norwegia:1 
Minister in Stockholm he was rather arrogant, and took no pains to con­
ceal that he intended to exploit the fact that Sweden's friendship meant 
more to the rival great powers than Norway's.10 
In the Russian Foreign Ministry two conceptions of the affair seem 
to have made themselves felt. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Sazonov, was apparently in favor of a general conference immediately, 
in order to restrict any further uncontrolled land claiming in the archi­
pelago. The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, preferred the Swedish 
proposal, and it gradually became apparent that his policy would be 
pursued.11 In Berlin, London and Paris they were favorably inclined and 
ready to assist, but the Norwegian Government received no real supporP2 
Foreign Minister Irgens admitted that he had hoped for support in 
London for the proposal which had been submitted as a result of British 
initiative. The point was, however, that even though the British Govern­
ment had made a compromise proposal, in order to rescue the negotia­
tions from the backwater, it had no intention of incurring the displeasure 
of Russia or Sweden by supporting Norway. The Danish Government, 
anxious to remain neutral in this Norwegian-Swedish discord, declared 
that it wold abstain from making any pronouncement as to what should 
be done as Denmark had no interests in Svalbard. Only the United States, 
the Netherlands and Belgium accepted the invitation to the conference.13 
At the suggestion of the German Foreign Minister, Irgens offered 
to pay a visit to Stockholm, and thus prove the Norwegian Government's 
desire to cooperate with Sweden. To start with, Count Taube showed a 
certain interest in this suggestion, and proposed Gothenburg as a meeting 
place. Later, however, he abandoned his suggestion.14 He wanted the 
Norwegian Government to send delegates immediately to Stockholm, in 
order to go through the detailed proposal which the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry had worked out.15 The Norwegian Government rejected this 
resolutely, and it now seemed that negotiations would once more reach 
a deadlock. But the Russian Government was also unwilling to concede 
a more prominent position to Sweden than to Norway and Russia, and it 
submitted a compromise proposal for preliminary discussions in OS10,16 
which saved the situation. At the recommendation of the British,17 the 
Norwegian Government decided to accept this. The United States now 
also agreed to a preliminary three-power conference, but still maintained 
that it would be best to discuss all proposals and plans at a conference 
between all the interested parties. is Foreign Minister Taube, however, 
did not give up. It seemed as though he was willing to go to any lengths 
in an effort to prevent preliminary discussion being held in Oslo. As a 
last resort he suggested sending experts to Oslo and St. Petersburg, in 
order to acquaint the Governments there with the Swedish proposal. 
But at this juncture came a reminder that inability to arrive at a Nor­
wegian-Swedish understanding might easily result in both parties losing 
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ground, for Leningrad was now being suggested as a venue for the con­
ference. Faced with this situation Count Taube chose the lesser of two 
evils. He eventually agreed to meet in Oslo, and Norway informed the 
other states that "the major conference" would have to be postponed 
indefinitely. 
Looking back at the dogged tug-of-war that had been going on 
between Norway and Sweden, one clearly sees how greatly it was in­
fluenced by narrow considerations of prestige, and it is difficult to under­
stand the matter unless one takes into account the relations obtaining 
between the two countries in the years immediately following the dis­
solution of the union. Added to this was the rivalry of the great powers; 
some of them had repeatedly declared that they were inspired by the 
desire for impartial arbitration, but nevertheless they were bent on ex­
ploiting the situation to their own advantage. The results was a com­
promise. Internationally, as well as nationally, political settlements usu­
ally seem to be a compromise between more or less conflicting interests, 
or to be a dictate by the stronger party. If one of the parties is unable 
to promote its own interest, the result arrived at may easily be merely a 
temporary solution. The weakness of the arrangement arrived at, as far 
as the procedure for solving the Svalbard question was concerned, was 
obvious. It becomes apparent if one asks what interests in Svalbard were 
to be represented at the conference which was now about to take place 
in Oslo. The interests of the Norwegian mine workers and trappers and 
Norwegian capital interests would be taken care of by the Norwegian 
Government, which also had an opportunity of protecting any strategic 
and political interests Norway might have. Any economic interests which 
Russia felt she might have, were also represented. Sweden had apparently 
neither strategic nor economic interests to maintain. All three states had 
so-called historical interests, i. e. by virtue of the activities undertaken 
by their nationals in Svalbard - the part they had played in discovery, 
exploration and industry - they considered they had a special right to 
a share in determining the fate of the archipelago. However, there were 
several other powers which had similar historical interests, especially the 
Netherlands and Great Britain. The West European powers had admit­
tedly declared that their interests were so negligible that they were pre­
pared to leave it to Norway, Russia and Sweden to work out a suggestion 
for the government of the archipelago. One might therefore hope to avoid 
difficulties in that quarter, but this could not be unconditionally assumed. 
EN'en though they had shown a certain acquiescence, out of regard to 
their relations with Sweden or else did not, for the time being, wish to 
attend an international conference, they had not had their last say in the 
matter. The decisive weakness in the method of procedure chosen was, 
however, that the Americans, who had the greatest capital interests in 
the islands were not even represented. 
The Oslo Conferences. 
Working Out a Unique Constitution. 
As the dissolution of the union receded into the distance, the relations 
between Norway and Sweden acquired a more amicable character, though 
only the slightest provocation was still necessary to set a press campaign 
going. However, in the early summer of 19 10 the papers were even dis­
cussing the possibility of a Norwegian-Swedish defence pact. It seemed, 
therefore, that there was a chance of the projected three-power con­
ference being held in a comparatively cordial political atmosphere; but 
an incident now occurred which ruffled tempers on the Swedish side 
of the border. 
Parallel with the main negotiations, Norway and the United States 
had also carried on discussions to find a solution for land disputes be­
tween Norwegian and American nationals at Svalbard. The Norwegian 
Government had for this purpose worked out a proposal for a separate 
agreement between the two powers, the essence of which was that the 
magistrate at Troms0 was to settle disputes.1 When this was known, it 
caused dissatisfaction in both Sweden and Russia, because it was con­
sidered that the Norwegian Government had thus anticipated events. 
Swedish press commentaries were especially severe,2 and in fact more 
importance was attached to the affair than it deserved. At this time there 
was a change of Minister at the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm. When 
the new envoy was received in audience in order to hand over his creden­
tials, it appeared that King Gustaf was visibly irritated at the Norwegian 
Government's procedure, which he characterized as not very gentleman­
like.3 It was even suggested that the separate Norwegian-American 
transactions might lead to the postponement of the Oslo conference; but 
the result was not as serious as that, and in July the conference was 
opened in the Nobel Hall in Oslo. Though this prelude to the conference 
was not promising, the choice of delegates offered the best possible 
guarantee that the negotiations would be marked by expert knowledge, 
attention to essentials, and goodwill. Sweden sent as chief delegate, 
County Governor Hjalmar Hammarskji:ild, a noted legal expert and poli­
tician, and as second delegate her Minister in Oslo Gustav Falkenberg. 
On the Russian side negotiations were in the hands of Anatol Kroupensky, 
Russian Minister in Oslo, and Professor Boris Nolde. The latter was 
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legal adviser to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Norway was represented 
by former Prime Minister Francis Hagerup, who was probably regarded 
as the leading legal expert in the country. There was a certain similarity 
between him and Hammarskj6ld, both with regard to theoretical know­
ledge, experience and political attitude, while both of them were pro­
tagonists of Scandinavian cooperation. Hagerup was elected Chairman 
of the conference. Norway's second delegate was her Minister in Wash­
ington, Helmer Bryn. 
Each of the three countries submitted a draft convention. These were, 
however, so similar that there seemed a very good prospect of reaching 
agreement. The Swedish draft4 embodied, in its main outlines, the prin­
ciples which the Swedish Government had previously submitted, including 
however the amendment that the international tribunal should have its 
seat in Stockholm, and not in Troms0 as previously suggested. Instead 
of a tribunal of this nature, the Russian Government suggested, as 
supreme authority for Svalbard, a commission consisting of one Nor­
wegian, one Russian and one Swedish member, chosen for a period uf 
six years. This commission would have certain administrative, legislative 
and judicial functions.5 The difference between the Swedish and the 
Russian draft was, however, not very marked, as the tribunal suggested 
by the Swedish Government was also to have certain administrative and 
legislative functions. 
The instructions of the Russian delegates were in essence that Sval­
bard was to be declared a neutral no man's land. Administration and legal 
procedure were to be based on the principles of equality with regard to 
the rights and obligations of the three powers, and measures should be 
instituted to prevent the indiscriminate claiming of land in the arch i­
pelago.6 
The drafF submitted by the Norwegian Government also contained 
proposal for a three-power commission as the supreme authority. This 
would, however, have a less permanent character than the institutions 
suggested in the two other drafts. It was envisaged that the commission 
should meet at the request of the chairman, as cases came up for settle­
ment. The reason given for this was that, once the first set of rules had 
been worked out and the local machinery set in motion, not many cases 
would occur. Moreover, the arrangement should prove inexpensive.8 
In other respects the Norwegian draft differed from the others on 
two essential points. According to all the proposals a police commissioner 
and a judge should be appointed for Svalbard. The Norwegian draft 
suggested that these officials should be appointed by the Norwegian 
Government, while the Russian draft proposed that they should be 
appointed by the international commission.9 The Norwegian point of 
view was based on the argument that officials appointed by an inter­
national commission would not be subject to any disciplinary or penal 
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authority. The commission could dismiss them, but that might be either 
too severe or too lenient a punishment. In the event of their being ap­
pointed by the Norwegian Government, there would be a greater guaran­
tee that they would discharge their duties in a conscientious manner.10 
The other decisive point in which the Norwegian draft differed 
from the other two was with regard to the court of appeal. According 
to the Russian and the Swedish draft, decisions pronounced by the police 
commissioner and the magistrate could be appealed respectively to the 
three-power commission and the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the 
Hague. The commission suggested in the Norwegian draft would, how­
ever, not be vested with judicial powers. The decisions of the police 
commissioner and the judge would be subject to appeal to Norwegian 
courts or to an arbitration tribunal. The reason given for this was that 
it was not general practice to give the same institution judicial and legis­
lative authority. Besides, if the commission, as suggested in the Nor­
wegian draft, were not intended to be a permanent institution, it should 
not be entrusted with too many tasks.l1 These arguments, which were 
used to back up the Norwegian proposals were also motivated by a long­
felt desire to have the police and judicial authority in Svalbard entrusted 
to Norwegians, and executed in accordance with Norwegian legal prin­
ciples, as the great majority of the workers in the islands were Nor­
wegians whose interests must be protected, and demands had been raised 
in the Storting to this effect.12 For that reason the Norwegian draft also 
contained an appendix with regulations governing the relations between 
employee and employers. The three drafts differed otherwise on a number 
of points, but these differences were not sufficiently political in character 
to impede an agreement. 
As far as declaring the archipelago a neutral no man's land was 
concerned, there was in fact agreement in advance. In this matter the 
Russian wording, with a few minor alterations, was chosen.l3 
With regard to the character and competence of the supreme 
authority the Norwegian Government had to abandon its claim. The 
conference decided to establish an international commission as the su­
preme agency for the administration and exercise of justice, and to make 
the other authorities in the archipelago immediately responsible to it. 
The commission was to consist of a representative with a substitute, 
from each of the three countries. The members were to assume the chair­
manship in turn. The commisssion should have its seat in the chairman's 
country of origin, and meet at least once a year. By giving it an am­
bulatory character one avoided the difficult question of where to place it, 
a question that would have had to be solved if it had been decided to 
give the commission a permanent seat. On the other hand, the proposed 
arrangement would entail certain difficulties with regard to archives, etc. 
Apart from verdicts, the decisions of the commission should be unani-
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mous. In this way one would avoid measures being instituted, which con­
flicted with the essential interests of one of the member states. But that 
would, of course, make the commission less effective, i. e. it would not 
have the same facility for settling certain matters as it would were its 
decisions based on a majority vote. No regulations were drawn up to 
cover the eventuality of the commission not reaching an agreement. The 
commission was to frame the necessary regulations for preserving law 
and order in the territory and other regulations to be laid down according 
to the convention.14 
As the police was to be an agency of the Three-Power Commission, 
the latter would choose the police commissioner and his deputy. But as 
there were at the time practically only Norwegians in the archipelago, 
there would not be much point in choosing a police commissioner who 
was not Norwegian. The Russian and Swedish negotiators therefore 
agreed to rule that the police commissioner should belong to the state 
which had the greatest number of nationals in Svalbard. The result of this 
rule was that, to begin with at any rate, he would be a NorwegianY' 
If the proportion of nationals in the archipelago changed, it would be 
possible to get a police commissioner of another nationality as he was 
to be nominated for a period of six years at a time, in common with the 
members of the commission. 
With regard to the administration of justice, it was decided as a 
general rule that persons residing in the archipelago should come under 
the jurisdiction of their own national courts.16 In order to satisfy im­
mediate requirements, however, it was necessary to make a couple of 
essential exceptions to this rule. Infringement of police regulations would 
be dealt with by the police commissioner.17 But it was also necessary to 
arrange for an easy settlement of the most frequent kinds of dispute. 
In this respect the Russian draft contained a suggestion that the inter­
national commission should appoint a magistrate for Svalbard, while the 
Norwegian and Swedish drafts suggested that the magistrate at Troms0 
should decide minor disputes. On this point, as on the question of the 
police commissioner, a compromise was reached. It was considered 
that it would be inconvenient for the judge to reside in Svalbard. It was 
therefore agreed that the commission should appoint a magistrate and 
decide for a period of six years at a time in which town he should have 
his seat. In its choice of town the commission should take the geograph­
ical situation and communications with Svalbard into consideration. 
The magistrate should be a national of the state to which his seat was 
assigned.is These regulations would entail that the magistrate would be 
a Norwegian and that his seat was Troms0 or Hammerfest in Norway. 
The Norwegian-Russian disagreement with regard to choice of police 
commissioner and judge was thus solved by Norway giving way in form 
and Russia in fact. 
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The decisions of the magistrate and the police commissioner coulll 
he appealed to the Three-Power Commission. 
In their decisions the Svalbarcl authorities, while taking into con­
sideration the basic principles of private international law, should apply 
the regulations of the convention and any prescript which might be issued 
in connection therewith. If these proved insufficient, the principles of law 
and equity should be applied.19 
The rules of legal procedure for the Svalbard authori ties should be 
laid down by the Three-Power C0Jl1mission.20 The execution in Svalbard 
of judgements, verdicts and decisions made by the commission or the 
magistrate, should be put into operation by the magistrate. The rules for 
this should be worked out by the cOlllmission.21 
Public institutions would only be organized by the Three-Power 
Commission or under its supervision. An exception was made to this rule 
in that the postal service which Norway had already established could 
continue as long as no objection was made to it. In addition each indi­
vidual state would be able to minister to the spiritual welfare of its 
citizens, and establish public institutions of a humanitarian or scientific 
character.�2 
The conditions which the draft convention aimed especially to settle, 
and for which it in part provided rules and in part left to the commission 
to settle, were the claiming and transfer of land. Cases of this kind should 
he registered by the magistrate, who would also decide in case of land 
disputes. At Russia's request it was decided that no one could acquire 
property rights, only "claimer's" and "user's" land rights. Areas claimed 
must not be unreasonably large, and if they were allowed to remain 
unused for more than six years the right uf user would lapse.2:3 The 
Russian Government aimed in this way to prevent anyone acquiring 
large areas of land by means of fictitiolls c1aims.24 States and nationals 
of non-contracting powers could 110t, according to the draft convention, 
claim land in Svalbard,z;; and a number uf other restrictions were placed 
on the right of c1aillling.26 
Employers were enjoined to draw up a contract with each of the 
workers they appointed, which was to be written in a language the worker 
understood. The employer should be obliged to look after sick workers 
until such time as they had recovered or could be sent home. The cost 
of sending the worker home was to he borne by the employer. If a worker 
was the victim of an accident, for which he was not responsible, he 
should be entitled to damages from the employer. The amount of this 
compensation should be fixed according to rules drawn up by the Three­
Power Comt11ission.27 Labor disputes were to be settled by the magistrate 
who as we have seen would be a Norwegian. These rules were of special 
significance to Norway and the United States. As long as Longyear had 
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operated in Svalbard, there had been disputes regarding his obligations 
to his workers in the event of illness or accidents which occurrej at 
work.2R Another point in the draft which primarily affected the Nor­
wegians, dealt with the regulatil)f1s for hunting and fishing,2�J and rules 
were also set up which aimed to make exploration easier. 
The expenses of the set-up envisaged were to be covered by registra­
tion fees and taxes on occupied plots of land. The dues of this nature, 
however, should only be levied on the agreement of all the signatory 
powers. It was envisaged that any default could be shared among the 
powers, apart from the expenses of the Three-Power Commission, which 
were to be borne only by Norway, Russia and Sweden.:JO Any disputes 
arising out of the interpretation or application of the convention should 
be settled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, whe:1 
circumstances permitted. The convention was to apply for 18 years at a 
time, and all states which so desired could join.:l1 
The draft convention was an unusual document, both from a purely 
political point of view and from that of jurisprudence. [t attempted to 
regulate a sort of pioneer community on an Arctic archipelago, where 
geographical conditions made it difficult to establish an effective exercise 
of authority - a community which neither constituted a state nor be­
longed to one or more states. It existed in a territory which was charac­
terized as a no man's land. Executive, legislative and judicial authority, 
for certain sections of community life, was placed in the hands of an 
international commission, while a good many of the functions exer­
cised by a modern state in its territory were entrusted to the individual 
states to which the people on the islands belonged. [n reality Norway, 
Russia and Sweden claimed a sort of condominium, and in the preamble 
to the draft convention based their reasons for taking this step on their 
economic interests, the share they had had in the discovery and the 
scientific exploration of the archipelago, and the fact that their territories 
were situated nearest to Svalbard. 
The press campaign which seemed to be a necessary corollary of 
any diplomatic conference in those days, was 110t entirely lacking. An 
anonymous article in the leading Conservative Oslo paper "Morgen­
bladet",:12 entitled "Norway's Historical Rights to Spitsbergen", aroused 
the greatest attention. The author maintained that it was an undisputable 
historical fact that Svalbard had been Norwegian from olden times, and 
that it was a mistake for the Norwegian Government to invite other 
powers to discuss the political status of the archipelago. The ideas he 
set forth were commented on in the press, but they seemed to be too 
extreme for anyone to accept, although part of the writer's historical 
review was really intelligent. The Prime Minister regretted in an inter­
view that such arguments were allowed to appear in the leading paper 
of the party in power. The press also contained sensational reports about 
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the state of tension between Norway and Russia, caused by disagreement 
at the Conference. The only kernel of truth which these rumors contained 
was that the Norwegian and Russian negotiators had, to begin with, 
maintained different views on the appointment of Svalbard's police com­
missioner and magistrate. 
In Government quarters in Oslo there was, on the whole, satisfaction 
with the result of the negotiations, and the same seems to have been true 
in Stockholm. At any rate Foreign Minister Taube was pleased. He ad­
mitted now that Svalbard had no particular significance to Sweden. But 
owing to the scientific work Swedish explorers had carried out, it had 
become "une question d'amour-propre" for Sweden to take part in nego­
tiations as one of the leading states.33 In London it was expected that 
relations between Norway and Sweden would improve now that agree­
ment had been reached in this matter.34 In Russia the draft convention 
was subject to considerable criticism, but it is possible that this emanated 
from circles which had little influence.35 At any rate it appeared that the 
state of agreement reached between the three countries would last. The 
first distance along the chosen road had thus been covered. Now they 
could proceed to the next stage, and get the other interested powers 
to consent to the draft. 
Criticism and Revision of the Draft Convention. 
After agreement had been reached between Norway, Sweden and 
Russia, the matter entered on a new phase. Negotiations now became 
more cumbersome. To a certain extent the Norwegian Government still 
maintained the initiative, but it had to confer with the Swedish and the 
Russian Governments in every little step it took. The various powers also 
conferred directly with Norway, Sweden and Russia at the same time. 
In this way misunderstanding and confusion could easily arise. 
As long as the three above-mentioned states, especially Sweden and 
Norway, were at odds, the attitude of the European powers had been 
characterized more by this circumstance than by the actual facts of the 
case. There were now grounds for believing that the states which had 
worked out the draft convention would combine to have it put into effect. 
As long as France, Great Britain and Germany stuck to their statement 
that they only had negligible interests in Svalbard, and that they would, 
in practice, accept any proposal which the three most interested states 
agreed on, there was a chance of a speedy solution. 
A new factor, however, appeared. The negotiations which had been 
going on between Norway and the United States to solve the land 
disputes between Norwegian and American nationals in Svalbard had 
not produced any result. There might have been a chance of settling the 
matter by arbitration, but the American Government demanded, as a con-
6 
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dition for agreeing to a settlement by arbitration, that the rules, accord­
ing to which a verdict would be given, should be laid down in advance. 
The Norwegian Government desired that the tribunal should be free to 
make its decision on the basis of the accepted principles of justice and 
equity. 1 Before this Norwegian-American difference had been settled 
there was little prospect of the American Government agreeing to the 
draft convention, and there was reason to believe that the West European 
powers would not take any steps which did not suit the United States. 
On the whole the state of agreement existing between the three 
powers which had worked out the draft convention was only skin-deep. 
In Russia there were a number of changes in the foreign service. Alex­
ander Izvolsky was appointed Ambassador to Paris and Sergei Sazanov 
came in as Foreign Minister.2 He was reserved in his attitude to the draft, 
but there appeared to be little danger of the Russian Government re­
pudiating it, even though only the final protocol dealing with the sub­
sequent method of procedure had been signed with binding effect by the 
delegates.3 The Foreign Minister's caution might be due partly to the 
criticism which the draft had incurred in Russia, and partly to the desire 
to pursue a considerate policy in all dealings with the United States. 
The well-known American financier, John H. Hammond, came to Russia 
in the autumn of 1910 to investigate the possibilities of investing American 
capital, and it appeared that relations between the two powers, which 
previously had not been too good, had now improved.4 Those hopes, 
however, were short-lived. Relations deteriorated once more owing to the 
Russian authorities' treatment of American Jews, and negotiations were 
started with respect to the interpretation of the Russo-American agree­
ment of 1832, and subsequent Russian rules establishing the rights of 
American nationals in Russia.5 But these negotiations dragged on, and 
there were prominent politicians in Washington who recommended that 
the United States revoke its trade agreement with Russia, unless the latter 
adopted a more conciliatory attitude. 
In Berlin dissatisfaction was soon expressed with the draft conven­
tion. It was stated that there were objections to German nationals being 
judged by non-German judges, and to the fact that the judge and the 
Svalbard Commission had unduly great powers.6 In the summer of 1910 
there was a change of Foreign Minister in Berlin. Wilhelm von Schoen 
was appointed Ambassador in Paris, and was succeeded as Foreign 
Minister by Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter; it was possible that this 
change might entail a stiffer German attitude to the Arctic question. 
In the Foreign Office in London, where it had been repeatedly stated 
that the British Government would accept practically any proposal to 
which Norway, Sweden and Russia might agree, there was also a good 
deal of reservation, and it was hinted that the jurists had a number of 
objections to make.7 
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It was not surprising that Foreign Minister Taube should be pessi­
mistic. He had all the time maintained, and probably believed as well, 
on the basis of the information he had received in Berlin and in London, 
that if only Norway and Sweden could reach an agreement the rest would 
be plain sailing. He had apparently reckoned with the possibility that 
there would be no need for any major conference in Oslo - that it was 
only a question of the other powers appending their signatures, once they 
had given their consent to the draft agreement. Now he feared that the 
apple-cart would be upset owing to German objections, lack of enthu­
siasm in Russia, American difficulties, and British procrastination, as he 
expressed it.s 
The American financiers who were interested in mining in Svalbard 
disapproved thoroughly of the draft convention,9 and they could reckon 
on the sympathy of Congress. When the House of Representatives had 
to abandon the project to amend the Guano Islands Act, the chairman 
of the committe dealing with the matter had promised Longyear his 
support, should it prove necessary in the future. Furthermore, faced with 
an election, which many people considered would turn out to the advant­
age of the democrats, it might be expected that Senator Lodge would 
be anxious to do his electors a service. 
In the State Department it was felt that the matter was now growing 
unpleasant. It was difficult to reconcile the claims submitted by the Ame­
rican companies, supported by the powerful Senator Lodge, with tradi­
tional American foreign policy,1O And the observations on the draft con­
vention which the American Government sent to the Norwegian Govern­
ment were fairly extreme. It was maintained that as the United States 
and Norway could not find any basis for arbitration in the disputed land 
claims, the American Government could not give its consent to any con­
vention which did not recognize the validity of American nationals' claims 
to land as registered in the State Department. The draft convention was, 
moreover, too complicated and too extensive, and did not take sufficient 
account of the United States' interests. American industry in the islands 
was the only industry which could form a basis for the taxation to cover 
expenses. The only community of any size, and the only permanent one, 
it was stated, was on land which American nationals had acquired. The 
United States therefore considered that they should be entitled to a share 
in the working out of the convention. The American Government repeated 
in its note its assurance that it merely desired to secure the interests of 
American nationals, and to preserve the character of the archipelago as 
a no man's land, and it was stated that even though the State Department 
could not accept the convention in its present form, the United States 
was not averse to a system of administration for Svalbard, provided that 
"the rightful ownership of the land acquired by its citizens as recorded 
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in the Department of State was recognized" and the archipelago's status 
as a no man's land was retained. "But the Government of the United 
States could not admit the right of exercise of authority conveyed by 
any convention to which it should not be a party or an adherent upon the 
territory of its citizens as specified above."1l The views here expressed 
seemed opposed to the statement previously made by the American 
Government. It was in fact stated that the American Government would 
not permit the exercise of any authority on American property in Svalbard, 
as laid down in a convention of which the United States was not a sign­
atory - which in itself was quite reasonable. But there were only two 
possibilities left. Either one would have to abandon the attempt to create 
a system of administration for the archipelago - and this did not seem 
to be the wish of the American Government - or else the United States 
would have to join the convention. Despite previous statements to the 
contrary, the note could only be taken to mean that the United States 
chose the latter alternative. It was also clearly stated that the United 
States demanded the right to participate in the working out of the pro­
jected agreement. One could notice once more the difficulty the 
State Department had in steering a middle course between its traditional 
foreign policy and a desire to safeguard the economic interests of Ame­
rican nationals. 
The attitude of the American Government apparently had consider­
able influence on that of the West European powers. After making in­
quiries in Washington, the British Government replied that it was unable 
to accept the draft convention, principally owing to the difficulties in­
volved in the suggested jurisdiction. But as the United States had already 
announced that they were unable to accept the draft for weightier reasons, 
the British Government found it unnecessary to make specific objections. 
At the Foreign Office the wish was now expressed that Norway should 
reach an agreement with the United States before further steps were 
taken.12 
The French Government abstained from making any official pro­
nouncements. And it was clearly stated that one would not annoy the 
United StatesYl The Norwegian Government was privately forwarded a 
commentary14 on the draft, which was the work of Louis Renault, the 
legal adviser of the French Foreign Ministry. The Belgian Government, 
too, found no reasons to make any observationsYi 
The Dutch Government objected to Norway, Russia and Sweden 
stating in the preamble to the draft convention the part they had played 
in the discovery of the archipelago, and pointed out that this was not 
historically correct. At the Hague the only discovery of Svalbard which 
was recognized was Barents' in 1596. It was further observed in the 
Dutch note that the statement that territorical waters were to extend 
to the eight nautical mile line must be a misprint. This was, however, 
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not the case: it was in fact a compromise; the Russians would have liked 
to have made it even greater. The Dutch Government, moreover, wanted 
compulsory arbitration in disputes arising out of the interpretation and 
application of the convention, whereas the draft only proposed arbitration 
when circumstances permitted.16 
The Danish observations only concerned the method of covering 
expenses, as it was feared that Denmark, which in reality had no interests 
in Svalbard, should be forced to pay a disproportionately large amount 
of the costs of the suggested arrangement,17 
The German observations, on the contrary, were quite far-reaching. 
In the opinion of the German Government,it was doubtful whether the 
suggested international jurisdiction of Svalbard would work satisfactorily. 
There were particular reasons for investigating whether the laws which 
were to be applied, and which according to the draft were largely to be 
worked out by the Svalbard commission, ought to be laid down in the 
convention itself. Furthermore, one ought to examine whether it might 
not be necessary to provide a more effective guarantee for the indepen­
dence of the Svalbard legal authorities. The German Government also 
made objections to the regulations dealing with the legality of former 
claims, and against the competence of the magistrate and the Svalbard 
commission to settle disputes about such claims. It proposed that in cases 
of this nature the decision should either be made by an institution in which 
nationals of all the interested states were represented, or by an absolutely 
neutral body. The German Government also found it difficult to accept 
the rules of the draft convention to the effect that the contracting powers 
should see to it that judgments and verdicts pronounced by the Svalbard 
legal authorities be executed in their territory,18 All things considered, 
the answers which were received could hardly be regarded as encourag­
ing. The German and, above all, the American Government had made 
far-reaching objections, while the British and the French Governments 
had abstained from making detailed observations at all. As a result, 
there was not much hope of being able to reach a speedy solution to the 
problem. Foreign Minister Taube, who in October 1911 was replaced by 
the Minister in Washington, Count Albert Ehrensvard, could not look 
back on any great progress in the Svalbard policy for whose main outline, 
more than anyone else, he was responsible. 
* 
After the somewhat cool reception the draft convention had received, 
the governments of Norway, Sweden and Russia were in doubt as to 
how they should proceed. It was, however, clear that if progress were to 
be made, new proposals regarding rules for the validity of old claims 
and the settling of land disputes, must be worked out. This would have 
to be the first and most important task; and it was agreed to meet in 
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January, 1912, in Oslo, to discuss the observations on the draft conven­
tion. The Norwegian proposed amendments19 were made the basis for 
discussions, and the draft convention was rapidly gone through. A very 
amicable tone prevailed, and all parties did their best not to jeopardize 
the unity which had been achieved between the three states. 
As far as the Svalbard Commission was concerned, a proviso was 
added that members should be legal experts and should enjoy the highest 
moral reputation, and that voting should be by secret balIot.20 
In the rules for legal procedure in cases to be decided by the police 
commissioner, the amendment was made that the accused should be 
entitled to have a defending counsel appointed by his government.21 
And the regulations laying down the competency of the magistrate were 
more clearly framed.22 It was further agreed to include in the convention 
a clause to the effect that the signatory powers should establish com­
petent jurisdiction for cases arising on Svalbard and which, according to 
the convention, should be settled by the national courts.23 
As the American and German objections were primarily aimed at 
the regulations in the draft convention dealing with the right to use land 
in Svalbard, and against the way in which land disputes should be settled, 
the conference dealt chiefly with these questions. 
With regard to the former question, the Norwegian delegates pro­
posed as an amendment other rules for land occupied before the con­
vention came into force than those which were to apply to land claimed 
subsequently. They were of the opinion that the rules for delimitation of 
the area, and the obligation to exploit the land, should not apply to older 
claims. The Russians had at that time no claims in Svalbard, but it was 
they who at the previous conference had proposed these restrictions, and 
they would not depart from the main principles which had been agreed 
on with regard to this point.24 Instead they suggested that the question as 
to what rights were enjoyed by those who had claimed land in Svalbard 
before the convention came into force, should be decided by an arbitration 
tribunal. It was envisaged that this could consist of a representative from 
each of the Three-Power Conference States, and in addition the United 
States, Great Britain and Germany could have a representative each. 
while the president of the court should belong to a non-interested power. 
With regard to the latter question, dissatisfaction was felt primarily 
with the regulations which laid down that disputes about land claimed 
before the convention came into force should also be decided by the 
Svalbard magistrate - who would be a Norwegian - with a right tu 
appeal to the Svalbard commission, where only Norway, Russia and 
Sweden were represented. The other states, with some justification, main­
tained that this method of procedure did not altogether guarantee an im­
partial decision. Either all interested parties would have to be represented 
in the court, or else the decision would have to be in the hands of a neu-
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tral court. To put this right, it was agreed to let the above-mentioned 
arbitration court also decide disputes of this nature.25 
The British Government eventually decided to submit its observa­
tions, which concerned primarily the question of jurisdiction. A:cording 
to British legal procedure the law courts in Great Britain could not deal 
with disputes which had arisen between British nationals in Svalbard, 
without making a legal amendment which it was doubtful whether Parlia­
ment would accept. It might be possible to find a solution by establishing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Svalbard, according to the terms of the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act. But the British Government considered that it 
would be more advisable, with the consent of all the interested powers. 
to organize a suitable legal set-up in the islands with law courts arriving 
at their decisions according to recognized European principles of law. 
Similar difficulties arose with regard to the draft convention's re­
gulation that criminal cases be tried by the courts of the defendant's 
country of origin. Without a change in the existing laws being made. 
the British Government would not be able to fetch home persons who 
had committed crimes in Svalbard in order to have them tried by British 
courts of law, except in the case of murder and manslaughter. 
The British Government further considered that the rule that the 
commission should always sit in the country to which the president be­
longed, and not in Svalbard, would result in practical difficulties. It was 
also pointed out that the draft contained no regulation for the contingency 
that the members of the commission were unable to reach agreement and 
that it did not take sufficient account of British interests. An international 
commission in which the plaintiff's nationality was represented would be 
preferable to the proposed arrangement with one magistrate. Finally 
objections were raised to the clause that territorial waters should extend 
to eight nautical miles.26 
The information that Great Britain, according to current legal prac­
tice, was not in a position to fetch home people who were guilty of crimes 
in Svalbard and try them before British courts, caused considerable sur­
prise in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. This very method of procedure 
had been proposed in the memorandum which the British envoy in Oslo 
had handed to Foreign Minister Irgens. But when the Norwegian envoy 
in London pointed this out, the British Government answered in a note 
that Sir Arthur Herbert's suggestion was quite private, and that he had 
made this clear to Foreign Minister Irgens. The Foreign Office did 
not share the views set forth in the memorandumP Foreign Minister 
Irgens had, however, always been under the impression that the sug­
gestion came from the Foreign Office, even though Sir Arthur had de­
scribed it as private. This method might have been chosen so that the 
British Government could have its hands tree. The episode might perhaps 
be taken as proof that in 1910 the Foreign Office had not studied the 
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facts of the case in any great detail, but had chiefly been concerned with 
promoting unity between Norway and Sweden. 
It was agreed to publish the draft simultaneously in Norway, Russia 
and Sweden. The Norwegian press was cautious in its commentary, but 
it was clear that there was not complete satisfaction with the result. Some 
papers expressed their dissatisfaction that Norway had not been given a 
greater say. The leading papers otherwise reflected considerable skepti­
cism with regard to Russo-Scandinavian cooperation. I t was feared that 
it would entail disadvantages for the weakest members of the trium­
virate.28 In Sweden greater satisfaction seemed to reign. It was pointed 
out that only a short while ago Norway had claimed the archipelago, and 
in view of this, it was felt that the result was not at alI bad.29 The press 
in the other European countries did little more than announce the draft 
convention without offering any comments. A single British paper, re­
ferring to the annexation of 1614, deplored that Great Britain had not 
played a more active part.30 But as the observations which the states had 
previously made were only partly complied with, the same objections 
were, by and large, repeated by the Foreign Ministries.31 
The American Plan for an International Administration. 
In the summer of 1911 the Arctic Coal Company had some trouble 
with its workers, in the course of which the manager, John Gibson, was 
assaulted. The trouble seems to have been caused by a few Swedes, who 
were immediately transported to Norway and charged with insubordina­
tion,1 but the Norwegian courts of justice considered the case to be out­
side their competency. The company contacted the American Minister 
in Oslo in order to have the workers transferred to Sweden. The Nor­
wegian-Swedish extradition clauses could not, however, be applied, as 
the offences had been committed outside Norwegian territory, and the 
indictment had to be sheIved.2 One result of this incident was that the 
company in its annual report to the State Department strongly empha­
sized the need for a police and judicial authority in Svalbard, although it 
still considered a comprehensive administrative and judicial organisation 
sunperfluous. 
As there seemed no immediate prospect of a solution to the claims 
disputes, Longyear appealed anew to the State Department for protection 
for what he alIeged to be his property.3 The American Government, there­
fore, demanded as a condition for attending the projected conference in 
Oslo that a settlement should have been reached in these disputes, thus 
putting some pressure on the Norwegian Government, which having 
obtained a few minor concessions from the American Government, had 
to abandon its demands with regard to the litigation procedure con­
templated.4 
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The State Department, faced with a demand from the Arctic Coal 
Company for an authority capable of maintaining law and order in Sval­
bard, and moreover finding the draft convention unacceptable, set out, 
in the winter of 1912, to prepare a convention of its own, calculated to 
meet the needs of the American interests in the archipelago. Its main 
principles were laid down hy the New York lawyer, Robert Lansing 
who on various occasions had acted as adviser to the State Department. 
It proved no easy task to work out a simplified set-up, despite repeated 
demands from the Arctic Coal Company's lawyer that the arrangement 
should be made as inexpensive as possible.5 In the meantime, Longyear 
produced a highly ingenious scheme, based on the principle that the 
forthcoming conference should entrust the government of Svalbard to a 
limited liability company with a joint-stock capital of 10 million dollars.6 
The State Department, however, considered that this arrangement 
smacked altogether too much of business; besides, what would happen 
if the Russians acquired the majority of the shares? 
From the political point of view the establishment of a proper 
government for Svalbard was extremely difficult as long as the archi­
pelago remained a no man's land. Any exercise of authority or govern­
ment, in the sense here dealt with, would apparently have to be based 
on the state principle or the state idea. The question of the ultimate 
source of sovereignty being, however, irrelevant, the main problem to be 
tackled was how state authority could be exercised in a no man's land. 
The question which had not been dealt with by the Oslo Conference was 
tackled by Robert Lansing who reasoned as follows: "In order to ap­
proach the subject intelligently it was necessary at the outset to lay down 
a few premises which were more or less axiomatic. First: Sovereignty is, 
stated in general terms, the power to do all things without account­
ability. Second: Sovereignty in its exercise finds expression in the direc­
tion and limitation of human action in its relation to persons and things; 
and this direction and limitation may be restricted by a spatial sphere 
or by the particular persons, whose actions are directed and limited. 
Third: Government is an exercise of sovereignty and is, therefore, de­
pendent for its existence on the existence of sovereignty. Admitting the 
correctness of these two general forms of sovereign authority, namely 
the exercise of direction and limitation of human action within a defined 
area without regard to the persons affected, which furnishes the concept 
of territorial sovereignty (dominium) and the exercise of direction and 
control of the actions of particular persons without regard to the place 
of exercise, which furnishes the concept of political sovereignty (impe­
rium), "7 Lansing supposed that the signatory powers might delegate the 
latter form, political sovereignty, to the Svalbard Government, which 
would thus have a theoretical basis for the exercise of authority over the 
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persons residing in the archipelago, provided they belonged to the powers 
which were party to the convention.8 And as the American draft conven­
tion was based on the principle that the archipelago should remain a no 
state's land it did not recognize property rights to land, only user's 
rights.9 
The legislative authority should be entrusted to an international 
commission subject to the unanimous consent and approval of the con­
tracting powers and to the preliminary declarations and provisions of the 
convention. This commission should consist of three members, Norway, 
Russia and Sweden appointing one each, subject to the approval of the 
signatory powers.10 The last mentioned clause viz. that the appointment 
should be subject to the approval of the signatory powers, was rather 
far-reaching. By means of this veto system, however, the United States 
intended to acquire control of the projected government of Svalbard. The 
United States Government reasoned that the bodies and persons exer­
cising authority in the archipelago did so on behalf of the signatory 
powers, and should consequently be placed under control of the latter. 
The executive power should be placed in the hands of administrative 
officers consisting of a commissioner-general and a police commissioner 
appointed by ordinances of the international commission subject to sum­
mary removal by the commission which might exercise such power at 
will, and should exercise such power at the request of any two of the 
contracting powers. The commissioner-general should act as chief ad­
ministrative officer, fiscal officer and land officer of Svalbard. The com­
missioner-general should reside at the principle settlement in the archi­
pelago for a fixed period, and for the remainder of the year in Troms0, 
and the police commissioner should reside permanently at the principle 
settlement in Svalbard.ll 
Judicial power should be vested in the commissioner-general, who 
should in his judicial capacity sit as judge of an international court in 
Svalbard, in the Court of First Instance at Troms0, in the criminal courts 
of the contracting powers, and in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
the Hague. The respective jurisdictions of the various courts were speci­
fied in the draft.12 The draft, moreover, contained rules for the claiming 
and use of land, personal contracts made in Svalbard, licenses, hunting, 
fishing, public property, etc.1:3 The expenses involved in the proposed 
administration should be covered by fees, legal costs, fines and public 
charges. Should the moneys derived from the above-mentioned sources 
prove insufficient, the deficiency should be covered by the signatory 
powers contributing in equal shares.a Taxes on coal production were not 
mentioned in the draft. 
Any power might adhere to the convention, and any signatory or 
adherent might, at one year's notice to the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
withdraw from the agreement, which should remain in force as long as 
four powers remained parties thereto.15 
-91-
Several motives were reflected in the American draft convention. 
The United States, owing to its traditional foreign policy of non-inter­
vention in European affairs, felt that it could not participate in the 
government of Svalbard. Consequently it tried to achieve a measure of 
control over this government by means of a veto arrangement. Moreover, 
it was obvious that the draft aimed at favoring Norway, the weakest of 
the powers with a seat on the Svalbard commission, by providing that the 
president and the secretary should be Norwegian. For obvious reasons 
it was felt in the State Department that giving a great power like Russia 
so strong a position in the Svalbard commission as the three-power 
proposal did, might entail considerable disadvantages. In the financing 
of the proposed administration the American draft, as might be expected, 
tried to favor the American mining companies, which had repeatedly ex­
pressed their fear of having to pay all the sums required for the sug­
gested administration and were therefore anxious to reduce the amount 
to a minimum. The United States was also careful to include a clause 
which allowed it to withdraw from the convention at a year's notice. 
The United States had objected to the three-power draft as being 
too expensive and too complicated. It was, however, open to debate 
whether the American draft contained any real improvement in this re­
spect, though to a certain extent it was better fitted to satisfy immediate 
needs. The United States Government tried to get Great Britain and 
Germany to agree to the draft, and the latter power seems to have 
adopted a favorable attitude.16 The matter was probably somewhat more 
involved as far as Great Britain was concerned, as she was anxious to 
avoid offending Russia. 
Negotiating while the Great Powers Mobilize. 
The diplomatic negotiations and the publicity they received in­
creased public interest in the archipelago, and it seemed as if some 
nations were keen to emphasize their achievements in the polar regions 
in order to back up their claims. In the summer of 1910 Arctic exhibitions 
were arranged in Russia and in Sweden. The exhibition in Stockholm 
aimed particularly to give visitors to the International Geological Congress, 
then being held there, an impression of what Swedish exploration in Sval­
bard had accomplished. Delegates to the Congress were also invited on 
a trip to the archipelago. In Archangel the Society for the Exploration 
of the Arctic Areas of Russia held a polar exhibition to stimulate interest 
in the northern regions. The Russian press repeated its old demands for 
a more enterprising Arctic policy, and complaints were raised that the 
Norwegians were too aggressive, and even tried to establish themselves 
on Novaya Zemlya; and the Russian authorities decided to send an ex­
pedition with colonists to the islands. The caution which had been a 
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feature of Russian foreign policy after the defeat at the hands of Japan 
was gradually disappearing. This was noticeable not only in the Balkans 
and in Persia, but to some extent in the Arctic as well. 
Russians and Swedes now began to take part in the economic ex­
ploitation of Svalbard, more or less at the instigation of the state autho­
rities, or with the help of state institutions. In the summer of 1910 a 
Swedish expedition was sent north to investigate the possibilities of coal 
mining. It was particularly the iron industry which wanted to cover its 
demands, but representatives of the Swedish railways were also interested 
in the project. A company was formed to develop the fields which were 
claimed, but in the years immediately following only a little experimental 
working was started. 
North Russia had a considerable coal consumption, which was 
covered by imports from Great Britain, and it was an obvious thing for 
the Russians to try to meet these demands by coal from Svalbard. In 
1912 they fitted out an expedition which undertook some prospecting, 
and in the following years the Russians did a little experimental working.1 
Several British companies reported claims in Svalbard to the Foreign 
Office. One of them, the Northern Exploration Company, was later to 
play an important rule. Together the British companies had large areas 
at their disposal, and they started experimental working in a number of 
fields. But satisfactory results were not achieved, and in addition a 
serious land dispute arose between an English and a Swedish company. 
The Swedish Government suggested arbitration, but at the desire of the 
British the case was postponed in expectation of a general settlement for 
Svalbard. 
On the expedition of Prince Heinrich of Prussia and Count Ferdinand 
Zeppelin, in 1910, a few minor areas were claimed. Somewhat later the 
Hamburg America Line and the Norddeutscher L1oyd, which used to send 
tourist ships to Svalbard, claimed several small tracts of land, chiefly 
for the purpose of building tourist stations.2 A German geologist visited 
the archipelago and investigated the possibilities of exploiting oil bearing 
shale, but this produced no positive results. And the Germans did not 
succeed in participating in the mining industry of Vestspitsbergen. 
Though considerable capital and a lot of expert knowledge were 
available to exploit the Svalbard coalfields, it was nevertheless difficult 
to make any profit. In the entire pre-war period it was only the American 
and a couple of Norwegian companies which had any production, but 
the whole output never exceeded 50, 000 tons a year, of which the Ame­
ricans produced about o/s. 
Fishing, sealing and hunting decreased during these years. After 
1909 it proved unprofitable for hunters to spend the winter in the archi­
pelago, and fewer and fewer expeditions were sent out. An occasional 
vessel from North Norway continued to carry on a little sealing and hunt-
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ing during the summer, but the results were never encouraging. In 1912 
the two last whaling companies had to cease operations, as there was 
hardly any whales left. Norwegian ships still carried on some tourist 
traffic, and a few companies specialized in organizing hunting trips for 
wealthy individuals, particularly Germans. On the whole the economic 
activities in the archipelago were by no means in proportion to the poli­
tical activities which the interested powers displayed. 
Communications between Svalbard and the mainland were consider­
ably improved. The Norwegian Telegraph Service had long considered 
building a strong wireless station which could serve the northern coastal 
area and part of the Barents Sea. The question acquired immediacy when 
the American company wished to establish wireless communication be­
tween its plant in Svalbard and the continental telegraph system. It re­
quested the Norwegian Telegraph Service either to build a station or 
grant the company a concession to do so, or else to cooperate in carrying 
out the plan. The Storting decided forthwith that Norway should under­
take to construct the necessary wireless stations, and the Telegraph 
Service made a contract with the Arctic Coal Company whereby it under­
took to build one wireless station in Svalbard and one in Northern Nor­
way, and to transmit the company's correspondence for a period of 15 
years. The Arctic Coal Company would undertake to build one or several 
smaller stations in communication with the Telegraph Service, but they 
were not to be so powerful that they could establish radio contact with 
the mainland; this practice was later followed by other companies. The 
postal service was also improved. A post office was established in the 
archipelago, and a service, which made two trips a month, was main­
tained during the summer at the expense of the Norwegian Post Office. 
The Norwegians had now taken the lead in exploration. From 1909 
expeditions were sent out annually from Norway. They carried out com­
prehensive work, especially in the fields of cartography and geology, but 
also In other fields.3 In the first two years the expeditions were led by 
Captain Gunnar Isachsen, later by the geologist Adolf Hoel and Captain 
Arve Staxrud. Several expeditions from other countries visited the 
archipelago during these years. The expedition of Prince Heinrich of 
Prussia and Count Zeppelin which was organized on a grand scale, 
aroused widespread attention. Its object was said to be preliminary 
investigations for an expedition to the North Pole by airship. The party 
included a large staff of scientists, and a meteorological and wireless 
station was set up. A number of experiments with balloons were made, 
apparently with good results. And although the projected flight to the 
Pole was not attempted, princes and airships were apt to stir people's 
imagination and make the Arctic islands headline news. 
* 
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During the years when negotiations had been proceeding, the powers 
had taken increasing interest in the archipelago, and in view of the 
international tension its strategic importance was undoubtedly considered 
by the naval staffs. Diplomats had succeeded in partly bridging the gaps, 
but new difficulties had arisen, which might make themselves strongly 
felt when the projected conference was finally convened. 
Owing to change of government in Norway and the unrest in South­
East Europe consideration of the Svalbard question was not resumed 
until the autumn of 1913. After preliminary discussion with Russia and 
Sweden Norway invited the powers to send their delegates to Oslo in 
June 1914, and on this occasion all the powers except Belgium were 
willing to attend on the proposed date. A few weeks later the United States 
sent its draft convention to the Three-Power Conference States, and 
requested Norway to send a copy to each of the other interested powers. 
In view of the great divergence between the American draft and that of 
the three powers, it was not easy to arrive at a compromise. After con­
sidering several ways of proceeding, the Three-Power Conference States 
agreed to submit the American draft to the conference, though this would 
have to be based on their own draft. 
After many difficulties and objections, Norway, Sweden and Russia 
eventually agreed to bring their delegates together twelve days before 
the conference, in order to work out amendments to their draft, on the 
basis of the observations of the various states and the American draft. 
Norway was represented by the same delegates as previously; while the 
other two states sent new representatives. In February 1914 there had 
been a political crisis in Sweden on the question of defense, and County 
Governor Hjalmar Hammarskj6ld had formed a new Government. He 
was replaced as Sweden's first delegate by former Foreign Minister Eric 
Trolle; the Swedish Minister in Osl o, Baron Fredrik Ramel, was second 
delegate. Russia was represented by Director in the Foreign Ministry, 
Alfred Bentkovsky, and her envoy to Oslo, Sergei Arsenyev. 
On this occasion the three states went considerably farther, in their 
attempt to meet the wishes of the other powers, than at the 1912 con­
ference. It was agreed to propose that the preamble to the draft con­
vention be amended, so that it became more readily apparent that the 
three states had undertaken to work out a government for Svalbard on 
behalf of all the interested powers, i. e. that they were acting, as it were, 
in the r(lle of l1landaiories. Furthermore, they acceded to the Dutch re­
quest to omit the reference to their participation in the discovery of the 
archipelago.'1 Out of deference to the United States' desire that the signa­
tory powers should exercise an effective control over the SvaJbard COI11-
mission, it was agreed to propose that tIle ordinances worked out by the 
Commission should be submitted to the signatory powers and accepted 
by them on the basis of a majority voting.;' To meet the demand for still 
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more neutral juridical proceedings, it was agreed to abolish the Svalbard 
Commission as an appeal court for the decisions of the magistrate and 
the police commissioner. In its place an international tribunal was en­
visaged. The Svalbard Commission could decide where this was to be 
situated, and appoint the president of the court from among the subjects 
of a state which had no economic interest in the archipelago; the other 
members could be appointed by the governments of the parties con­
cerned.6 It was considered advisable, at the same time, to increase the 
powers of the Svalbard magistrate.7 As several states had objected to the 
draft convention not containing clear rules on which the Svalbard legal 
authorities could base their decisions, it was agreed to propose the use 
of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligation of 1911, and the Swiss Federal 
Code of Civil Law of 1907, with the modifications which the Svalbard 
Commission, with the approval of the signatory powers, considered 
necessary.8 
In order to remove the most serious British objections to jurisdiction, 
an arrangement was suggested, the essence of which being that the states 
which did not consider it possible to set up a competent jurisdiction for 
crimes committed in Svalbard, could transfer jurisdiction over their 
nationals to another of the signatory powers.9 With regard to the ex­
penses of the Svalbard government, it was agreed to recommend the 
Danish proposal to divide the powers into three categories. A state in the 
first category should pay five units, a state in the second category two 
units and a state in the third category one unit. In other words a state 
in the first category would have to pay five times as much as one in the 
third category.10 Furthermore, it was decided to accept the French sug­
gestion of compulsory arbitration in all disputes regarding the inter­
pretation of the convention, when circumstances permitted.!1 Cases might 
easily occur, however, in which questions of the interpretation of the 
convention and its application were closely related to one another. 
When the representatives of the powers were finally able to meet, 
seven years after the matter had been raised, the political situation in 
Europe had become fraught with tension. In the spring of 1914, Germany 
was seething with reports of an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, and 
British denials were incapable of allying German suspicion.12 In the 
course of the summer there were rumors of military activity which boded 
ill. The arrogance of the great powers seemed to grow with the increase 
in their armed preparations. Though it had been possible by long and 
careful deliberations on the Svalbard question to remove a great number 
of stumbling blocks, serious new difficulties had arisen in their place. 
Under the circumstances it was a far from easy problem which confronted 
the delegates to the conference. 
The United States was represented by the envoy in Oslo, Albert 
G. Schmedeman, former Minister in Madrid William M. Collier and legal 
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adviser to the State Department Fred K. Nielsen. Collier was taken ill 
during the conference and was replaced by Assistant Secretary of State 
Alvey A. Adee, who happened to be in Europe at the time. The other 
great powers were represented by their envoys in Oslo and a legal expert: 
France by Minister Abel Chevalley and Professor Elie Chevalley; Great 
Britain by Minister Mansfeldt de Cardonnel Findlay and the lawyer H. W. 
Malkin; and Germany by Minister Count Alfred von Oberndorff and 
Or. Waiter Si mons, legal adviser to the German Foreign Ministry; Den­
mark and Holland were only represented by their envoys in Oslo, Minister 
Otto Krag and Minister Count ]ohan van Limburg Stirum, respectively. 
The Norwegian Government's chief delegate, Or. Francis Hagerup, was 
elected President of the Conference. 
Several representatives of the coal mining industry in the archipelago 
also gathered in Oslo to follow the discussions at close range. Longyear 
invited the conference delegates on a trip to Svalbard, so that they could 
study conditions at first hand. Fortunately for Longyear the invitation 
was declinedYl The 20 odd diplomats would hardly have been parti­
cularly comfortable on board the old whaler at the disposal of the Arctic 
Coal Company. 
At the first meeting, the amended draft of the three states was sub­
mitted, together with an explanatory report from Or. Hagerup. Thereupon 
the conference was adjourned for a week in order that the delegates 
should be given a further opportunity to acquaint themselves with the new 
proposals. As the need arose committees were appointed. One was 
entrusted with the task of investigating questions on which the conference 
was unable to agree, another was to discuss the regulations for covering 
the expenses of the projected arrangement, and an editorial committee 
was set up to deal with the articles on which the conference agreed. 
It soon became apparent what were the decisive points of disagree­
ment, but no clear grouping took place. To a certain extent Norway, 
Sweden and Russia were obliged to defend jointly the points of view set 
forth in the three-power draft, with Russia making the final pronounce­
ment on behalf of the three. The Danish, French, Dutch and British 
delegates adopted on the whole a cautious attitude. The greatest differ­
ences of opinion arose between the American and German delegates on 
the one hand, with their demands for far-reaching amendments to the 
three-pllwer draft, and the Russian delegates on the other hand, who 
declined to agree to the German and American demands. 
When the American delegates arrived in Oslo, they assumed that 
the draft convention which the State Department had worked out, would 
be submitted to the conference as an alternative to the three-power draft. 
The conference, however, was not ill a position to deal with the American 
draft, as it was written in English and was based entirely on Anglo­
American legal principle". Tile other nations had to use the three-power 
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draft as a basis for their investigations into the matter; in any case it 
would have to be translated into French. This would take time, and the 
State Department agreed that the American delegates should only use 
their draft as a basis for the demands they submitted to the conference.1� 
As the chief aim of the American Government was to secure effective con­
trol of administration and legislation its delegates persisted in their at­
tempts for a veto with respect to the choice of the members of the Three­
Power Commission, and the rules agreed on by the Commission. The 
Russian delegates were prepared to go as far as accepting the veto in the 
case of the rules drawn up by the Svalbard Commission,15 but they would 
under no circumstances agree to the signatory powers' veto with regard 
to the election of members of the Three-Power Commission, or other 
officials. It was considered a slight that other states should have the right 
to intervene in the Russian Government's choice of its own subjects for 
official duties in the Svalbard administration,16 and the American dele­
gates, anxious not to create a deadlock, agreed to drop their demand for 
a veto regarding election to offices, provided the conference agreed on 
the other points in the draft convention.17 There was, however, little 
chance of this being done. 
In the course of the years during which the Svalbard negotiations 
had been proceeding, the German Government had completely altered its 
point of view. In the earlier stages repeated assertions had been made 
in the German Foreign Ministry that Germany was only interested in 
finding a solution; but after the first Three-Power Conference, it was 
stated that correspondence with the Hanseatic towns had clearly shown 
that German interests in the islands were quite considerable. This volte­
face in the German Foreign Ministry must be seen in connection with the 
expedition of Prince Heinrich and Count Zeppelin. And now, in 1914, it 
was stated that large firms and shipping companies and even a prominent 
person had interests in the archipelago.18 Germany's interests in Svalbard 
were undoubtedly greater than those of Norway, Russia and Sweden 
combined, and therefore the German Government could not accept the 
proposal that the government of the territory should be handed over to 
a commission on which only these three states were represented. This 
would become a sort of condominium.19 Instead the German Government 
sought to persuade some of the other interested powers to agree to an 
arrangement whereby the Svalbard Commission should have a permanent 
seat - Oslo, Copenhagen or the Hague were all possibilities - and 
consist of one representative of the state where the Commission was 
situated and of the diplomatic representatives in that country of the other 
interested states, assisted by legal experts.20 This proposal was submitted 
to the conference. The German delegates admittedly also declared them­
selves satisfied with an unlimited veto,21 but this seems to have been a 
manoeuvre in order to achieve a measure of cooperation with the 
7 
-98-
Americans. In the German Foreign Ministry the opinIOn was that the 
American proposal, based on the veto principle, was quite impracticable. 
If any state at any time could reverse any decision, the whole legal set-up 
would become an illusion and cease to exist, the head of the legal section 
declared.22 It was quite clear that what the German Government really 
desired was to get a member on the Svalbard Commission, irrespective 
of what form it was finally given, and it looked as though it were pre­
pared to upset the conference on this issue. It feared that the Russian 
delegates would propose putting the decisions of the conference to a 
vote. The German delegates had therefore been instructed to oppose any 
such procedure.23 
The American Government had repeatedly emphasized that it had 
no political interests in Svalbard, but merely desired to protect the eco­
nomic rights of its nationals. The instructions of its delegates were in 
essence that "it was not deemed to be for the best interests of the Govern­
ment or to be consistent with its established politics either to contribute to 
the expenses of maintaining a government in Spitsbergen or to share in 
the responsibility of its administration".24 The German Government mean­
while had made energetic attempts in Washington to get the American 
Government to consent to being represented in the Svalbard administra­
tion. It maintained that a step of this kind did not conflict with the 
Monroe Doctrine as in this case it was a no man's land which was to 
be administered jointly by the powers. It appears that, to a certain extent, 
this view had been accepted in the State Department, for in the instruc­
tions issued to the American delegates it was furthermore stated that, if 
it should prove impossible to get the veto rules accepted, they could 
agree to an arrangement which more or less corresponded with the 
German proposals. But before they suggested or discussed a plan of 
this sort, they were to submit a report to the State Department stating 
the reasons which, in their opinion, made it necessary to take this step. 
Before the American Government had received a report, considered it, 
and sent special instructions to its delegates, they were not to discuss an 
arrangement of this kind.25 The delegation therefore consistently main­
tained that the United States did not wish to be represented in the admi­
nistration of the territory,26 since the veto arrangement had just as much 
chance of being accepted as the German proposal. 
The Norwegian delegates were willing to agree to the German claim, 
because they believed that the veto system would hamper the admini­
stration more than if all the interested states were represented.27 The 
Swedish delegates adopted a similar attitude.28 The British delegates 
agreed to accept the German proposals on two conditions: that the British 
Government should not be forced to be represented on a Svalbard C0111-
mission, and that the proposal was accepted by the three states most 
interested, Norway, Russia and Sweden.29 In this way it was possible to 
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avo id running counter to Russian interests. The French delegates adopted 
a similar attitude, and openly declared that they could only accept a 
proposal which Russia was able to accept.30 The Danish and Dutch 
delegates attempted to be as neutral as possible and abstained from any 
definite standpoint. 
While the conference was sitting the international situation became 
increasingly acute. At the end of June came the report of the murder of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Sophie von Hohenberg, which 
was a great shock to the delegates. 31 In the course of July the troops of the 
great powers were taking up their positions on the frontiers of Europe.32 
It was now fairly clear that war was inevitable. At a time of such nervous 
tensions it would be exceedingly difficult for an international conference, 
where both the Entente and the Central Powers were represented, to reach 
agreement. Nevertheless, energetic attempts were made to achieve prac­
tical results. The draft convention was twice discussed in detail, but it 
was impossible to reconcile the German and Russian points of view.33 
The German Government demanded the right to be represented in the 
administration of the archipelago; the Russian Government would not 
agree to this in any form. After the delegates had been assembled through­
out the month of July there was no further course left but to postpone 
the discussions. It was agreed that the conference should convene again 
in February of the ensuing year, but before the delegates had reached 
their own countries war had already broken out. 
Since negotiations had started seven years earlier, an interesting 
series of proposals had been submitted and many attempts had been made 
to find a solution. Norway had proposed two alternatives: a sort of joint 
administration by all the interested powers, and an arrangement whereby 
Norway assumed jurisdiction. On the initiative of Sweden energetic 
attempts had been made to set up a form of joint Norwegian-Russian­
Swedish administration. The United States had proposed that this three­
power administration should be made dependent on a veto system, which 
would enable everyone of the signatory powers to exercise effective 
control; and finally Germany had proposed a jo int administration of all 
interested powers, based partly on ideas touched on by the Norwegian 
Government at the commencement of negotiations. But it had been im­
possible to agree on any of these alternatives. 
Although the conference had convened at an exceptionally difficult 
time, the unsatisfactory outcome was not only due to trifles or ruffled 
tempers. The clarification of the situation which the conference had pro­
duced was in effect calculated to create profound pessimism. To a certain 
extent the result which had been achieved by laborious discussions over 
a period of many years were nullified. The very principle on which 
discussions had formerly been based, viz. that the administration of Sval­
bard should be in the hands of a few powers, was upset. What the Ger-
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man Government unconditionally demanded was that this principle should 
be rejected and replaced by another based on the participation of all 
interested states in the government of the territory. It is easy to under­
stand why it was impossible for the conference to carry out such a com­
plete change of course. 
The motive adduced by the German Government to support its claim 
for participation in the administration of the archipelago was not quite 
convincing. German interests in the islands were not large; but the 
Germans were apparently inclined to attach some strategic importance to 
the Arctic in view of the grouping of powers obtaining, and for obvious 
reasons they were not in favor of Scandinavian-Russian cooperation. 
However, one gets the impression that their attitude was above all dictated 
by considerations of prestige and the desire for parity with Russia. 
Antagonism had now reached the point where it was hard to make the 
slightest concession. When the conference assembled, war was probably 
regarded as something of a foregone conclusion in Berlin, and under 
these circumstances Germany was naturally reluctant to grant any ad­
vantage to her opponent. 
As far as the Russians were concerned the matter was clear enough. 
They had always been on their guard against German expansion in the 
Arctic, and they would acquire a stronger position in serving on a joint 
commission with the two small Scandinavian states, than they would if 
some other great powers were also represented on it. Moreover, they 
could be certain of British and French support; and in the circumstances 
they found no reason to accede to the German claims. As far as Sweden 
and Norway were concerned, the matter was an entirely different one. 
In fact, the point at issue was not very large, and it seems sur­
prising that it should prove impossible to arrive at a practical solution. 
But the problem actually appeared to make unduly large claims on the 
ability of the powers to cooperate, or on their goodwill in conceding a 
slight advantage to one or more of the parties, even though this might 
entail an amelioration of conditions in the archipelago which would prove 
of benefit to all the states interested. 
The Paris Settlement. 
The Bulk of the Mining is Taken over by Norwegian Interests. 
Though the strategic importance of Svalbard had been stressed by 
the press of many countries, the archipelago did not become a battle­
ground in the first World War. North Russia admittedly played an im­
portant role, and already at an early stage of the war, German U -boats 
operated in the Arctic, but newspaper reports1 to the effect that they 
used Svalbard as a base have not been confirmed. 
The belligerents abandoned their activities on the archipelago. The 
personnel from the German base at Krossfjorden returned home to Ger­
many in the autumn of 1914, and there was no subsequent work under­
taken at the station. The Germans, however, had their eyes fixed on the 
islands. In 1916 the German Admiralty issued a comprehensive descrip­
tion of the waters.2The Germans still intended to play an important part 
in the Arctic, and when they dictated their peace terms to the Russians 
at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, a clause was added whereby the two parties 
agreed to work for an international administration for Svalbard where 
Germany and Russia would enjoy parity. With this in view they would 
request Norway, as soon as possible after the general conclusion of peace, 
to summon a new conference.3 The fact that Germany had included 
clauses about Svalbard in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk aroused wide­
spread attention, and in the allied press it was stated that the Germans 
had far-reaching plans. Both the British and the French Minister in Oslo 
inquired of the Norwegian Government what it intended to do in the 
matter, and were told in reply that Norway held the same view with 
regard to the settling of the Svalbard question as she had done in 1914.4 
The affair was hardly as important as some press announcements tried to 
make it. The treaty clauses really implied little more than that the Ger­
mans demanded the right to participate in the administration of the terri­
tory,5 a claim which the Russians had firmly refused in 1914. The whole 
thing assumed the proportions of a mere episode when Germany had lost 
the war, and the Soviet Russian Government declared in November 1918 
that it did not recognize the validity of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
In 1914 a new company was formed with Russian capital. It was, 
however, taken over by a Norwegian, and only small quantities of coal 
were mined during the war. The other Russian company, the Grumant 
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Mining Company, did not continue working, but the Russian authorities 
planned to increase the production of Svalbard coal as soon as conditions 
permitted. Just before the revolution five million roubles were voted for 
this purpose.6 In 1917 the railway was completed as far as Murmansk, 
thus increasing the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean, and it was 
to be expected that the Russians would devote more attention to these 
waters than they had ever done before. 
The British held aloof, but in some quarters there was considerable 
interest in the archipelago, and the authorities were requested to lay 
claim to it. In the spring of 1918, the Northern Exploration Company, 
with the assistance of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, fitted out 
an expedition to Svalbard. It was organized by Sir Ernest Shackleton, 
though he was forced to leave it at Troms0 in order to take over an im­
portant post in the British expeditionary corps to Murmansk. The object 
of the expedition was to start experimental working, to lodge a protest 
with the Norwegians who were said to have appropriated British land, 
and to seize German property. The British flag was hoisted on the 
German station at Ebeltofthamna.7 This gave rise to rumors that Great 
Britain had occupied Svalbard, rumors which were generally accepted 
until they were denied in the press. 
During the war the Scandinavian countries soon noticed the great 
disadvantage of being dependent on foreign coal. In Norway consump­
tion fell from approximately 3 milIion tons in 1915 to about a million 
tons in 1917, and the shortage was severely felt in industry. This acted 
as a spur to increased investment in coal mining in Svalbard. The price 
of coal was high, so that here were possibilities of mining at a profit, 
and there was plenty of capital available in this boom period. 
The Swedes made great efforts to increase their production, and 
new fields were purchased. There were plans to reach an output of close 
on a million tons a year, but to start with, only small progress was made, 
in the last war year the export being but four thousand tons. A new 
Swedish attempt was also made to exploit phosphate deposits. 
It was the Norwegians, however, who achieved the most favorable 
results. John M. Longyear had never thought of running the mines in 
Svalbard himself; he had only looked for a good investment. But when 
his nephew, William D. Munroe, who ran the undertaking in its first few 
years, died, Longyear was forced to take a more immediate share in the 
work of running the mines at a profit.s For this reason he had considered 
the possibility of selling out as early as 1909, and just before the war 
negotiations were pending with German banks,9 but it was not until 1915 
that the question achieved real actuality. There were several reasons for 
this. That year the ice conditions were unusually bad, and the cooperation 
with the Norwegian authorities, which Longyear had never considered 
quite satisfactory, was rendered more difficult by the war.tO The shortage 
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of mining equipment and means of transport was felt acutely. It was also 
difficult to procure the necessary provisions, and the sending of letters 
and telegrams was hampered. Even though coal prices were good, the 
company felt obliged to give up working in the autumn of 1915.11 Nego­
tiations were started with Russian, Swedish and Norwegian representa­
tives with a view to effecting a sale.12 Encouraged by the state authorities, 
several banks, led by the Bank of Norway, combined to form a syndicate 
with the idea of purchasing the property of the Arctic Coal Company. 
Shipowners, industrial undertakings and businessmen joined hands in this 
venture. Negotiations with the Americans were led by Bank Director 
Nicolay Kielland-Torkildsen, and in the spring of 1916 the deal was put 
through. The coalfields of three Norwegian companies abutting on the 
Arctic Coal Company's areas were also purchased. In this way the long 
protracted boundary disputes were made up. The syndicate was converted 
into a joint stock company, called the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kul­
kompani. 
The new company did not get off to a particularly good start. It was 
difficult to procure the necessary equipment; working conditions and 
wages were to start with unsatisfactory, and Svalbard too was to feel the 
effects of the great ferment which permeated the working class towards 
the end of the war. A serious strike broke out in the mines of the company 
and a naval vessel was sent north with the Troms0 magistrate, who was 
given the task of arbitrating. As this proved unsuccessful the workers 
were shipped home. After this, longshoremen in Norway refused to un­
load ships carrying coal from the company's mines. A settlement was 
reached, however, so that new workers could be sent north before the 
season ended. Despite the fact that there was no public administration of 
justice on the spot, one managed fairly successfully with no intervention 
from the authorities in Norway. A "code" of penal laws had gradually 
developed, based on the principle of fines - a punch on the nose rated 
so much, a box on the ear less, and a fight was "priced" according to 
what it was worth.13 
Other smaller Norwegian companies were also formed, and a few 
of the older ones increased their share capital and started experimental 
working. A couple of them, De Norske Kulfelter Spitsbergen and Kings 
Bay Kul Company employed a considerable number of workers. The 
latter company was engaged in a dispute with the Northern Exploration 
Company over the coalfields. A company started working on Bj0rn0ya, 
not only mining coal, but also taking up production of phosphates 
and asbestos. No little stir was caused when the Arctic Oil Company was 
formed to start dri11ing for oil at Gr0nfjorden.14 The undertaking, how­
ever, proved completely unsuccessful. A company which aimed to deliver 
guano had better luck. Altogether in the summer of 1918 there were 700 
men working in Norwegian concerns, 100 in the Swedish and 50 in the 
British. 
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In 1915 a law was passed in Norway dealing with the state super­
vision of wintering expeditions to Arctic regions. It imposed very severe 
standards as to equipment and provisions, which were to be controlled 
by a commission before departure. The law also stipulated that all ex­
peditions should include vessels available for bringing personnel home, 
or failing this there should be some other guarantee that they be called 
for at a specific time. The object was to save hunters from having to 
spend an additional Arctic winter in their miserable huts, short of provi­
sions, and an easy prey to scurvy. As mining developed, the conditions in 
which wintering hunters worked changed too. They were now able to buy 
provisions from the mining companies, and in this way they could evade 
the law. Their catch could be sent home with the coal ships. A special 
"class" of hunters grew up, who spent several years running in the archi­
pelago. Now and again there would be men of other nationalities than 
Norwegians, but this was exceptional. The hunters also developed their 
own system of justice. Rumors were occasionally current that some 
crimes had been committed, but these were never confirmed. 
The war did not put a stop to exploration. Every year expeditions 
led by Assistant Professor Adolf Hoel and Commander Sverre R0vig, 
were sent out from Norway, and carried out a great deal of work.15 In 
1918 a meteorological station was set up on Bj0rn0ya. Much was also 
expected of a geophysical station at Vestspitsbergen which was to be 
ready in 1920. From a political point of view, however, the decisive 
change that had occurred during the war was that the greater part of 
the mining had been taken over by Norwegians. 
Post-War Attitude toward Svalbard. 
The great change wrought by the war was to have a decisive bear­
ing on the Svalbard question. The economic interests of the various 
powers in the archipelago had been radically altered, while the relative 
strength of the European great powers now presented an entirely new 
picture. Pre-war negotiations had been marked by growing tension be­
tween the two European blocs. One of these was now hors de combat, 
leaving the other free and unhampered. Moreover, one of the powers 
most interested in Svalbard, Russia, was in the throes of a civil war, 
and did not for the moment take any regular share in international 
politics. 
Previollsly, the British Government had not shown any particulal 
interest in the archipelago or regarded it as of much importance. The 
first feelers put out by the Norwegian Government suggested that the 
British would not raise any post-war demands to the territory, or place 
any obstacle in the way of Norway's aspirations.! Events, however, took 
a change which was not entirely favorable to Norway. 
-105 -
Already before the war, the British companies which had occupied 
land in Svalbard and a number of explorers had demanded that Great 
Britain should appropriate the archipelago and cite the occupation of 
1614 as her reason for doing so, or at any rate undertake a formal occu­
pation of the areas claimed by British companies. During the war these 
active elements doubled their efforts. In 1916 the companies sent a joint 
request to the Foreign Office to undertake a "re-annexation". The follow­
ing year the Geographical Society in London decided to send an appeal 
to the Government to secure what was called Great Britain's political, 
economic and strategic interests in the archipelago by occupying it. The 
Government replied, however, that the Svalbard question could only be 
solved by negotiations between all interested states, and that for the time 
being it was not practicable to initiate such discussions.2 Several times 
the demand was also made in Parliament that Great Britain should 
maintain James I's occupation.3 The agitation in rfavor of re-annexation 
was supported by the Northcliffe Press, though it was not until after the 
autumn of 1918, when the Northern Exploration Company's expedition 
had returned, that it gathered momentum. The members of the expedition 
declared that the archipelago not only contained immense wealth, but 
was also of great strategic importance. The prime mover in this campaign 
was the Northern Exploration Company, which published several pam­
phlets in which the possibilities of mining iron ore were emphasized.4 
Others too were of the same opinion. Herbert G. Ponting, a journalist, 
who had been attached to the above-mentioned expedition in the capacity 
of Foreign Office observer, wrote a series of articles in the "Financier", 
in which he asserted that the iron ore deposits in Svalbard were con­
siderably larger than those of North Sweden.5 The real object of these 
exaggerated reports appears to have been to create interest in a British 
appropriation of the archipelago among business circles who could in 
turn bring pressure to bear upon the authorities. "Certain neutral states" 
were accused of appropriating British property during the war - a 
reference to the alleged seizure by the Norwegians of some of the Northern 
Exploration Company's buildings, a matter which was being investigated 
by the Norwegian Attorney General. It was also alleged that the Nor­
wegians had occupied some of the company's land. This really only in­
volved one of many disputed occupations on the archipelago, though 
there was much that suggested that the British company was in the right. 
The British claims were also reflected in the comments of the Dominion 
press.6 
Among the members of the Geographical Society in London Sir 
Martin Conway, an authority on the history of Svalbard, was the most 
tireless advocate of an active British policy. It was on his initiative that 
a request was sent to Foreign Office.7 At a meeting in December, 1918, 
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he gave a lecture on the history of the archipelago. In summing up, he 
declared himself very sceptical with regard to an international arrange­
ment of the kind envisaged before the war, and was of the opinion that 
it would be best if one single state were entrusted with the task of 
protecting the resources of the territory, whether mineral wealth or fauna. 
In his opinion Great Britain had the greatest right to the islands because 
her claims to sovereignty were of longer standing and more sustained 
than those of any other state, and it was the duty of the British Govern­
ment to maintain this right. In the debate that ensued a very bright 
picture was painted of the mineral wealth of the archipelago. After the 
meeting, however, the Director of the Geological Survey, Sir Aubert 
Strahan, sent a letter to the Society in which he pointed out that according 
to a report issued by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
there was no reason to believe that there were workable deposits of iron 
ore in Svalbard. Several of the debators attacked the Norwegians with 
considerable acrimony for their action, and the Norwegian Minister in 
London was forced to protest to the President of the Society against 
what he called "unwarrantable attacks on a friendly nation". There were, 
however, a number of points made in Norway's favor, while the President, 
Sir Thomas Holdich, drew attention to the archipelago's geographical 
connection with Norway, and pointed out that the Norwegians had not 
said their last word in this matter.8 
The strategic considerations mentioned in the press seemed some­
what untenable. It was even stated that Great Britain ought to develop 
Svalbard as an Arctic Gibraltar, and the highly unfavorable climatic 
conditions were almost ignored. The more realistic view was that Great 
Britain was interested in controlling the archipelago, in order to protect 
the timber trade between North Russian and British ports.9 Some experts, 
especially in naval circles, considered that Svalbard's greatest strategic 
importance, from the British point of view, lay in the fact that Norway 
might become independent of British coal, the need for which had enabled 
the Allies during the war to exercise effective control of Norway's J\\er­
chant Marine.10 
At the end of the year the "financier" gave a survey of Britain's 
claims. According to this paper, the claims were based on the fact that 
the British had explored the area as far back as 1607. James I's occupa­
tion comprised the whole archipelago, apart from the northwest corner 
which the Dutch occupied. This occupation was recognized through the 
17th century, and had never been formally renounced. At the beginning 
of this century British prospectors had pioneered in exploring and sur­
veying coal fields, and eighty percent of the workable mineral deposits 
were in British hands. The paper had scant praise for the Norwegians' 
contribution.ll 
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Some people even went so far as to maintain that the archipelago 
was British territory. This view, based on the assumption that james I's 
occupation of 1614 was still valid, or that Svalbard had been formally 
occupied by the British expedition which visited the archipelago in the 
summer of 1 9 18, cannot have been altogether exceptional, for we find 
Whittaker's Almanac for 1 9 19 giving Svalbard as British territory,12 
The British Government, however, maintained its attitude, and this 
was stated on several occasions in Parliament. In the spring of 19 19, 
after the Foreign Office had made a statement in which Svalbard was 
declared terra nullius, a Member of Parliament asked whether Henry 
Hudson had hoisted the British flag in Svalbard in 1607, whether the 
country had been formally occupied by England as King james' New 
Land in 1614, whether British sovereignty had been abolished, and if 
not, whether the Government intended to maintain it for the advantage 
of present or future settlers. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 
Cecil Harmsworth, declared on behalf of the Government that, while it 
was aware of Hudson having visited Svalbard in 1607, there was no 
proof that he had hoisted the British flag. It appeared that the English 
claim to Svalbard was periodically recognized by the Dutch interests 
concerned. There was, however, no proof that it had at any time been 
formally recognized, and even if English sovereignty had been established 
at the time, it would be difficult to base any present claims on it, as 
Great Britain had had nothing to do with the archipelago for the last 
200 years. Apart from this, all interested powers, including Great Britain, 
had recognized Svalbard as no man's land at the Oslo Conference in 
1914. Great Britain was therefore not in a position to act on her own. 
The whole question would have to be the subject of international negoti­
ations.13 Thus the Government's attitude admitted of no doubts, but 
those in favor of British acquisition of the archipelago had influential 
spokesmen in Parliament, amongst them Sir Martin Conway, Conserva­
tive M. P. for the English Universities, and Sir Harry Brittain. The latter 
was an energetic individual who held various important official posts. 
Even those who were most vociferous in their demands for British 
acquisition were naturally aware that Norway held a number of trump 
cards. The director of the Northern Exploration Company, F. W. Salis­
bury-jones, a clever and energetic, but perhaps somewhat cynical indi­
vidual, was in favor of Norway and Great Britain - as the states most 
interested - deciding the matter between them,14 He offered to organize 
a meeting in London, at which his own company, one Norwegian, one 
Swedish and one Scottish company were to be represented. The idea 
would be to discuss the administrative set-up, the police force and in fact 
all the questions which had arisen in connection with the development of 
Svalbard. A suggestion of this nature might be criticized, especially when 
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noted that only one Norwegian company had been invited. The others 
were not even mentioned, whereas the Scottish company to be invited 
had, as yet, undertaken no production. Moreover, the English and the 
Swedish companies mentioned were linked up by an exchange of shares. 
Quite naturally, the Norwegians exercised caution; they agreed neverthe­
less to the suggestion, though refusing to discuss questions relating to 
the political status of the archipelago, on the grounds that this was a 
matter for the authorities in the various countries, but expressed willing­
ness to participate in a conference in Oslo and to invite the various 
companies working in Svalbard to negotiate on a number of other 
questions, such as health conditions, working conditions, survey, and 
navigation.15 
The chief objection to Norway's taking over the archipelago - an 
alternative which was regarded with some favor not only in the Foreign 
Office - was that Norwegian mining legislation would prove an obstacle 
to British companies. The Norwegians, however, declared that they were 
willing to settle this question by a special agreement.t6 In the British 
Foreign Office this was regarded as a satisfactory agreement. To start 
with, little importance was attached to the campaign for Great Britain 
to acquire Svalbard, though in time it reached such proportions that it 
inevitably influenced the Foreign Office's attitude. Already in the begin­
ning of January, 1919, the Norwegian Minister in London was given to 
understand that, even if the archipelago were not given the status of 
Norwegian territory, it might nevertheless be possible to entrust Norway 
with its administration.17 
In recent years, the Swedes had not undertaken much exploration 
in Svalbard, though this did not mean that their interest in the archipelago 
had in any way diminished. Considerable attention was still devoted to 
the coal fields; some experts maintained that the possibilities for profit­
able working were good, and that the state ought to support the Swedish 
company, since it was possible to cover a very real part of Sweden's 
fuel needs with Svalbard coal.18 In Sweden, too, it was realized that 
Svalbard's political status might be decided at the Peace Conference, and 
in diplomatic quarters there were suggestions for Norwegian-Swedish 
cooperation; there was talk of dividing the archipelago between the two 
states or of a Norwegian-Swedish condominium;19 but these alternatives 
were never discussed between the Governments of the two countries. 
Hope for Scandinavian cooperation was also expressed in the Swedish 
press.20 
While demands were made in the Norwegian and British press that 
the respective countries should attempt to acquire sovereignty over Sval­
bard at the Peace Conference, the Swedish Government announced 
through its diplomatic representatives accredited to the great powers 
interested, that it still maintained that the archipelago should remain 
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terra nullius.21 On this basis a Norwegian paper carried a report that 
Sweden had protested against Norway's aspirations. This allegation was 
only partially correct; the Swedish Government had not yet been informed 
that Norway intended to submit a request for sovereignty over Svalbard, 
apart from what had been stated in the press; and for that reason the 
Swedish Government was unable to lodge a formal protest. Otherwise 
there were reasons for believing that the Swedish demarche was just 
as much due to demands in the British, as in the Norwegian press;22 
and it seems that this factor was overlooked in Norway. The ensuing press 
campaign therefore got off to a somewhat false start and adopted an 
unduly acrid tone. The announcement of Sweden's protest was im­
mediately denied by the Swedish Minister in Oslo, who protested to the 
Norwegian Government against the attacks on Sweden in the Oslo press. 
At the same time he recalled that all interested powers had agreed to 
regard Svalbard as terra nullius.23 In answer to the Swedish Minister's 
question, as to the attitude of the Norwegian Government, the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister replied that, should the question arise at the Peace 
Conference, Norway would maintain that the only satisfactory solution, 
as far as Norwegian interests were concerned, would be that the archi­
pelago be recognized as Norwegian territory. 
Some of the leading Swedish papers, particularly the liberal press, 
were, however, moderate in their attitude. It was pointed out that the 
recent discussion had finally made it clear that Norway's claim to Sval­
bard was supported by the unanimous opinion of her population. If this 
had been made known before, the agitated debate in the Norwegian 
papers would have been unnecessary. Swedish interests would be just as 
secure if the archipelago were handed over to Norway as they would be 
under an international form of government, and it was therefore unneces­
sary to frame a Norwegian-Swedish quarrel for that reason. Scandinavian 
cooperation should not be jeopardized merely for the sake of Svalbard, 
as the archipelago was not worth it. On the occasion of a conference of 
Nordic editors in Stockholm at this time a leading paper discussed the 
relations between the Scandinavian countries among themselves and with 
the world at large, and recommended that Sweden should support Nor­
way's claims to Svalbard. It appears, however, that this statement was 
made rather too much on the spur of the moment, or else the editor was 
criticized for making it; whatever the reason, a few days later the paper 
dealt afresh with the question, and adopted a more reserved attitude.24 
The Government, however, maintained the plan of 19 14, and made 
this known through the press. It semed to be a matter of prestige to the 
Swedish Foreign Office to achieve international administration in Sval­
bard. There were repeated references to the work which Swedish ex­
plorers and scientists had done, but the Swedish companies which had 
economic interests in the archipelago adopted a conciliatory attitude 
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and made no attempt to influence public opinion against Norway's 
aspirations.2� 
The Dutch had taken no noteworthy share in exploration and mining 
in Svalbard in the 19th and 20th centuries. They joined in, however, in 
the autumn of 1919, when a shipowner from Wassenaer, Hendrik H. 
Dresselhuys, acquired a majority holding in a small Norwegian company. 
But it was not until the 1920's that they started fairly large scale mining. 
On the other hand, the archipelago loomed large in Dutch history, and 
people had not forgotten the contribution made by Dutch sailors in days 
,long past. In 1878 the frigate "Willem Barentsz" had been sent north 
to erect a memorial at Smeerenburg. and tend the graves of Dutch 
whalers. 
During the negotiations which had taken place before the war, the 
Dutch Government had not displayed any particular interest in the archi­
pelago, but now, it seemed, a change had taken place. In the press it was 
declared that Holland could jLlstly claim at any rate certain portions of 
the archipelago,26 and it was clear that at the Peace Conference the 
Netherlands would place on record the contribution Dutchmen had made 
in former times. It was also announced that, with the economic support 
of the Foreign Ministry and the Dutch Geographical Society, a major 
work was being written on the voyages of discovery and mapping under­
taken by the Dutch in Svalbard.2i To a certain extent Holland's position 
was similar to that of Sweden, and quite naturally the governments of 
the two countries consulted one another in this matter. In the Norwegian 
papers it was announced that the Netherlands had already protested in 
London against Norway's aspirations. On that occasion, the Dutch 
Minister in Stockholm told the press that his Government was unaware 
of any plans for handing Svalbard over to Norway, and for that reason 
it could not have lodged any SLlch protest. But the Netherlands, he con­
tinued, reserved the right to participate in an international conference on 
Svalbard, as it had done previously.28 
In a way, Denmark was in a special position. She was interested in 
having the Arctic regions dealt with at the Peace Conference; for a long 
time the idea of extending Denmark's sovereignty to cover the whole of 
Greenland had been mooted. When the Danish islands in the West Indies 
were finally transferred to the United States, after lengthy negotiations, 
by an agreement of August 4, 19 16, an annexure was added to the 
treaty to the effect that the United States would not oppose any move 
to extend Denmark's political and economic interests over the whole of 
Greenland.29 Denmark was now anxious to get the other states, primarily 
Norway, to agree to this. Should Norway persuade the Peace Conference 
to deal with the Svalbard question, there was a certain chance that Den­
mark could at the same time have the Greenland question settled, and it 
was envisaged that if the Norwegian Government went all out to achieve 
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a favorable settlement of the Svalbard question, it would not pay so mucil 
attention to an extension of Denmark's sovereignty over East Greenland. 
I t seems that from the very first there had been hopes of being able to 
strike a diplomatic bargain with l\orway;:lO at any rate the Norwegian 
plan was immediately approved by the Danish Government. It should, 
however, be mentioned that apart from their whaling in times past the 
Danes had taken no interest in Svalbard, and consequently they had no 
real reason to oppose Norway's wishes. Shortly after the Peace Con­
ference had assembled, the Danish Foreign Minister, Erik Scavenius, 
requested the Danish Minister in Paris to be on the look-out for a chance 
of having Denmark's sovereignty over East Greenland recognized on 
some occasion during the ensuing discussion. The Minister was instructed 
to proceed cautiously, so as to prevent any suggestion being made for 
using Greenland as a bargaining lever during the negotiations about the 
Danish section of Slesvig.81 
After the Norwegians had taken over the fields of the Arctic Coal 
Company the attitude of the United States toward Svalbard had under­
gone a considerable change. In so far as economic interests were at stake, 
these should militate in Norway's favor, as American capital was in­
vested in the largest Norwegian company working in the archipelago. 
During the period when the Americans were engaged in mining, they 
had depended on the Norwegians to work their mines, and those who 
were acquainted with the situation realized how natural it would be to 
place the archipelago under Norwegian rule. Robert Lansing, who had 
composed the American draft convention for the Oslo Conference, now 
became Secretary of State; during his work on this case he had realized 
how difficult it would be to achieve a satisfactory international admini­
stration, and he had come to the conclusion that the best solution would 
be to hand Svalbard over to Norway, even though he had previously been 
unable to countenance a solution of this nature. The sale of the Arctic 
Coal Company's properties had changed the situation, and already in 
May, 1917, the Norwegian Government was informed that a Norwegian 
claim would be supported by the State Depart m cnt.:1 2  In September, 1918, 
Lansing drew up a promemoria containing the territorial disputes which, 
in his opinion, should be settled at the Peace Conference; in it he stated 
that Norway ought to be given sovereignty over Svalbard.88 And in 
Washington, too, a Government publication on the Svalbard problem 
was being prepared. 
As far as Russia was concerned, the situation was both difficult and 
nebulous. Russian trapping in Svalbard had long since ceased, nor had 
the archipelago at any time been an important arena for Russian Polar 
exploration. There were other areas which it had been more natural to 
tackle first. But, if Great Britain out uf consideration for the sea route 
to North Russia was interested in preventing any great power acquiring 
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control over Svalbard, then this applied to an even greater extent to 
Russia. The Russian Government had, for that reason, always been on 
its guard, lest Germany should get a footing in the area, as it was ob­
vious that in a Russian-German war the strategic importance of the 
northern waters was considerable. After the Murmansk railway had been 
completed these considerations weighed even more heavily. Moreover, 
the railway was built on the assumption that it would use coal from 
Svalbard.34 On the other hand, there was reason to believe that the Soviet 
Russian Government would have its hands fully occupied for some years 
yet, in consolidating its position within Russia's own borders; and even 
if it should retain the reins of government it was clear that a number of 
years would elapse before it could play any real role in international 
politics. Unless the old regime returned to power, it would not be pos­
sible for some time to continue negotiations on the subject of Svalbard 
along the lines followed before the war. At the moment there was general 
uncertainty on most points; the decisive question was whether the Bolshe­
viks would be able to retain power, and, if they succeeded, whether they 
would adopt the same attitude as the Czarist authorities had done, i. e. 
whether Russia's Arctic policy would continue as before. Nothing was 
known about this; the Bolsheviks were busy with more important things, 
and for the time being did not seem to give this question any attention. 
German investments in Svalbard were small, but the Germans had 
displayed considerable activity in the Arctic; and the fact that they in­
cluded the archipelago in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk proved that they 
attributed some importance to it. But, in any case, German interests were 
not so great that there was any particular reason to expect serious dif­
ficulty from the German side, provided the other interested powers were 
willing to accede to Norway's wishes. And even if Germany for the 
moment was unable to take part in the negotiations about the archi­
pelago, relations with her were not as difficult as with Russia. The Nor­
wegian Government could from the very first find out what was the atti­
tude in Berlin; but under the circumstances it was natural that neither 
the authorities nor the German press paid much attention to this matter. 
The French had participated in whaling in the past, as well as in 
exploration, but interest in the archipelago was not great. Only negligible 
French capital had been invested in mining; there were no private in­
terests capable of thwarting Norway's plans, and the authorities were 
definitely favorably disposed to Norway's aspirations.35 Even amongst 
the victorious great powers, rivalry was so strong that the French in all 
probability would rather favor the archipelago being handed over to 
Norway than to one of the great powers, if this alternative was raised. 
From time to time during the war the Norwegian press had voiced 
a demand that Norway should try to aqcuire Svalbard; in the autumn 
1918 a veritable campaign was initiated, demanding the return of 
-113 -
the old Norwegian land of Svalbard, and the Government was requested 
to submit the claim to the Peace Conference.36 Shortly afterwards 
came the news of the meeting, already referred to, of the Geographical 
Society in London. This unleashed a wave of sharp criticism in the Nor­
wegian press both against the campaign in Great Britain, and against 
the Svalbard policy Norway had so far pursued.37 The reasons adduced 
by the press for Norway's right to demand the archipelago were many: 
Svalbard belonged geographically to Norway, and was ancient Nor­
wegian territory discovered by Norwegians. During the years of national 
decline, however, the communications with the archipelago were severed. 
The name Svalbard had lived on in the saga, and deserved to be revived. 
All the nations which had previollsly shared in exploiting the natural 
resources of the archipelago had abandoned it, only Norwegian trappers 
and sealers had remained. When the Norwegians were accused of exter­
minating stocks of game it should be remembered that no one had pur­
sued a more ruthless destruction of the fauna than the British and Dutch 
in the 17th century. 
Norwegian trappers had collected much material for the scientists, 
and organized research work had been undertaken on a large scale. 
Since 1909 Norwegians had, with state support, undertaken exploration 
in the archipelago every summer. The Norwegian State had maintained 
postal and telegraph communications, and Norwegians had the largest 
share in exploiting the resources of the country. They had the experience 
and the ability to achieve good results in these far northern regions, and 
all foreign companies employed Norwegians. Coal was carried in Nor­
wegian bottoms and principally used in Norway. And Norwegian com­
munities had now grown up in the territory which could not be placed 
under the government of any other state without infringing the principle 
of nationality. 
If the archipelago was to be effectively exploited, it would be neces­
sary to establish an administrative set-up; one single power should take 
over the administration, but the necessary regard should be exercised for 
interests or justifiable claims of other nations; and no power had a better 
right to assume this administration than Norway. Compensation for 
losses incurred during the war could hardly be expected, since Germany 
had no means of paying, and therefore Norway should resume her 
sovereignty over this ancient Norwegian land as a sort of compensation. 
At a time when so many territorial claims were being met, when there 
was talk of freedom and justice, Norway should claim the archipelago; 
there was no doubt about the justice of her claim. Though Norway had 
not ventured to push her claims before the war, the situation was now so 
fundamentally altered that the Norwegian authorities were in duty bound 
to proceed in this matter. 
8 
-1 14-
Some papers pointed out that there was no desire on Norway's part 
to exclude other powers from the archipelago. Should Norway be 
entrusted with the task of administrering it, an open door policy would 
have to be practiced. The Norwegian attitude to the problem revealed 
the old traditional features - not a desire to exclude others, but the fear 
of being expelled by one of the great powers.3S 
During the debate in the Storting on the King's Speech in the middle 
of December 19 18, the Foreign Minister declared that the Svalbard 
question might be raised at the Peace Conference. The Government 
would follow the course of events carefully, and press Norway's rightful 
claims. Some of the party leaders, particularly the left wing liberal Johan 
Castberg, spoke in favor of a more active policy, and maintained that it 
would be to the benefit of all interested powers if Norway was extended 
control of the archipelago.39 
The Government organ, however, adopted a careful attitude, and 
wrote that, if it were internationally advisable for Norway to assume 
control over Svalbard, then this arrangement was preferable. But there 
was no reason for cherishing any ambitions in this direction; it was not 
vital for Norway to acquire Svalbard. The main thing was to establish 
an administrative arrangement, capable of providing law and order. 
If Norway was placed on an equal footing with other states, there was 
reason to believe that the Norwegians, by virtue of their competence, 
would be able to exploit the resources of the territory just as effectively 
as if the archipelago were handed over to Norway - and this applied all 
over the world. What we want, wrote the paper, is not territorial acquisi­
tion, but the same right to trade as all other nations all over the world. 
In a world united in a real League of Nations, it would be of subordinate 
interest whether an island or a piece of land formally belonged to one 
power or another, for under such circumstances everyone could truth­
fully state: "The world is my oyster". But during the winter of 1919 the 
paper changed its view and advocated Norwegian acquisition.40 
At the end of February, 1919, Svalbard once more became the 
subject of a fierce newspaper campaign, occasioned by the report that 
the Swedish Government had protested in London against Norway's 
aspirations. The whole thing developed more or less into a discussion 
on Scandinavian cooperation, which had made such good progress during 
the war; and some doubts were now cast on the chances of continuing 
this good work, unless there were mutual interests involved.41 At regular 
intervals Svalbard was a major newspaper topic during the winter and 
summer of 1919, and strong language was often used to describe the 
conduct of Norway's rivals.42 No literature, however, was published on 
the subject; though a survey of Norwegian exploration in the archipelago 
was being prepared; it did not appear until the Peace Conference had 
made its decision. 
-1 15 -
Beyond her frontiers, Norway's claim was also supported by un­
official representatives. Both through the medium of the press, and by 
means of their contacts with politicians and officials, they were able to 
carry out work of unquestionable value.43 The organ of the Norwegian 
Chamber of Commerce in London, the Anglo-Norwegian Trade Journal, 
expounded the Norwegian point of view to the British business world. 
In an article in January 1919, the journal deplored the campaign in the 
British press, and pointed out that the choice of Oslo as the seat of the 
pre-war Svalbard conferences could only be interpreted as an admission 
that Norway's interests were predominant. The British and American 
companies, continued the journal, had been dependent on Norwegian 
foremen, miners and sailors in their work in the archipelago; moreover, 
most of the mining interests were now in the hands of Norwegians. 
The campaign set afoot by the Northern Exploration Company 
aroused some anxiety in Norway. It was feared that it might also have 
repercussions outside Great Britain, and a private committee with Pro­
fessor Fredrik Stang as chairman was set up to decide what could be 
done to counter the English company; in addition it was to be an 
agency capable of representing Norwegian economic interests and of 
investigating the legal implications of a change in Svalbard's constitu­
tional position.44 
There were some influential men who considered that Norway should 
not lay claim to Svalbard, or who maintained a very reserved attitude. 
One of these was Dr. Francis Hagerup, who had presided at the Oslo 
Conferences. In common with a number of others, he held the opinion 
that powers with economic interests in the archipelago would find occa­
sion to interfere in the Norwegian administration, because the geographic 
conditions would make it impossible to create entirely settled conditions. 
He maintained, furthermore, that Norway had recognized Svalbard as 
terra nullius, and this standpoint could not be abandoned without the 
agreement of all the powers Norway had invited to the pre-war con­
ferences. Nor did he consider that the question could rightly be solved 
by the parties now assembled in Paris. But if it was considered inter­
nationally 'expedient that Svalbard were handed over to Norway, this 
solution might be preferred,45 
Norway Submits the Case to the Paris Peace Conference. 
In March 19 17 the French specialist on international law, Professor 
Louis Renault, had discussed Svalbard in a lecture, and concluded that 
the best arrangement would be to entrust the administration of the archi­
pelago to one single state, and that this state should be Norway. There 
were reasons for attaching some importance to Professor Renault's state­
ment. He was a recognized expert on international law, and as an adviser 
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to the French Foreign Ministry he could influence the attitude uf the 
Government in many questions. The Norwegian Legation in Paris there­
fore immediately reported Renault's statement.! The reaction of the 
Norwegian Foreign MinIstry might well seem surprising. The very day 
the report was received from Paris, the Legation in Stockholm was 
requested to announce that Norway did not intend to accept any request 
to take over the administration of Svalbard. The Norwegian Government 
adhered to the principles which had formed the basis of the Oslo Con­
ference in the summer of 19 14.2 In view of the fact that the Swedish 
Government had not requested any statement, this relatively important 
declaration might seem unnecessary and ill-advised. Much might change 
after the war. The statement, however, must be regarded in relation to 
the good political cooperation between the Scandinavian countries which 
had developed during the war. 
In the course of the autumn of 19 18, the military situation on the 
various fronts changed rapidly. In September, Bulgaria signed an armi­
stice, without first conferring with its allies. Shortly afterwards, Germany 
reacted favorably to the peace proposals which President Wilson had set 
forth already in January of the same year. The Allied and Associated 
Powers now began to discuss in Paris the main principles for an ar­
mistice.;] I t was obvious that peace would involve territorial changes also 
in the north. During the war Finland had won independence, and this 
new state would have its boundaries officially recognized. This brought 
the political status of the Aland Islands once more into the limelight. 
Both Sweden and Finland were claimants to these islands. The Swedish 
Government hoped to settle the matter at the Peace Conference, and 
Denmark intended to have the South Jutland question solved in a satis­
factory manner. Norway had suffered rather heavily during the war, and 
in the American press as well as in that of the Entente, sympathy was 
expressed for the losses she had incurred, both in men and ships as a 
result of the German U-boat campaign.4 Under these circumstances it 
would he natural for Norway to try to get the Peace Conference to find 
some settlement for Svalbard, which had increased in economic im­
portance to her during the war. For that reason former Foreign Secretary 
irgens, who was now Norwegian envoy to Copenhagen, suggested to his 
Government that joint claims should be made at the Peace Conference, 
Denmark claiming South Jutland, Sweden the Aland Islands, and Nor­
way Svalbard. If this plan should be rejected in Stockholm and Copen­
hagen, Norway should try through diplomatic channels to prepare a claim 
for Svalbard independently of the other two states.5 
Fredrik Wedel Jarlsberg had been Norwegian Minister in Paris ever 
since the Norwegian Foreign Service was organized in 1906.(; During his 
years of service he had made many influential friends in the French 
capita/.' This was probably due in part to the fact that he had a Danish 
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Baron title which was not without its value in the international society 
of Paris, but probably more to his generosity and his money. By his 
initiative and self-confidence he was on occasions able to achieve con­
siderable results. He understood the French temper, and got on very well 
with the French, whom he greatly admired. His patriotism was unswerv­
ing, and might sometimes appear almost chauvinistic. Now and again he 
would appear incredibly arrogant, almost comical. At times he could be 
extremely far-sighted, at others, his political views were utterly super­
ficial; but all things considered Norway could hardly have had a better 
man to represent her in the French capital, where the most far-reaching 
international questions of his age were to be settled. 
Of his own views on the Svalbard question he says: "The claim 
to Svalbard, apart from being an old national wish, was in my case 
based on the idea that Norway might thus be self-supporting with regard 
to coal. During the war I had seen plenty of examples of the belligerents' 
power to have their wishes fulfilled by threatening to withhold supplies 
of coal, unless we danced to their tune.S Therefore I saw in the acqui­
sition of Svalbard, with its large coal fields, an inestimable boon to our 
shipping in the event of a new war."9 He also felt that, if there should 
be territorial distributions in Scandinavia, then Norway which had suf­
fered more as a result of the war than her neighbors, ought to seize the 
opportunity to acquire Svalbard, because of the balance of power in the 
north, as he expressed it, using a term from power politics. Without 
instructions from Oslo he discussed the matter with the French Foreign 
1\1inistry which adopted a very accomodating attitude.lo He gradually 
acquired more and more interest in this question - it appeared to be 
almost a matter of prestige to him. He requested the Government to send 
him clear instructions, so that he might know what views were held in 
Oslo. On the occasion of the armistice Wedel J arlsberg sent a message 
of congratulations to the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon, who 
included a warm tribute to Norway in his answer. The Norwegian 
Minister Wedel Jarlsberg sent it home with the request that it be pub­
lished.l1 His intention seems to have been to make it generally known 
what opportunities Norway had if only she knew how to exploit them. 
At about this time the Legation in London also inquired as to what views 
the Government held with regard to Svalbard.12 
Several times in the course of the last 50 years, the question of 
making Svalbard Norwegian territory had been the point at issue, but 
apart from 1892, the Government had never made any real efforts in 
this direction. After the international discussions which had taken place 
before the war, the idea seemed still less tenable. In 1912 Foreign 
Minister Irgens characterized it as political daydreaming, because Rus­
sian-Swedish resistance to the project would always be encountered, and 
even if Norway got the islands, the responsibilities entailed would be so 
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great, that the gain would prove doubtful, and the question had little 
political importance. The aim of the Norwegian policy in this matter must 
be to prevent a conflict between the powers, and achieve a legal arrange­
ment which could be used by Norwegian industrial interests. Furthermore 
it would always be in part a matter of etiquette or honor to the Nor­
wegian Foreign Service to see to it that Norway's initiative - her, to 
a certain extent, leading position among the interested powers - was 
maintained.1'l Even as late as January, 19 18, the Foreign Ministry in­
formed the Norwegian Legations in the interested states that it continued 
to entertain the same view as during the negotiations in 19 14. There had, 
however, always been a section of the Norwegian people which did not 
agree with the attitude of the authorities. It was felt both just and reason­
able that Svalbard was made Norwegian territory. Now and again these 
views were expressed in the press, and after the expansion of Norway's 
economic interest in the archipelago during the war, they could be 
voiced with greater weight. In the course of the decades, during which 
the Svalbard problem had been a point at issue in Norwegian politics. 
it had changed character - not only by reason of the changes which 
had occurred in the archipelago itself, but probably just as much on 
account of the changes in the relations between the interested parties. 
After the war a new situation would obtain; again the Norwegian Govern­
ment was faced with the question of placing Svalbard under Norway. 
In November 19 18 the Foreign Ministry conferred with represen­
tatives of the Norwegian Shipowners Association as to what demands 
Norway should submit to the Peace Conference. The matter was then 
dealt with in a Government Conference, and the Foreign Minister brought 
with him a draft directive for the Legation in Paris. As far as Svalbard 
was concerned it stated that only a complete transfer would be of any 
value. If Norway received the archipelago on the condition that other 
powers were to retain their economic rights, this might lead to inter­
ference with the Norwegian administration. As the first-mentioned alter­
native seemed to be out of the question, the best thing would be for Nor­
wegian interests to be safeguarded by international administration and 
justice.14 
The arguments adduced by the Foreign Ministry, and others. too, 
might justify less enthusiasm than that evinced by Minister Wedel JarIs­
berg. Nor could the Government very well claim Svalbard with the idea 
of achieving some exclusive economic advantages for Norway, at the 
expense of other powers, which would in principle be contrary to its 
political conviction that the country's interests would best be served by 
a mutual free trade policy giving Norway access to all markets.t:; For 
that reason, Minister Wedel Jarlsberg remarked ironically that the 
Government did not want any colonies. It wanted the world market to 
itself, but this it was not to obtain. Nevertheless the Government could 
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not very well forbid its Minister to investigate the matter, or at that 
juncture exclude the possibility of the question being dealt with at the 
Peace Conference. The most natural thing would be to leave the door 
open, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting was also agreed 
on this;16 ultimately a general directive for Minister Wedel Jarlsberg was 
worked out. It stated that Norway was primarily interested in securing 
herself within the boundaries she already had.17 During the international 
discussions about post-war conditions, the following questions were 
of primary importance: security for Norway's foreign trade and shipping; 
an opportunity for Norway to make her voice heard in questions regard­
ing international law and organization which affected Norway's interests; 
compensation for the great losses - primarily in lives and shipping -
suffered as a result of such actions or measures on the part of the belli­
gerents as were contrary to international law, or which Norway had 
declared to be in contravention of international law, in her protests to 
the belligerents. With respect to Svalbard, the Government declared that, 
in view of the experience obtained during the international conferences 
about the archipelago, it would regard a Norwegian acquisition as the 
most satisfactory settlement and would consequently welcome this solu­
tion which need not exclude the settling of land disputes by an inter­
national tribunal.18 
For the time being the method of proceeding with the discussions 
at the Peace Conference had not been settled. But the French Foreign 
Ministry advised the Norwegian Government to prepare its case, and 
promised to treat it favorably when the time was ripe.19 On the advice 
of Philippe Berthelot, director of the Political Department, with whom 
Wedel Jarlsberg was very friendly, the views of the Norwegian Govern­
ment were submitted to Foreign Minister Pichon and to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.2o At about the same 
time the case was taken up in London. The Norwegian Minister, Ben­
jamin Vogt, explained the Norwegian views in a letter to the former 
British envoy in Stockholm, Sir Esme Howard, who had been appointed 
adviser on Scandinavian affairs to the British delegation to the Peace 
Conference.21 The Norwegian envoy in Washington broached the question 
in the State Department, but, on the whole, Secretary of State Lansing's 
attitude was already known.22 When the Norwegian Government drafted 
its directive for Minister Wedel Jarlsberg, it could, on the basis of the 
reports which had been sent in from the Legations, with a considerable 
degree of certainty assume that a Norwegian claim to Svalbard would 
at any rate be favorably received in Washington and Paris. The neutral 
states interested were not approached, as the Norwegian Government 
had not yet definitively decided to submit the matter to the Peace 
Conference. 
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The European press offered the impression that the Peace Con­
ference would be a sort of new Congress of Vienna, which would draw 
up a new map of Europe and solve all international disputes, but this 
time on new and fairer principles. It was therefore by no means sur­
prising that a number of papers voiced the demand that the neutrals 
should also have an opportunity to send delegates to the conference, as 
a world-embracing settlement of this nature would be bound to affect 
the interests of neutral states. In the rules of procedure for the Peace 
Conference it was also decided that neutral states might be summoned 
"by the powers with general interests", i. e. the Big Five, in questions 
in which the neutrals were directly interested. They might then present 
their cases orally or verbally.23 Otherwise, all petitions, memoranda, 
observations and documents which were addressed to the Conference by 
others than the delegates were to be received and classified by the Secre­
tariat. Those which were of political interest were to be briefly sum­
marized in a list circulated to the delegates.24 The Secretariat would con­
sequently have authority to decide what cases were of political interest, 
and as, according to the rules of procedure, the neutral states were to 
apply in writing to the Secretariat, this arrangement would be bound to 
make it difficult for them to get a chance to express themselves. The 
matters they were interested in were naturally of secondary importance 
compared with the great problems which faced the Conference. The 
neutrals tried, nevertheless, to the best of their ability, to promote their 
interests, especially with regard to frontier adjustments. At the begin­
ning of March 19 19 a delegation from the Danish Rigsdag arrived in 
Paris in connection with the South Jutland question. A delegation worked, 
from January on, for the purpose of joining the archipelago of Aland to 
Sweden. It probably had some sort of contact with the Swedish Legation, 
but it was not until April that the Swedish Government requested the 
Conference to discuss the right of the population of the islands to decide 
by a plebiscite whether the archipelago was to belong to Sweden or 
Finland. At first the Conference was inclined to have the matter dealt 
with by the Baltic Commision, but at the British suggestion it was referred 
to the League of Nations. 
Among the tasks facing the Conference the creation of a League of 
Nations was in a category of its own, and concerned the neutral p,owers 
to a very great extent. For that reason, the Scandinavian states requested 
the French Government, at an early stage, to be allowed to take part in 
this work, but it was stated that the creation of a League of Nations 
would be reserved for the Allied and Associated Powers. A number of 
neutral powers were, however, invited to participate in an unofficial 
conference on this question, and all three Scandinavian states attended. 
Many difficult territorial questions were on the agenda, and at a 
very early stage the Conference set about solving them. To start with it 
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became a practice to let representatives of the interested states appear 
before the Council of Ten in order to put forward their claims. This 
arrangement, which resulted in long speeches but not much clarification, 
proved unsatisfactory. A new method was therefore adopted: Commissions 
were appointed which were entrusted with the task of clarifying the various 
territorial problems.25 The intention was to deal with these in the course 
of February and March. At the end of February the Danish Minister in 
Paris appeared before the Council of Ten to submit the views of his 
Government on the South Jutland question. There was also a definite 
possibility that Svalbard might be dealt with.26 Wedel Jarlsberg therefore 
wired home that all territorial claims would be settled during the Preli­
minary Peace. In his opinion there was now no time to lose; Norway 
must submit the Svalbard question to the Conference as soon as possible; 
and after he had had a conversation with the Secretary General of the 
Peace Conference, Ambassador Paul-Eugene Dutasta, who believed 
that Norway's turn would soon come, \Vedel Jarlsberg repeated his report 
and urged the Government to send directives.27 
In the Norwegian Legation in Paris the staff worked feverishly to 
prepare the speech which Minister Wedel Jarlsberg was to deliver when 
his turn came to present Norway's claims before the Peace Conference. 
A number of pieces justificatives, giving statistical information about 
Svalbard, were also prepared. It now became apparent how difficult it 
was to prepare this material in Paris. It was necessary to cable to Nor­
way for a great deal of information. Though Wedel Jarlsberg had not 
yet received any instructions from his Government he decided to send a 
request to the President of the Peace Conference, Georges Clemenceau, 
for permission to present his case. At the Legation the material which was 
being prepared was in no way ready. The French Professor Charles 
Rabot, who had undertaken to write a brief account of Svalbard,28 was 
also not quite ready. His book was, however, due to appear in the very 
near future. Nor had the account of the scientific work undertaken by 
Norwegians in Svalbard, which it was intended to issue for the occasion. 
reached the Legation. These documents and charts should, of course, 
have appeared before the case was submitted to the Peace Conference, 
but Wedel Jarlsberg was very impatient and maintained that they would 
have to appear later.29 For the time being he must make do with his 
address, for he would wait no longer. It was not, however, so easy to 
obtain a hearing as he had hoped. 
In the beginning of March the Svalbard question was dealt with by 
the Storting. Without proceeding to a vote, it was decided to send the 
Legation in Paris the following message: as so many international ques­
tions were to be settled at the Peace Conference, it was Norway's 
cesire that the Svalbard question should also be solved satisfactorily in 
principle. 
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After Norway, Russia and Sweden had held preliminary conferences 
on the subject in 19 10 and 1912, the Norwegian Government invited 
various powers to meet in Oslo in 19 14 to provide settled conditions in 
Svalbard. As a basis tor discussions the principle had been laid down 
that the archipelago's status as terra nullius must be preserved. The 
Norwegian Government did not consider the arrangement proposed by 
the preliminary conferences in 1910 and 19 12, and discussed at the inter­
national conference in 1914, as the 1110st acceptable one to Norwegian 
interests. A solution which entirely satisfied these interests would be, 
in the opinion of the Norwegian Government, that Svalbard was handed 
over to Norway with the consent and goodwill of all the interested 
powers. This solution which appeared to be the most practical one, also 
fron-, an international point uf vie,v, need not exclude the possibility of 
land disputes being settled by an international court. 
This directive was intended to serve as a guide to the policy the 
Government wished to pursue. But within the framework drawn up, 
Wedel Jarlsberg could use such information as he considered advisable 
to support the case.:lO This would in any case be necessary, as the reasons 
which the Government gave for its attitude seemed rather weak. It is 
hard to understand why the Gnvernment suggested, and the Storting 
accepted, such a slender basis for the Norwegian action. It seemed pos­
sible to adduce arguments which, frol11 the point of view of the other 
interested states, would have proved far more convincing. 
Minister Wedel Jarlsberg's optimism proved, however, to be un­
founded, for there was no sign that the Conference would deal with the 
case for the time being. In answer to his request to the President to be 
accorded a hearing, he merely received a reply from the Secretariat 
acknowledging his letter. The staff in the Norwegian Legation now had 
plenty of time to work out the material which was to be placed before 
the Conference. The matter I,\'as, in fact, pushed somewhat into the back­
ground, as the Minister had a lot of other work to do on the occasion 
of the arrival in Paris of the Norwegian delegation which was to parti­
cipate in the discussions about a League of Nations. President Wilson's 
insistence that the rules for the League of Nations should be included in 
the Preliminary Peace terms, was now the chief topic in the French capital. 
The chances of a minor case, slIch as the Svalbard question, being dealt 
with in the near future deteriorated; and a mood of pessimism prevailed 
in the Norwegian Legation,:l! The Paris press demanded a swift decision 
with regard to the peace terms with Germany, People were frightened by 
the advances of the Bulsheviks, and it appeared that the Peace Con­
ference was making every effnrt to conclude the first phase of the nego­
tiations as soon as possible, 
The next step taken by th: Norwegian Government, after giving 
Wedel Jarlsherg his directi\-es, was to inform all the states which had 
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participated in the Svalbard conference in 19 14, apart from Russia,32 
that it wished to submit the case to the Peace Conference. It now gave 
more complete reasons for its attitude, and pointed out the geographical 
and economic conditions which, in the opinion of the Norwegian Govern­
ment, made it necessary and natural to place the archipelago under 
Norway; and the respective governments were requested not to place 
any hindrances in the way of this solution.'l3 The answers which the 
Government received were on the whole satisfactory. It was especially 
from certain neutral states that opposition was expected, but none of 
these adopted an altogether unconciliatory attitude. 
Stockholm was reserved. The Swedish Foreign Minister stated that 
strong objections had been raised by some scientists against departing 
from the terra nullius principle. But the Swedish companies working in 
the archipelago would agree to it, provided their economic interests were 
protected.34 By and large, the Swedish Government no longer seemed 
too desirous of maintaining an unfavorable attitude, even though it re­
garded the Norwegian plan with mixed feelings. 
In Copenhagen Norway received full support. The Danish Foreign 
Minister declared that he fully recognized the importance of the geo­
graphical and economic considerations which warranted awarding the 
archipelago to Norway. In his opinion this would be decidedly the most 
practical arrangement. He suggested that Denmark and Sweden should 
state in Paris that they would like to see Norway's wishes accomodated35 
- a proposal of undoubted value, though the Norwegian Government 
could not hope that Stockholm would go so far. 
The Norwegian plan encountered the stiffest opposition at the 
Hague. Foreign Minister Herman van Karnebeek maintained that hit­
herto the matter had been dealt with by the interested parties. The 
Norwegian Government had now submitted the question to a conference 
of belligerents, where cases affecting neutrals were out of place, and 
where new parties were involved. A decision by an assembly of this 
nature was not pleasant to the Netherlands. The step which the Nor­
wegian Government had taken would complicate the situation. The Peace 
Conference was not a consultative assembly. In reply to this the Nor­
wegian envoy could state that the Dutch Government had at the invitation 
of France also sent a delegate to the conference to negotiate on certain 
questions. The assumption from the Norwegian side was, moreover, that 
all interested states should give their approval.36 It was, however, clear 
that the Norwegian Government would meet opposition in Paris from this 
quarter, and it appeared that the Dutch Foreign Minister was very an­
noyed at the step Norway had taken. 
Nor were Norway's chances particularly favorable in the British 
Foreign Office. At any rate by no means as favorable as with the British 
delegation to the Peace Conference. The Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord 
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Curzon, felt that it was doubtful whether the Peace Conference would 
find time to deal with the matter. But as the Norwegian Government had 
submitted the question in Paris, it could only wait and see whether there 
would be opportunity to deal with it. Some powers had, after all, sought 
the assistance of the Conference in settling certain questions which were 
really outside its sphere of authority. With regard to the campaign which 
was being carried on in the British press and in Parliament, he declared 
that it was led by private individuals who had interests in Svalbard and 
received no support from the Government. But it was undeniable that 
there were considerable British interests in the archipelago which had 
to be protected. In addition, Svalbard was in his opinion important from 
the strategic point of view, for which reason the case had considerable 
significance to Great Britain.37 
In Washington international rule was regarded as unworkable, and 
it was felt that the best arrangement would be to assign the archipelago 
to Norway. Assistant Secretary of State, William Phillips, promised to 
cable immediately to the American delegation in Paris38 - an unneces­
sary step insofar as Mr. Lansing had long since taken his stand, and was 
decidedly in favor of Norwegian sovereignty over the islands as the only 
practical solution. 
Although it was clear that the German Government could exercise 
no influence in Paris, the Norwegian Government also approached Berlin. 
In the German Foreign Ministry it was considered right that Norway 
should bring the matter before the Peace Conference. In the opinion of 
the Foreign Minister this would be a quite practicable solution. The 
German Government would have no objection to this method of proce­
dure; but a necessary condition would be that Germany's economic 
interests were protected.39 Italy had no interest in Svalbard, and it had 
never participated in the negotiations. But as she was one of the Big 
Five in Paris, the Italian Government was informed about the matter. 
Here too, the Norwegian views received every sympathy.40 For the time 
being Norway had no relations with the Soviet Government. The per­
sonnel of the Norwegian Legation in Leningrad returned home in Sept­
ember 1918, and the Russian Embassy in Paris was still staffed by repre­
sentatives of the old regime. 
At the end of March, Wedel Jarlsberg attempted to obtain a hearing 
at the Peace Conference, but without success. In British quarters, he was 
advised to submit the case in writing to the President, Georges Clemen­
ceau. This was done in the beginning of April, but at this juncture the 
preliminary peace negotiations were already being concluded. Three days 
later the conference had proceeded sufficiently far with its deliberations 
to be able to invite the German Government to send representatives 
to Paris.41 
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The expose which Wedel Jarlsberg sent to the Peace Conference 
contained an account of Svalbard's political history. In a supplement it 
included an article from the Trade Agreement of 1663 between Denmark­
Norway and France, in which Louis XIV recognized, at any rate in­
directly, the sovereignty of the Norwegian Crown over Svalbard, and 
article 7 in the Treaty of Lund of 1679, in which the Swedish King ac­
cording to the Norwegian interpretation of the Treaty extended a similar 
recognition. The supplement also contained information about the various 
mining companies working in the islands, and statistical details presented 
a clear picture of the activities of the Norwegians in the archipelago over 
the last twenty years. In view of the short time available and the dif­
ficulties of getting information transmitted telegraphically from Norway, 
the work of preparing the case had been well done. 
Wedel Jarlsberg seems to have exceeded the directive which the 
Government had drawn up, in so far as he included a section dealing with 
future mining regulations,42 but he was obliged to do this. The British 
delegation had stated clearly that a clause of this nature was absolutely 
necessary in order to satisfy those in Great Britain who had economic 
interests in Svalbard.43 The Norwegian Government had, in fact, pre­
viously informed London that it was willing to admit a special mining 
legislation, in the event of Norway being assigned the archipelago; but 
Wedel Jarlsberg had not been instructed to include this in his appeal 
to the Peace Conference. 
The arguments which were set forth in the Legation's expose ap­
peared more convincing than those contained in the Government's direc­
tive. Mention was naturally made of the fact that Germany had included 
Svalbard in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and it was pointed out that 
Norway's economic interests in the islands had, in the course of the last 
ten years, developed to such an extent that the archipelago could now 
be regarded as having a Norwegian population. 
Without pleading Norway's old sovereignty to the territory the 
Norwegian Government, it was stated, had in 1907 proposed an inter­
national arrangement; but the experience gained during the ensuing 
negotiations had clearly revealed the impossibility of reaching an inter­
national settlement if the archipelago's status as a no man's land was 
retained, and that the only satisfactory solution would be to hand Sval­
bard over to Norway. 
This solution by no means excluded the possibility of settling 
disputes about present claims to land by an international court; and the 
Norwegian Government had no objections to the interested states draw­
ing up mining regulations before the archipelago was handed over to 
Norway. 
The Norwegian Government, it was further declared, was convinced 
that it was acting in accordance with the interests of peace in submitting 
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to the Conference this question which for centuries had been the subject 
of disagreement, and it would express the hope that all interested powers 
would agree to return Svalbard to Norway, the only power which had 
exercised sovereignty over the territory.44 
There was no prospect of the Conference dealing with the case in 
the immediate future; but the clause in the Treaty of Versailles which 
laid down that Germany renounce all rights and claims in or over former 
German territory outside her boundaries as fixed in the Treaty, as well 
as all rights and claims which she held as against the Allied and Associ­
ated Powers up to the conclusion of peace,45 might to a certain extent in­
crease the chances of the Conference dealing with the Svalbard question 
sooner or later. In order to support the matter, a copy of the Norwegian 
promemoria to the Conference was distributed to the Governments of the 
interested powers with a new request that they adopt a friendly attitude 
to Norway's c1aims.46 That Norway's chances were regarded in Paris as 
being very good was obvious from an application made by the Portu­
guese Government to the Norwegian Government for the right to under­
take sealing and fishing in Svalbard. At the time, the Norwegian Govern­
ment was naturally not in a position to enter into negotiations of this 
nature, but promised to deal favorably with the matter, should it sub­
sequently have actuality.47 As long as negotiations were going on with 
Germany in Versailles it was impossible to get anything done, despite 
the efforts of Wedel jarlsberg. After the German Government had signed 
the treaty, on the 28th of june, the Conference had more time. It now 
turned its attention to the peace treaty with Austria which was less com­
prehensive in scope, and after Wedel jarlsberg had had a conversation 
with Clemenceau, he succeeded in having Svalbard put on the agenda 
at the beginning of july. 
In many quarters objections had been made to the Norwegian 
Government's efforts to have the Svalbard question dealt with at the 
Peace Conference. The Dutch Government was especially averse to this 
course, and there were obvious objections to it: in Paris there were 
powers which had no interests in Svalbard, while on the other hand 
several of the states that had participated in the negotiations before the 
war were not represented. The conference, however, might adopt a course 
which would give the states not normally represented an opportunity 
of stating their case. The Dutch Government maintained that the Peace 
Conference could not be regarded as a consultative assembly. Norway 
however, was not the only country which tried to introduce questions 
which strictly speaking were out of place. Sweden, for example, wished 
to have the question of the Aland Islands dealt with, while Denmark was 
desirous of settling her claim to East Greenland. Though the procedure 
desired by Norway was not without its weak points, there seemed at the 
time no other possibilities of reaching a settlement. Nor could it be denied 
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that Norway was more interested in finding a solution than any other 
country, especially after the decided increase in Norwegian economic 
activity in the archipelago during the war. To convene a conference con­
sisting of the states which had participated in the Oslo negotiations did 
not seem possible in the near future. At that time it was difficult to 
imagine representatives of some of the interested powers gathered round 
the conference table side by side with the Bolsheviks, in order to work 
out a solution based on the principle that the archipelago should be 
governed by a commission on which only Norway, Sweden and the Soviet 
Union were represented. A further consideration was that experiences 
gained during the attempts to reach a settlement on the basis of the 
archipelago remaining terra nullius had proved quite futile. The Nor­
wegian Government therefore had to realize that, if the question were to 
be settled in the near future, then this must be done at the Peace Con­
ference. The publications on the subject of Svalbard prepared in Holland, 
Great Britain and the United States on the occasion of the Conference 
proved, moreover, that in these countries, too, this possibility had been 
envisaged. 
That the Norwegian Government should wish to have the matter 
dealt with in Paris was naturally not merely to achieve just any kind of 
settlement, but because it reckoned with a solution which would prove 
satisfactory to Norway. It had not only asked that the matter be dealt 
with, it had also requested that Norway should be given the archipelago, 
but on the very important assumption that all the interested powers volun­
tarily agreed. This was clearly expressed in the directive which had been 
given to the legation in Paris, but the legation's request to the Peace Con­
ference was ambiguous on this point. The Svalbard question was well­
known to the foreign ministries of the interested states. If the powers 
whose word would weigh most in Paris could not agree to a solution 
acceptable to Norway, they were likely to refuse her request that the 
question be dealt with. On the other hand, the Norwegian Government 
was in a position to hope that, should the conference once deal with the 
matter, the solution would go in Norway's favor. This was probably the 
most important reason why some states were averse to the matter being 
dealt with in Paris at the request of Norway; But this state of affairs 
did not exclude the possibility that the solution arrived at by the Con­
ference would be the best, or even the only practicable one. 
The Svalbard question was raised together with claims Norway 
wished to make in connection with the general post-war settlement. 
But it was not merely a claim of compensation for damage suffered, or 
a reward for services rendered during the war. To have the matter settled 
in a satisfactory way was for Norway an old wish - one might almost 
call it an old right - which it had become more and more urgent for 
Norwegians to have fulfilled. Serious doubts had arisen, but after giving 
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the matter thorough consideration it had been agreed to raise the question 
in connection with the political reorganization which was to take place 
after the war and to try to have the archipelago handed over to Norway. 
The solution which had been discussed at the conferences in Oslo - as 
things had turned out - could not be regarded as satisfactory to Nor­
wegian interests, nor did it seem capable of realization in the near future. 
The time was favorable, insofar as Norway enjoyed a measure of 
popularity among the victors. But Norway's claim to the archipelago was 
based on a far more solid foundation than the good will of the victors. 
It was founded on historical, economic, geographical and political 
grounds. 
Sovereignty or Mandate. 
The question which the Norwegian Government had submitted to 
the Peace Conference was discussed by the Supreme Council at a meeting 
on July 7. It was proposed that the matter should be dealt with in the 
Baltic Commission, but Secretary of State Lansing, who realized how 
complicated it was, wanted to set up a sub-committee. This procedure was 
agreed on, and the French Government was requested to invite all in­
terested states to submit their points of view to this cOl11mission. Italy's 
Foreign Minister, Tittoni, took the opportunity to draw attention to his 
country's need for coal, and requested the Conference to take it into 
account in deciding on the Sva!bard coal fields.! This may have been 
why Italy was given a representative on the commission, viz. Marchetti 
Ferranti. The other members were Jules-Alfred Laroche, deputy director 
of the European Departement of the French Foreign Ministry; Fred. 
K. Nielsen, a legal consultant to the State Department; and Charles 
Tufton, a secretary in the British Foreign Office. The commission's task 
was to judge the claims of the various states in the archipelago, and then 
to submit to the Supreme Council a draft for its administration.2 
Once the Peace Conference had taken up the matter the Norwegian 
Government, in view of the statement made by the Foreign Ministries of 
the interested states, might be in a position to hope that the archipelago 
would be handed over to Norway. The question was now in what form 
and on what conditions this would be done. 
The League of Nations' Covenant, which at Wilson's request con­
stituted the first part of the Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1918, contained 
provisions regarding the future form of government in those colonies of 
the Central Powers whose populations were not yet ready for self­
government. The main principle was that the administration of such 
countries should be entrusted to highly developed nations, which by virtue 
of their resources, experience, or geographical position would be capable 
of exercising this authority as mandatory powers on behalf of the League 
of Nations. The mandates were to vary in character. according to the 
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degree of development of the populations concerned, the geographical 
position of the territory, its economic conditions and the like. The type 
of authority, control or government to be exercised by the mandatory 
power, unless previously laid down by the members of the League of 
Nations, should be settled by the League of Nations' Council in every 
single case, and the mandatory power was to submit to the Council an 
annual report on the area which had been entrusted to it. A permanent 
commission was to examine these reports and assist the Council in all 
questions concerning the tenure of mandates. 
The conclusion reached was that the ex-German colonies in South­
West Africa, and certain islands in the Pacific, owing to their sparse 
population or limited size, their remoteness from the centers of civiliza­
tion - as it was put - their geographical proximity to the mandatory 
state concerned, or similar considerations, could best be governed accord­
ing to the rules of the mandatory power and as an integral part of its 
territory. 3 These were the so-called C Mandates. 
In Great Britain there were some people who considered that Nor­
way should be entrusted with the task of governing Svalbard as a C 
Mandate, as a preliminary to Norwegian sovereignty. 4 But it was obvious 
that the principle of a mandate could not well apply to Svalbard; the 
fundamental idea of a mandate was to assist people who had only 
achieved Iow cultural standards to reach a level of development where 
they might fend for themselves in the modern world; in other words it 
amounted to a temporary arrangement. The population of Svalbard con­
sisted largely of Norwegians who only spent a relatively short time on 
the archipelago, most of them returning after a few years to Norway, 
where they had their homes. In the course of the spring of 1919, however, 
the opinion gained ground that Svalbard should be governed as a man­
dated territory. 
In Great Britain the position was least clear. Those who were anx­
ious to place Svalbard under British sovereignty adduced economic, 
strategic5 or h istorical arguments to support their case. Though they were 
few in numbers they made up for this by being very active. They included 
businessmen, scientists, explorers and officers. They made their opinions 
felt not only in Parliament but also at the Peace Conference. Sir Harry 
Britten, M. P. and F. W. Salisbury-jones, director of the Northern Ex­
ploration Company, went to Paris in order to bring pressure to bear on 
the British delegation. 
The British reports of large deposits of iron ore in Svalbard caused 
some stir, though this news was received with a certain amount of reser­
vation by experts. In Norway it was fully realized that they were nothing 
but a bubble which would soon burst. The only question was whether 
this would occur before the Paris Peace Conference had made its de­
cision. A Scottish expedition led by Dr. Bruce which made its way to 
9 
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Svalbard in July, 1919 wired home that it had discovered considerable 
deposits of coal; but this news aroused hardly any interest in British 
business circles, as coal could be produced more cheaply in Great Britain 
than in Svalbard. The Norwegian press, too, contributed to the spread 
of rumors, which could hardly have been favorable to Norway's cause 
at this juncture, e. g. the news that there were large oil deposits in Vest­
spitsbergen. It was naturally repeated in the foreign press, and if any 
reliable evidence had been available, increased pressure would have 
been brought to bear on the British Foreign Office to prevent Norway 
having her demands fulfilled. The fraction in favor of British acquisition 
of the archipelago received, however, no support from the Government. 
Time and again the Foreign Office had declared that Great Britain would 
lay no claim to Svalbard. But there were different opinions prevalent: 
some persons in the top echelon considered that the archipelago should 
remain no man's land, others that Norway should be given sovereignty 
over the area. The last-mentioned attitude was held by Foreign Secretary 
Arthur Balfour and by the Assistant Under-Secretary Eyre Crowe, who 
were both in Paris. Moreover, Private Under-Secretary Cecil Harmsworth 
seems to have shared their opinion. But the Acting Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Curzon, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, Ronald Graham, were 
very reluctant to hand the archipelago over to Norway.6 This difference 
of opinion between �he British delegation in Paris and the Foreign Office 
was probably partly due to the fact that in London the various campaigns 
had given an exaggerated impression of the British interests at stake. 
Everything tended to suggest that the Foreign Office regarded Norway's 
claim with genuine favor, but the pressure exerted had forced the Foreign 
Office to adopt a compromise, viz. that of handing Svalbard over to 
Norway to be administered on behalf of the League of Nations. As the 
date for a decision approached it became more and more obvious that 
this would be Britain's final attitude.7 But in Norwegian quarters it was 
repeatedly emphasized that a solution of this kind was quite unaccept­
able.8 Whether the Norwegian Government would have stuck to this 
attitude if the matter had come to a head is open to doubt. 
As far as Sweden was concerned it gradually became clear that the 
Government would not persist in its demand that Svalbard should remain 
no man's land, but would concur in a Norwegian mandate. It is possible 
that in Sweden a little annoyance was felt because the Peace Conference 
had concurred in Norway's request to settle the Svalbard question while 
refusing to deal with the Aland Islands. Moreover, it was considered 
that the Norwegian Government had behaved in a rather high-handed 
manner, and should have taken Swedish interests more into account. 
As things developed, it would, however, not be expedient for the Swedish 
Government to persist in its demands for retaining the archipelago as 
terra nullius. But it was definitely apparent that Sweden was not keen 
-131-
I)n extending Norway sovereignty, and in Paris a measure of resistance 
was offered to this solution; 9 in fact the general impression was that the 
Swedish Government adopted a less conciliatory attitude than the one 
which appeared in the Swedish press - a state of affairs which was 
mo�e or less the opposite of that in Great Britain. In order to avoid any 
unfavorable consequences which might arise from the Swedish position 
the Norwegian Foreign Minister asked the Swedish envoy in Oslo that 
Sweden support a solution acceptable to Norway. This was done on 
the recommendation of \Vedel J arlsherg who noticed that there was fric­
tion in Paris. 
In essence, the attitude of the Dutch Government was that a new 
attempt should be made to arrive at some form of international admini­
stration. The archipelago might, for example, be placed under the League 
()f Nations, which could then appoint a single state to administer ipo 
I t possibly considered the chances of having Svalbard placed under 
the protection of the League of Nations in order subsequently to lay 
claim to the rf)le of administrator, basing its claim on the part Dutch 
sailors had played in former times in the exploration and exploitation of 
the islands. The comprehensive survey of Dutch discovery and carto­
graphy of Svalbard, which was drawn up for the Peace Conference, 
seemed to suggest that this was the course intended. 
When the Danish envoy in Paris learned that the Peace Conference 
had set up a commission to settle the claims of the various powers to 
Svalbard, and that the Danish Government would be asked its opinion, 
he suggested that his Government should make its attitude to a trans­
ference of Svalbard to Norway dependent on the Norwegian Govern­
ment's attitude to an extension of Danish sovereignty over the whole of 
Greenland;l1 he feared that Norway would object to a step of this nature. 
The Danish Government had previously declared that it had no parti­
cular interests in Svalbard;12 but it decided, nevertheless, to make an 
attempt to obtain a statement from the Norwegian Government. On re­
ceiving directives, the Danish Minister in Oslo declared, during a con­
ference with Foreign Minister lhlen, that his Government would repeat 
to the Svalbard Commission what it had already told the Norwegian 
Government, viz. that it had no particular interest in the Svalbard ques­
tion, and that it would declare that it had no objection to the archipelago 
being handed over to Norway. He then mentioned the wish of his Govern­
ment to obtain the agreement of the powers to Danish sovereignty being 
extended to cover the whole of Greenland, and that it would endeavor to 
have this question dealt with by the Svalbard Commission in Paris. 
Finally the Danish Minister expressed a hope that Norway would place 
no obstacle in the way of this extension of sovereignty, and Mr. lhlen 
replied that the matter would be considered.13 One week later the Danish 
Minister once more approached the Norwegian Foreign Minister for an 
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answer. By now the question had been discussed, and Ihlen declared that 
the Norwegian Government would not hamper the settlement of the 
Greenland question.14 
In Germany, at that time, there was little interest in Svalbard, while 
Russia's representatives in Paris15 who were kept informed of the progress 
of the negotiations agreed in principle to Norway acquiring sovereignty, 
provided that Russia's interests would be protected.16 
At the end of july, Denmark and Holland handed in their replies to 
the Svalbard Commission. As had been expected the Danish reply was 
favorable to Norway.17 The Dutch Government, on the other hand, de­
manded that the archipelago be governed as a mandated territory on 
behalf of the League of Nations. Should the archipelago, contrary to her 
demand, be handed over to one single state, Holland would regard her­
self as bound to reserve her rights. Concurrently with the note, the Dutch 
Minister in Paris handed over copies of the survey of Dutch exploration 
and mapping of Svalbard, which had been prepared at the expense of 
the Dutch Foreign Ministry and the Dutch Geographical Society.1s 
The Swedish Government hesitated, first inquiring of the British 
and Norwegian Governments whether Norway would not be content to 
accept a mandate.19 Then at the beginning of August it handed in its 
report to the Svalbard Commission stating that mandated rule would be 
best, though Sweden was not entirely unfavorable to the idea of Nor­
wegian sovereignty over the archipelago, provided regulations were laid 
down guaranteeing the nationals of other states certain rights. The regu­
lations which the Swedish Government was anxious to incorporate in the 
treaty, however, were very far-reaching;20 Minister Wedel jarlsberg 
managed to have them slightly reduced, but in all essentials the demands 
were acceded to by the Svalbard Commission. Furthermore the Swedish 
Government demanded a share in the negotiations. But this demand could 
not be met. Finland also expressed a wish to join in the negotiations, on 
the grounds that Finnish subjects might get economic interests in 
Svalbard.21 
In London it was now being openly declared that Norway ought to 
be satisfied with a mandate. It also seemed as if the delegation in Paris 
had changed its attitude; Mr. Balfour, who had previously promised 
Minister Wedel jarlsberg that he would support Norway's claims for 
sovereignty, now adopted a more cautious attitude, and hinted that the 
Norwegian Government should make representations in London, and 
the Norwegian Minister was not slow to follow this injunction. As he 
feared that there would be an undue loss of time if he merely wired home 
about the matter, he immediatedly dispatched his Counsellor j. F. jakhelln 
to London to ask the Norwegian Minister there to explain the case to the 
Foreign Office. But despite Norwegian efforts it was impossible to get 
the Foreign Office to change its attitude; Lord Curzon was decidedly 
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averse to granting Norway sovereignty, and it was maintained that out 
of regard to the strong public opinion which this matter had provoked, 
it would not be expedient to go further than offering Norway a mandate. 
Large delegations of businessmen and scientists, demanding that British 
interests should be protected, had been received. The Foreign Office had 
to proceed in such a way that it might be able to provide an answer 
both in the press and in Parliament calculated to restrain the most voci­
ferous.22 The only grain of comfort which the Norwegian Minister re­
ceived was that Lord Curzon had little to do with cases submitted for 
negotiation by the Paris Conference, where the British attitude was 
decided by Foreign Minister Balfour. 
Even after the Svalbard Commission had been in session for several 
weeks it was not clear what the results would be. The attitude of the 
American Government seems to have been decisive. Secretary of State 
Lansing maintained the view that geographical conditions made it pre­
ferable that the archipelago was placed under Norwegian sovereignty, and 
that this would prove in every way the most favorable solution. When 
he realized that the Conference was going to deal with the question, he 
immediately cabled Frank L. Polk, at that time head of the American 
delegation, instructing him that this line was to be pursued even if the 
Foreign Office evinced a preference for a mandate.23 It is possible that 
the attitude in the United States to the League of Nations might also, 
to some extent, have influenced the standpoint of the State Department 
to Government by mandate. But - more imporant still - Lansing ob­
jected for several reasons to the mandate principle as elaborated at the 
Peace Conference.24 And no real opposition was made by the British 
delegation to Norway acquiring sovereignty, despite public opinion in 
Great Britain, the only great power with any real interests in the archi­
pelago which at that time had a chance of influencing the course of 
events in Paris. Foreign Secretary Balfour in fact did not deviate from 
his views that Norway should be given Svalbard;25 but he undoubtedly 
had to take into account the agitation which this matter had aroused in 
Great Britain, as well as the views held by Lord Curzon and others in 
the Foreign Office. 
On August 28, the same day that Secretary of State Lansing cabled 
Polk to adhere to the viewpoint that Norway should be extended sover­
eignty, the commission concluded its work. In its report to the Supreme 
Council it stated that, whereas the archipelago was situated in a region 
which at the time belonged to no state, everyone was bound to agree that 
it was necessary to give it a definite status. Two solutions had been con­
sidered; one, which was proposed by various powers and some members 
of the commission, was to entrust Norway with a mandate on behalf of 
the League of Nations. Another, which Norway had demanded, was to 
grant her sovereignty over the archipelago, with reservations guranteeing 
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the interest of other countries concerned. In view of the decided interests 
Norway had in Svalbard, her vicinity to the archipelago, and the advant­
age of reaching a final solution, the commission had agreed that Norway 
should be granted sovereignty, and the powers most interested would not 
object to this solution. 
The commission did not cite article 118 of the Versailles Treaty as 
ground or condition for dealing with the Svalbard question, nor did it, 
in its report to the Supreme Council, make any mention of the extent 
to which this question had been discussed. 
After the commission had submitted its findings, there was reason to 
expect that the question of mandate or sovereignty was as good as settled. 
The Dutch Government now declared, like the Swedish, that it could 
agree to Norway being extended sovereignty on condition that the rights 
of the individual powers were guaranteed,27 and after this it was prob­
able that the Supreme Council would abide by the findings of the Sval­
bard Commission. It would, of course, be possible that the sovereignty, 
according to the terms of the draft treaty which the Peace Conference 
would submit to the Norwegian Government, might be so undermined 
that Norway would prefer another arrangement. On the other hand there 
were no grounds for believing that Norway would acquire larger rights 
if she merely received a mandate. The most she could expect in the latter 
case was some slight diminution of her responsibility in certain inter­
national situations. 
The principle of mandate had been to the fore in a certain form 
during pre-war discussions. Norway's offer to exercise her jurisdiction 
might be interpreted as wi11ingness to carry out this function on behalf 
of all interested powers concerned. The three-power-proposal was 
changed at the 1914 Conference so as to make it still clearer that Norway, 
Russia and Sweden undertook the govern ment of the archipelago on 
behalf of all the powers signing the convention. But the mandatory 
government worked out by General Jan Smuts, and dealt with by the 
Council of Ten in January, 1919,28 was based on certain principles and 
conditions which would make it imprudent for Norway to accept as far 
as Svalbard was concerned. Minister \Vedel Jarlsberg's firm attitude in 
this question was by all appearance justified, though his demands for 
sovereignty were based on pure patriotism and personal considerations 
of prestige rather than on a clear understanding of what mandatory 
government would really entail in the case of Svalbard. 
In light of the aims which the allied war leaders had declared, it 
accorded i11 for the victors to appropriate ex-enemy territory as colonies. 
On the other hand France and Great Britain had made secret agreements 
during the war in which they had divided up the most highly developed 
of the colonies belonging to the Central Powers into various spheres of 
interest, and there was reason to believe that these two great powers 
were anxious to have control of them, at any rate for the immediate 
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future. They could achieve this as mandatory powers. Idealists enjoyed 
a sense of security and progress in the thought that supreme control was 
vested in the League of Nations; the population of the mandated terri­
tories could be consoled with promises of self-government as soon as 
possible. The vanquished powers would perhaps find it easier to cede 
territory when it was placed under the League of Nations than were the 
victor to retain it as his own colony. The principle of mandate was thus 
suitable for the purpose for which it had been designed. But it was 
certainly never supposed that the principle might be made to apply to 
territory the population of which consisted almost entirely of the same 
nationality and enjoyed the same level of culture as the mandatory state 
concerned. According to Article 22 of the League of Nations' Covenant 
it applied to "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of 
the late war had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which 
formerly had governed them and which were inhabited by peoples not 
yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world". Furthermore this arrangement was limited to the time it 
would take to 'educate' the people in each mandated territory to fend for 
themselves. It was easy to see that these conditions made the mandate 
principle rather unsuitable for Svalbard, even though the type of govern­
ment to be exercised by the mandatory state would in every single case 
be laid down by the League of Nations' Council; and the principle of 
national self-determination which was generally recognized by the Peace 
Conference would suggest that Norway should be given sovereignty. 
There were also other considerations. By the Versailles Treaty of 
June 28, 1919, and the Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923, Germany and 
Turkey, respectively, gave up their colonies. There is a considerable dif­
ference of opinion as to who was really entrusted with the sovereignty 
of these territories.29 Already at the Peace Conference there were some 
who pointed out the uncertainty which prevailed on this point. Secretary 
of State Lansing was one of these.30 If the interested powers had agreed 
to ask Norway to govern Svalbard as a mandated territory on behalf of 
the League of Nations, it is possible that the question of sovereignty 
would be just as unclear as in the case of the former colonies of the 
Central Powers; but there was perhaps a still more important reason 
than those already mentioned, for Norway not to accept a mandate. The 
Norwegian authorities had always been a little anxious about an arrange­
ment which would allow foreign powers to interfere in any Norwegian 
administration that might be established. If Norway accepted a mandate 
there was a possibility that several powers with economic interests in 
Svalbard might be represented in the permanent Mandate Commission 
of the Council, and experience had shown that even comparatively small 
private undertakings were capable of influencing the authorities in the 
home country, and of affecting public opinion through the press and in 
other ways.31 
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Working Out the Treaty. 
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry assumed that the Peace Conference 
would submit principles for rendering Svalbard to Norway, and that the 
Norwegian Government would be entrusted with the task of working 
out a draft in accordance with these principles; 1 it saw, therefore, no 
reason to make any preparations before the Conference submitted its 
proposals. But a private committee drew up a draft treaty. 
Things were not to turn out as the Foreign Ministry had expected. 
Shortly after the Svalbard Commission in Paris had come together, and 
long before it had been decided whether Norway should be given a 
mandate or sovereignty, it demanded a Norwegian draft as quickly as 
possible, to use as a basis for its deliberations. As it was Norway that 
had asked for the decision of the Conference, she would also have to 
submit a proposal. Time was short, as the commission was, according 
to plan, supposed to complete its work in four weeks. 
When this situation arose, Minister Wedel Jarlsberg cabled to Oslo 
for the draft which the private committee had worked out. This had, how­
ever, only a short while before been sent to the Foreign Ministry which 
was keen to have it thoroughly examined by all interested departments, 
before it could be sent to Paris as the Government's proposal. The situa­
tion was a tricky one. The Svalbard Commission was pressed for time, and 
demanded that Wedel Jarlsberg should submit a draft forthwith. The Nor­
wegian Minister then hit on the expedient of asking the legal adviser to 
the French Foreign Ministry, Henri Fromageot, to work out a draft treaty 
for the Norwegian Legation.2 
The draft drawn up by Fromageot contained, according to Wedel 
Jarlsberg's report, five main points. 1. The powers gathered at the Peace 
Conference should recognize Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard. 2. Ex­
isting claims to land should be settled by international decision. 3. Mining 
rules should be settled by special agreement, to come into force at the 
same time as the treaty. 4. It was Norway's duty to see that the archi­
pelago was not used as a base for warlike preparations, especially as a 
base for submarines. 5. Other states were to have the right to adhere 
to the treaty.3 
It was, however, agreed that the treaty should be given another form, 
so that all interested states which were able to make their voices heard 
at the time in Paris could put their signatures to the treaty. 
At the end of July the Svalbard Commission summoned Minister 
Wedel Jarlsberg to a conference, and Professor Charles Rabot appeared 
as geographical adviser. Wedel Jarlsberg repeated what he had main­
tained in the expose submitted to the Peace Conference, and demanded 
that Norway be granted sovereignty. He maintained that a mandate was 
a form of government applicable in the case of primitive people. Svalbard 
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had no native population. The people working in the archipelago were 
Norwegians. He proposed that the question be settled by a treaty between 
the Big Five in Paris, and Denmark, Holland, Sweden and Norway. When 
asked to explain in greater detail what sort of treaty he had envisaged, 
Wedel promised to hand in a finIshed draft at short notice. At the meet­
ing, the American representative, Fred K. Nielsen, gave the impression 
of being willing to make the greatest concessions to Norway's requests. 
He maintained that if Norway were to be given the archipelago, it would 
be as well not to encroach too much upon her sovereignty. 
In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry the stipulation that Norway 
should be obliged to see to it that the archipelago was not used as a 
base for warlike preparations was regarded as important, and the military 
authorities were asked to state their opinion. They concluded, however, 
that Norway should accept it. It was easy to exercise surveillance over 
submarines, their report said. Moreover, it was unlikely that Svalbard 
would be subject to infringement of neutrality, as the land was situated 
so far north, far from any probable theatre of war. The harbors were 
bad, navigation difficult, and there was open water for only three months 
of the year. The Foreign Ministry nevertheless reserved the right to 
examine the draft in detail before it was submitted to the Svalbard Com­
mission.5 Wedel Jarlsberg realized, however, that if this was done it 
would take a long time before he got a draft accepted in Oslo. A few 
days after he had received the above information he cabled the draft 
agreement to the Foreign Ministry. But at the same time he announced 
that he had already handed it in to the commission ad referendum.6 This 
resolute move on the part of Wedel Jarlsberg must have caused well­
founded surprise in Oslo, for it turned out that the draft treaty which 
he handed in contained very important conditions which did not appear 
in the resume the Government had previously received.7 This contained 
no mention of the very comprehensive rights which the subjects of other 
states would have, and which in fact would place them on an equal 
footing with Norwegians, as far as the right to exploit the economic 
resources of the archipelago was concerned. The Foreign Ministry im­
mediately replied that it could not accept the draft as the basis for a 
treaty, and that the Norwegian Government could under no circumstances 
come to a decision in three weeks. It considered that the best course 
would be to have the matter postponed until the autumn, so as to allow 
the necessary time for reflection. The wish was also expressed that Wedel 
Jarlsberg would return home in order to confer with the Government.8 
On the very day that the Foreign Ministry's reply telegram was 
being encoded in Oslo, Wedel Jarlsberg cabled from Paris to say that the 
Svalbard Commission was anxious to know as soon as possible what 
standpoint the Government adopted. He declared that the draft had been 
worked out in cooperation with the French Foreign Ministry and as fa r 
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as possible in agreement with the wishes of the other interested grear 
powers. He therefore urged the Norwegian Government to accept it in 
its general outlines as soon as possible. It should only insist on changes 
in so far as these were absolutely necessary.9 The French envoy in Oslo 
also hinted that the matter now called for quick decisions.10 As Wedel 
Jarisberg did not receive an immediate reply from the Government he 
returned to the charge. "The Ministry must be good enough", he cabled, 
"to put aside less important matters. Speed in this case, as in so many 
others, will be synonymous with success, and Norway must never lay 
herself open to the charge of being unable to promote this matter owing 
to lack of resoluteness and courage in assuming promptly the necessary 
responsibility".H The Minister was evidently excited at being on the 
point of bringing to a happy conclusion a matter which, in his opinion, 
was of great importance to his country. It was difficult for him to under­
stand the constitutional caution which had to be exercised at home, and 
he was in despair at the lack of dispatch which seemed to prevail in the 
Foreign Ministry. That the Government should ask to have the matter 
postponed until the autumn might in fact be taken as a sign that it mis­
understood the situation, or was willing to take the risk of jeopardizing 
its chances because it considered the matter had taken an unfortunate 
turn. The Peace Conference had been gracious enough to agree to settle 
the question. It was now working at full pressure to dispose of the most 
important matters, because the members of the Supreme Council hoped 
to be able to leave Paris in the near future.t2 Should the Norwegian 
Government demand a postponement until the autumn, there was reason 
to believe that the Conference would refuse to deal with the matter. The 
Svalbard Commission had admittedly been able to postpone the closing 
date of its work until August 15, but time was still short. When the 
commission had finished, its report would be discussed by the Supreme 
Council, which would then invite all interested states to make their obser­
vations on the draft treaty. When the answers had been received and 
examined by the Supreme Council the Peace Conference would invite the 
powers to sign the treaty. Wedel Jarlsberg was therefore of the opinion 
that the Government would have ample time to confer with him before 
being obliged to submit the matter to the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Storting. A postponement would in his opinion have the most serious 
consequences and prove extremely unfortunate to Norway. It would 
result in intrigues and opposition. The powers would withdraw their 
support to Norway, and her chances of having the matter settled would 
be lost. The Svalbard Commission was also unwilling to reduce the ex­
tensive rights which the powers would have in the archipelago according 
to the terms of the draft.t3 
At the end of July the Swedish Minister in Oslo handed over a verbal 
note which was couched in exceptionally sharp terms. The Swedish 
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Government, it said, had heard to its surprise that Minister Wedel Jarls­
berg had stated his intention of submitting a proposal for a Svalbard 
treaty between the Big Five at the Peace Conference and Norway. Other 
states, including Sweden, would be invited to join later. The Swedish 
Government deplored that attempts were being made by Norway to have 
the matter dealt with in a manner which excluded effective Swedish 
participation. This course was, in the opinion of the Swedish Govern­
ment, extraordinary, especially in view of the fact that the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister had promised repeatedly a few months before that the 
Swedish Government would be informed of the steps which Norway 
would take. Later on, the note revealed that the Swedish Government 
was familiar with the actual contents of the proposal which Wedel Jarls­
berg had submitted to the Svalbard Commission, and which included the 
proviso that Sweden should be invited to participate as a signatory 
power. It demanded nevertheless a copy of the draft treaty as soon as 
possible and a declaration from the Norwegian Government that it would 
do everything in its power to have the subsequent treatment of the matter 
undertaken in such a way that Sweden would have an opportunity of 
protecting her interests. It was further pointed out that at the meetings 
of the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries it had been agreed to 
continue the friendly cooperation which had taken place during the war, 
but that the Norwegians' course of action seemed to run counter to this 
spirit of cooperation.14 
The day after this verbal note had been received in the Foreign 
Ministry, the Acting Foreign Minister J0rgen L0vland, had a conference 
with the Swedish Minister Baron Rame!. L0vland declared that Norway 
would like to see any agreement that might be reached on Svalbard also 
signed by Denmark, Holland and Sweden, but the Norwegian Government 
could not make an agreement of this nature dependent on the fact of 
these powers signing or not signing.15 This was naturally at variance 
with the views that Norway had previously maintained, and it was ob­
vious that the Norwegian Government was reluctant to push through a 
settlement to which Sweden or any of the other interested states not 
represented at the Peace Conference was definitely averse. Either L0V­
land had failed to make himself sufficiently acquainted with what had 
previously happened in this case, or else his statement must be regarded 
as an answer to the somewhat niggling attitude which the Swedish 
Government had shown; of course, his statement was not particularly 
well received in Stockholm.16 
This little feud between Norway and Sweden was started by an 
almost comic incident which occurred in Paris. After Wedel Jarlsberg 
had been summoned before the Svalbard Commission, a letter was sent 
to him from the Conference containing a resume of what had taken place 
at the meeting. This was addressed to Baron Wedel jarisberg, "Ministre 
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de Suede". As a result of this mistake, the Swedish envoy opened the 
letter and brought it to the Norwegian Minister the foIlowing day. Wedel 
jarlsberg's annoyance can easily be imagined, but he maintained a brave 
front and replied to Minister Ehrensvard that this was most convenient, 
as he would not now need to inform him of its contents. As matters now 
stood, Wedel jarIsberg considered it best to ask the chairman of the Sval­
bard Commission for permission to send the Swedish envoy privately a 
copy of the draft, and this was done the next day,17 
After the Norwegian Government had received reports from Paris 
that it was impossible to have the matter postponed, it decided to set up a 
committee to advice on what answer Wedel jarlsberg should have and 
especiaIly to examine what rights and obligations Norway would have 
according to the draft treaty - what rights not included in the draft 
ought to be there, and what obligations Norway should avoid. It does 
not appear, however, that the committee achieved anything; time was 
so short that it was only possible to get an expert on constitutional law 
to comment on the draft. In a Government conference at the beginning 
of August it was agreed to propose to the Foreign Affairs Committee that 
Norway should not hold to its demands that the case be postponed, and 
the legation in Paris was immediately informed of this decision. But a 
reminder was also given at the same time that the approval of the Stor­
ting was necessary before any binding resolution could be taken.IS 
The Svalbard Commission agreed to Wedel jarIsberg's proposal 
for a treaty signed by the Big Five in Paris and all the other interested 
states, with the exception of Russia and Germany, whom it was impos­
sible at the moment to invite to participate in the negotiations. The deci­
sion to transfer the archipelago to Norway was formulated as foIlows: 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognize, subject to the 
stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of 
Norway over the archipelago of Svalbard, comprising with Bj0rn0ya all 
islands between 100 and 350 longitude east and between 740 and 81 0 
latitude north. "19 But the above-mentioned stipulations were of such a 
kind that the expression "full and absolute sovereignty" was considerably 
weakened. On the basis of the demands made by the various interested 
states, the commission saw to it that the provisions guaranteeing the 
nationals of all contracting parties equal economic rights, were worked 
out more effectively even than in Wedel jarIsberg's draft. A number of 
new provisions were also added.20 With regard to mining regulations, 
Norway was entrusted with the task of drawing up a draft which would 
give equal rights to the nationals of all contracting parties, especiaIly as 
to taxes and working conditions, and would furthermore guarantee wor­
kers and officials the necessary wages as weIl as security with regard 
to physical, moral and intellectual welfare. This was to be submitted to 
the other contracting parties. Should agreement not be reached, the 
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matter should be decided by a commission, consisting of one represen­
tative of each of the treaty powers. The Svalbard Commission made no 
mention in its draft of the voting procedure to be used by this com­
mission.21 As far as hunting was concerned - a matter in which the 
Norwegians were especially interested - it was agreed that occupiers 
of land should enjoy exclusive rights on their own lands within a radius 
of 10 kilometers from their headquarters, and in the vicinity of houses 
or installations which had been erected with a view to developing their 
property.22 The conditions for scientific research were to be laid down 
by agreement.23 The commission agreed to the provisions in Wedel 
Jarlsberg's draft to the effect that the archipelago should be demilitarized. 
With reservations for such rights and obligations which membership of 
the League of Nations might entail, Norway was to undertake neither 
to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base, nor to con­
struct any fortifications in the territories specified in the draft agreement, 
nor to allow those territories to be used for warlike purposes.24 With 
regard to Russian nationals and companies, it was proposed that they 
might enjoy the same rights as nationals and companies of the contract­
ing parties until the recognition of a Russian Government might permit 
Russia to adhere to the treaty. Any claims they might wish to raise in 
the archipelago should be submitted through the Danish Government 
which had declared its willingness to lend its good offices for this 
purpose.25 
Before Norway assumed control of Svalbard, rules would have to 
be established preserving the rights which had been acquired before the 
treaty was signed. The commission proposed that all such rights should 
be recognized in principle.26 But in order that the Norwegian Govern­
ment should be able to issue title deed to land, it was decided in an 
appendix to the draft treaty that all claims should be tried by a com­
missioner of Danish nationality, appointed by the Danish Government. 
The choice of a Dane for this purpose was due to the fact that the Peace 
Conference had in mind the possibility of sending a Norwegian and a 
Swedish commissioner to Slesvig. The claims which the commissioner 
regarded as doubtful were to be decided by an arbitration tribunal.27 
Provided the Supreme Council accepted the draft, it should be sub­
mitted to the Norwegian Government, which was to inform the conference 
immediately of its decision. The other contracting parties should then be 
invited to state within a period of six weeks if they were willing to sign. 
The powers which did not answer within this period should only be 
allowed to adhere to the treaty as third powers on the invitation of the 
French Government. Those which had answered in the affirmative within 
the time specified, should be invited to sign in Paris, where the documents 
of ratification would be deposited. After ratification the French Govern­
ment would invite third powers to adhere to the treaty. 
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The draft of the Svalbard Commission was now examined by the 
British Foreign Office. Here certain additions and amendments were re­
quested, which aimed at preventing Norwegian nationals and the Nor­
wegian state from acquiring any advantages over the subjects of the 
other signatory powers, as far as economic activity was concerned,28 and 
it was added that the commission for the mining regulation mentioned 
in the draft should arrive at its decisions by an ordinary majority. 
After the Svalbard Commission had added the British remarks, the 
draft was submitted to the Drafting Committee. Here another important 
change was made: it was decided that article 8 should come into force 
after the treaty had been ratified, while the remaining articles should 
come into force simultaneously with the mining regulation; whereas ac­
cording to the draft agreement of the Svalbard Commission all articles 
should come into force simultaneously with the mining regulations.30 
The latter arrangement was, in a way, logically opposed to the provision 
of Article 8, but on the other hand the amendment made by the Drafting 
Committee might have highly unfortunate consequences for Norway. In 
a meeting at the end of September the Supreme Council adopted the 
draft treaty,31 which was then dispatched to the Norwegian Government 
in agreement with the proposal of the Svalbard Commission. 
The matter had not developed along lines entirely favorable to 
Norway at the Peace Conference. The result seemed to be that some of 
the interested states were going to compete in working out the most 
ingenious provisions calculated to undermine Norway·s sovereignty, so 
that Norway acquired no economic advantages over themselves. The 
result arrived at might remind one of conditions obtaining in former 
days, when the Dano-Norwegian Kings claimed sovereignty over the 
territory, but had to allow several nations the right to pursue the eco­
nomic activities, which were then of some importance; and there was an 
obvious historical sequence. The states which demanded the greatest 
encroachment on Norway's sovereignty were precisely those which could 
point to the activities their nationals had developed on the archipelago 
in former days. Several nations had from olden times enjoyed unrestricted 
economic rights in the Svalbard waters, even though they did not un­
conditionally oppose Norway's claim to sovereignty - in itself an inter­
esting state of affairs, which was due to legal ambiguities and Denmark­
Norway's inability to defend their interests with force, even though these 
interests might be defended in a court of law. But in thl)se days it was 
'Still a far cry from an international permanent court of justice. 
An important question in this connection, is whether Norway could 
in any way have achieved better results in Paris. Some Norwegians 
argued that no one wished matters to continue as they were. A solution 
of the type suggested before the war was not to be thought of. The only 
natural thing was to hand the archipelago over to Norway; the Nor-
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wegian Government should, therefore, have tried to oppose the most 
far-reaching demands; but they did not know that in Paris a mandate 
had been proposed as an alternative to Norwegian sovereignty. Norway 
had American, Danish and French support. The American representative 
on the Svalbard Commission made it quite clear that if Norway was to 
have the archipelago, it would be preferable from an international point 
of view to make as few encroachments as possible on her sovereignty. 
In favor of the demands for a considerable reduction in Norway's sover­
eignty for the benefit of the nationals of other states, were countries like 
Holland, Great Britain and Sweden. The Norwegian Minister in Paris 
did his best and it is probably correct to say that, as things turned out, 
no one could have achieved more than he did. 
Another question is whether the result could have been more favor­
able to Norway if the Conference had chosen to deal with the matter in 
another way. But any attempt to answer that question must necessarily 
be pure speculation. If the Norwegian Government had made more 
thorough preparations it might perhaps have ventured to propose, in 
some way or another, a plan as to how the matter, in its opinion, could 
best be dealt with at the Conference. In any case, no harm would have 
been done if it had drawn up in advance a proposal for a treaty. As things 
turned out, Minister Wedel Jarlsberg more or less had to improvise a 
draft in Paris. 
Differing Appraisals of the Agreement. 
In September, Wedel Jarlsberg left Paris with the draft of the Sval­
bard Commission in his pocket. In Oslo he was the object of great atten­
tion, and a number of prominent citizens, headed by members of the 
Government, gave a dinner for him. Among the many speeches was one 
paying tribute to France, and the MarseiJIaise was sung as an expression 
of gratitude to France for her goodwill during the treatment of the Sval­
bard case at the Paris Conference. Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen 
made the main speech. Actually he expressed himself in reserved terms; 
it was obvious that he wished Norway had been given the archipelago 
on slightly better conditions. When news arrived from Paris that the 
Supreme Council had accepted the report of the Svalbard Commission, 
the Norwegian press naturally expressed its satisfaction, but its enthu­
siasm was moderated because, as yet, there was no detailed information 
of the obligations and rights which the treaty would entail. People were 
warned not to have any exaggerated ideas about the economic advant­
ages. It was, however, assumed that even if all nations were to be dealt 
with equally, Norway would benefit from her geographical position, and 
it was hoped that the sovereignty which ;\!urway had now achieved would 
in the natural course of events and autumaticaIly develop into a state of 
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affairs which would benefit the country. It was also pointed out that 
even if the acquisition were to entail obligations and few economic ad­
vantages, the national significance of Norway's right now being re­
cognized was so great, that there were more grounds for rejoicing than 
for anxiety concerning the difficulties involved. 
The general impression was, however, that the national satisfaction 
of Norway's justifiable claims being finally accepted - that Norway's 
flag would now fly over the archipelago - was the key-note of the 
attitude and feelings which found expression. But at the same time could 
be noticed a measure of apprehension that the duties and responsibility 
involved would be out of proportion to the advantages gained. A leading 
commerce and shipping journal went furthest in this direction. Svalbard 
could not be handed over to any other state but Norway without Nor­
way's rights being violated, that was the core of the question, the paper 
stated. It was impossible to establish international rule, nor could things 
continue as they were. The development had been the only natural one, 
but the question was whether the limited sovereignty Norway had 
acquired was in accordance with Norwegian interests. In view of the 
information available about the treaty, the paper considered that the 
sum total of the whole matter was that other states had the same rights 
as Norway, but not the same obligations. If the citizens of other countries 
were to feel that they had been offended with regard to these rights, 
they would undoubtedly complain to their government about Norway's 
administration. 
The chief organ of the Labor Movement maintained that if Svalbard 
ceased to be a bone of contention, the obligations entailed would be no 
more than Norway could stand. If the contrary were the case her new 
colony would bring less joy than sorrow. In this connection the march of 
events in Russia would be of prime importance. Norway would have no­
thing to fear from a socialistic Russia. Should a reactionary period, how­
ever, set in in this country, Svalbard might become a source of new com­
plications. The paper was sceptical of the noble intentions of the great 
powers of the west. That the Supreme Council and its capitalist superiors 
had given formal sovereignty over the archipelago to a small state, was 
because this agreed with their own interests and was on their own 
conditions. 
The Government seemed to consider that the greatest advantage of 
the decision of the Conference was that Norwegian administration would 
now hold good in an area inhabited by Norwegians, and this had, after 
all, always been a principal aim of the Norwegian authorities. Thus in 
the opinion of the Prime Minister it was primarily the population staying 
in Svalbard which would benefit from the arrangement. In Norwegian 
business circles the essential advantage was considered to be that there 
would now be settled legal conditions on the islands. Minister We del was 
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given full credit for his untiring work in Paris, and many people con­
sidered that his popularity in the French capital had very largely been 
the reason for his success in carrying out his difficult task. The decision 
of the Peace Conference was also received with delight by Norwegians 
in other parts of the world.! 
When the Norwegian Minister in London paid a visit to the Foreign 
Office to give expression to the satisfaction which the decision of the 
Peace Conference had created in Norway, the Permanent Under-Secre­
tary, Lord Hardinge, exclaimed "You may inform your Government that 
there is great disappointment in England."2 This remark was, however, 
made half in jest. The Foreign Office had admittedly been approached by 
a number of people but the - undoubtedly heartfelt - fear of public 
opinion which had been felt in the Foreign Office proved to have been 
largely unfounded. In Fleet Street the decision was not at all ill-received. 
Most British papers wrote appreciatively of Norway. The conservative 
"Liverpool Post" wrote that there were many people who would have 
liked to see the archipelago handed over to Great Britain, but there were 
reasons to believe that Svalbard under Norwegian administration would 
be exploited in the best possible way for the benefit of the whole world. 
A few days later it even went so far as to write that everybody in Eng­
land was pleased that Norway should obtain the islands. That was 
certainly a rather exaggerated statement, but the opposite was at any 
rate not the general reaction. The most influential liberal paper, the 
"Manchester Guardian", recommended British-Norwegian cooperation: 
the Norwegians had experience and knowledge of Arctic conditions and 
Arctic industry, while Great Britain had capital to invest. The paper 
concluded by saying that, although the decision to give Norway political 
sovereignty over the archipelago was made partly in recognition of the 
role this country had played during the war, Norway's claims were in 
any case very strong. In an article a few days later the newspaper dealt 
once more with the matter, and in a way which was extremely favorable 
to Norway. In the British press, moreover, statements like the following 
were to be found: the Supreme Council had acted wisely in ignoring all 
but the Norwegian claims and simultaneously securing the economic in­
terests of all interested states, or, the decision has created general satis­
faction. The hope was expressed that Svalbard would now become a 
profitable field for British capital, and it was announced that the Foreign 
Office had secured the interests of British companies, regardless of the 
future sovereignty of the archipelago. It was also emphasized that the 
decision in Paris was no coincidence. The Svalbard Commission had in­
vestigated the whole matter historically and politically, and its decision 
was unanimous.3 Only a few papers expressed disappointment, not be­
cause the mandate plan had fallen through - that was hardly discussed 
- but because the archipelago was not handed over to Great Britain. 
10 
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A couple of them, possibly inspired by the Northern Exploration Com­
pany, used strong words and mentioned Heligoland as an example of 
what might happen if the British flag were hauled down in places where 
it had formerly flown.4 
In circles connected with the above-mentioned company, dissatis­
faction naturally reigned. The directors intimated that they had received 
a shock when the decision of the Peace Conference was made known. 
They appear, however, to have recovered fairly quickly, as the company 
shortly afterwards made energetic attempts to extend their interests in 
Svalbard by buying up Norwegian claims. 
In Parliament, a few members put a few peevish questions to the 
Government.5 But apart from this, the case did not arouse much attention. 
One of the members in question actually raised the topic again some­
what later, and demanded a statement to the effect that British interests 
were protected. On behalf of the Government it was declared that the 
treaty contained the most careful provisions for the protection of British 
enterprises6 - a statement which was undeniable. And in the course of 
the autumn, the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate published a pamphlet 
which emphasized that the transfer of the archipelago was not detri­
mental to the other interested states.7 
In Sweden the decision of the Peace Conference was, on the whole, 
well received. Most papers were pleased that Norway should acquire 
political sovereignty, provided Swedish economic and scientific interests 
were adequately protected; while, on the other hand, it was pointed out 
that the occupation d�mands put forward in the British press had not 
met with any sympathy in Sweden. In contrast to what had happened in 
Great Britain, the decision created no dissatisfaction in circles with eco­
nomic interests in the archipelago. They expressed, rather, satisfaction 
that they would now be able to work under settled legal conditions.8 
Certain conservative circles seemed to feel a trifle disappointed. 
They judged the question against the background of the joint Nordic 
policy of which they felt Sweden should be the leader. The Stockholm 
paper "Nya Dagligt Allehanda" reprimanded its colleagues for the atti­
tude they adopted. The paper feared that the results which the Nor­
wegians had achieved in Paris would strengthen their belief that a 
separatist policy was profitable. It administered a sharp rebuke to the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry, and demanded that the Riksdag should not 
treat the matter with the same nonchalance as the Government. It was 
not envy of Norway which prompted this attitude, the paper stated, but 
the conviction that a joint Nordic solution would offer many advantages. 
During the war England had cut Iceland off from Denmark and a similar 
situation might arise in the case of Svalbard. In that event the archi­
pelago would need stronger protection than Norway was in a position 
to offer. 9 
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The Dutch press also adopted a reconciliatory attitude, though 
making it clear that some people in Holland would have preferred Sval­
bard to become mandated territory. It would have been an ideal object 
for the League of Nations on which to acquire practice in mandatory 
administration, it was stated. to In the other treaty countries, the question 
was not given much attention. This was also true of Germany, while 
there was as yet no information to show how the Soviet Russian autho­
rities regarded the matter. 
In the report sent out through the Agence Havas it was stated that 
the Supreme Council had accepted the recommendation of the Svalbard 
Commission and awarded Norway "political sovereignty" over Svalbard. 
Thus a somewhat peculiar form of government and a new expression in 
political terminology was created. The expression "political sovereignty" 
was used by the press in several countries. It was apparently intended to 
imply that the subjects of all contracting powers had the same right to 
exploit Svalbard economically. But with the reservations implied by this 
fact and by the demilitarization of the archipelago, Norwegian law and 
Norwegian administration were to hold away. It was as yet difficult to 
foresee clearly what an arrangement of this nature would entail, and what 
consequences it might have. From the point of view of constitutional and 
international law, the archipelago had been a peculiar phenomenon ever 
since it entered the arena of international politics, and on the whole it 
continued to remain so. 
* 
In the Norwegian Government the treaty was subjected to consider­
able criticism. In accordance with article 8 the Norwegian Government 
should submit a proposal for mining regulations. This should be sent to 
the other contracting parties, which should make their observations. The 
matter could then be examined and decided on by an international com­
mission consisting of one representative for each of the contracting 
parties. The commission's decisions should be arrived at by majority 
vote. The provisions of article 8 were to go into force after all parties 
had ratified the treaty. The consequence of this was that N orway , as a 
result of her advance ratification, committed herself to the decisions that 
the international commission might make with regard to the terms of 
the mining settlement. Even though it was as sumed that the commission's 
deliberations would result in mining regulations satisfactory to Nor­
wegian national interests, the proposed procedure - that a state, with 
regard to the exercise of its authority, should in advance commit itself tu 
an arrangement which was to be decided on later by representatives of 
the other treaty po'>vers - was in itself unusual and repugnant. The 
method was still more ()pen to doubt, when one considered that the result 
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might easily turn out to be mining regulations which in all essentials 
differed from the draft submitted by the Norwegian Government. It might 
be a settlement which gave the old occupants such extensive rights that 
Norway would have no interest in undertaking the administration of the 
archipelago, and the sovereignty over the country would be a mere illu­
sion. The Ministry of Justice, therefore, maintained that the method of 
procedure suggested was formally incompatible with the dignity of a 
sovereign state and virtually unlikely to prove satisfactory to Norway, 
and it felt obliged to advise against the proposed treaty being signed in 
its present form. With regard to the application of the principle of equality 
for the nationals of all contracting parties, it was found that under the 
circumstances obtaining, no objections could be made. It would in any 
case be possible to expell foreigners according to the same rules as those 
applying to Norwegian nationals.!1 The provisions in article 9 were 
interpreted by the Defense Ministry to imply that Norway was not obliged 
to attempt unaided to oppose with force of arms the setting up of naval 
bases and fortifications.12 
The Director of the Telegraph Service gave a report on the provi­
sions for wireless telegraphy. He considered it most unfortunate that any 
landowner should be allowed to establish and operate radio stations and 
have access to free communication with permanent or mobile stations.!:l 
In his opinion this would result in an intolerable state ot competItion. 
It seemed, moreover, to be unfair to the Norwegian Telegraph Service, 
which at great cost had maintained wireless communication between 
Svalbard and the mainland for many years - a transmission which had 
also been of great help to foreign companies working in the archipelago. 
The arrangement was also untenable from the technical point of view. 
Unrestricted access to establish and run radio stations might easily result 
in confusion and general d isturbance. It must in any case be taken for 
granted that the Norwegian Government would have a controlling autho­
rity, so that in the interests of radio traffic it would have the right to 
decide, with regard to the technical set-up of the stations, their wave 
length and strength, their time schedules for transmission, etc.14 
The sum total of the remarks of the various authorities was that the 
draft treaty was characterized by vagueness and contained a number of 
provisions which were unfavorable to Norwegian interests; but only the 
provisions dealing with the mining regulations gave grounds for doubt 
as to whether Norway should sign.15 And it was eventually agreed that 
Norway should accept the treaty, but the Foreign Ministry was advised 
to have certain ambiguous provisions clarified by an exchange of notes. 
The Norwegian Government in its answer to the Supreme Council 
declared that even if the draft treaty contained provisions other than those 
which it might have preferred, it was willing to accept it and to sign as 
soon as answers were available from the other powers. To avoid possible 
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misunderstandings in the future, it gave, however, an account of its intel­
pretation of certain provisions about which there might be doubt. Article 
3, provision 3 would, in the opinion of the Norwegian Government, have 
to be interpreted as meaning that it did not give the ships of the con­
tracting parties any right to enter Norwegian harbors, beyond what inter­
national law and the valid trade and seafaring treaties might provide, 
or any right to participate in coastal traffic from one Norwegian harbor 
to another. Point 4 in the same article must be interpreted to the effect 
that the Norwegian Government could no give any special advantage to 
the nationals, ships or goods of any outside power in preference to the 
nationals, ships or goods of the contracting parties. 
In order to prevent any unfortunate outcome with regard to the 
drawing up of mining regulations, the Government chose a course which 
seemed to be quite practicable. It declared to the Peace Conference that 
it would, as soon as possible, send a draft to the other powers, with a 
view to having it discussed, as it was necessary for constitutional reasons 
to sUbmit both the mining regulations and the treaty simultaneously to 
the Storting for ratification. The intention was to make certain that the 
mining regulations were worked out and accepted before the treaty was 
ratified by Norway.t6 
The Supreme Council dealt with the Norwegian answer at the end 
of November.17 After a short debate it was agreed to accept the inter­
pretations which the Norwegian Government had given and to allow 
Norway to submit the mining regulations to the other contracting powers 
for examination before the treaty was ratified.18 Shortly thereafter, the 
other powers were invited to sign.19 None of the contracting parties had 
any serious objections to make. On February 9, 1920, the treaty was 
signed in the traditional Salon de I'Horloge in the French Foreign 
Ministry, where so many international agreements had been concluded. 
The Paris press congratulated Norway. The Journal des Debats 
wrote that there was every reason to rejoice at Norway's fortune. This 
country would now have a large part of its coal needs supplied by Sval­
bard and the treaty would be of great importance in creating settled 
conditions in the archipelago.20 The Oslo press devoted a great deal of 
space to the event, and paid a tribute to the men who had been engaged 
in Paris on the work of preparing the agreement, especially the Norwegian 
Minister Wedel Jarlsberg21• But the newspaper comments were marked 
by a tone of seriousness; the readers were advised not to cherish undue 
expectations, and it was pointed out that the agreement would also entail 
certain burdens for Norway. 
The Swedish Government was anxious to prevent any hindrance 
being placed by the Norwegians in the way of transit of goods from 
Svalbard via Norway, e. g. in the form of duty. It envisaged the possi­
bility of the Norwegian Government taking a step of this nature, on the 
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pretext that the provisions of the Convention of KarIstad22 dealing with 
transit could not apply to goods from Svalbard, if the archipelago was 
to be regarded as part of Norway. It had therefore proposed that the 
treaty should include a clause dealing with Swedish transit from Sval­
bard via Narvik. The Norwegian answer, however, was that this matter 
could be arranged mutually between Norway and Sweden, without in­
cluding it in an international agreement, and to this the Swedish Govern­
ment agreed. In an exchange of notes the Norwegian Government de­
clared that the Svalbard Treaty would not entail any change in the cur­
rent practice of goods transported between Svalbard and Sweden, or 
vice-versa, via Norway coming under the provisions of the Convention 
of Karlstad dealing with transit traffic.23 
At the same time an exchange of notes took place between the two 
countries guaranteeing Swedish scientists the same conditions for re­
search in Svalbard as enjoyed by the Norwegians.24 This might appear 
unnecessary, even though the treaty lays down that agreements shall be 
entered into regarding the conditions for scientific research and explora­
tion. It is possible that the Swedish Government wished to toss a crumb 
or two to those circles least in favor of handing Svalbard over h J\\lrway, 
as a means of silencing any criticism. 
Negotiations with the Soviet Union and Germany. 
The German Attitude to the Treaty. 
It was of decisive importance to Norway that the two interested 
great powers which could not partake in the Paris settlement should 
also adopt a favorable attitude to the solution reached and the procedure 
used. This was in accordance with the original idea of the Norwegian 
Government, that any transfer of Svalbard to Norway would have to 
take place with the voluntary consent of all interested powers. For that 
reason the German Government was also informed, at the same time 
as the others, that Norway intended to bring the question before the 
Peace Conference in Paris. Even though the German Foreign Minister 
declared that he regarded this as a fortunate solution,l there is reason 
to believe that he did not regard the question with unqualified favor. 
The procedure which gave Germany access to participate in the negotia­
tions was naturally to be preferred - from the Norwegian point of view 
as well. But in Berlin it was realized that this was impossible for the 
time being, and besides the matter was somewhat delicate. Germany had 
included the Svalbard question in the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. 
The Norwegian Government could draw attention to this, if the German 
Government objected on the grounds that the matter was no concern of 
the Peace Conference. 
The Norwegian Government continued to keep Berlin informed. In 
September 19 19, when the Svalbard Commission had concluded its work, 
the Norwegian Foreign Minister informed the Auswartiges Amt of the 
main points in the commission's draft, and stated that the Norwegian 
Government assumed that Germany would be invited to adhere to the 
treaty. The promise was made that the German Government would at any 
rate be informed unofficially of the Norwegian standpoint, when the case 
had been finally dealt with.2 In accordance with this, the German Foreign 
Ministry was given a resume of what had taken place in the case, and it 
was expressly stated that this information was given because the Nor­
wegian Government was anxious that Germany should adhere to 
the treaty.3 
It was, moreover, not quite clear what the German rights in Sval­
bard actually were. Article 1 18 of the Versailles Treaty laid down that 
in territory outside her European frontiers, as fixed by the treaty, Ger­
many should renounce all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over 
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territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and 
privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Allied 
and Associated Powers.4 The German Foreign Ministry declared that 
neither the Entente nor the NorVl'egian Government could quote this 
article as an excuse for settling the Svalbard question without Germany's 
participation. But an air of uncertainty prevailed. The legal adviser of 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry was of the opinion that article 1 18 
could possibly be interpreted in such a way as to include Germany's right 
to German occupied territory in a no man's land, and the right to German 
occupied territory in the archipelago. Germany was entitled to these 
rights vis-a.-vis all states including the Allied and Associated Powers. 
As the Versailles Treaty contained no provisions as to who should enjoy 
the rights Germany was forced to renounce according to article 1 18, it 
was reasonable to assume that the former German occupations in Sval­
bard were now open to acquisition by the subjects of the Allied and 
Associated Powers.5 But from a political point of view there was no 
reason why Norway should maintain such views, if the Entente powers 
did not do so. The main thing was to arrive at a friendly settlement with 
Germany. When inquiries were made through the Norwegian envoy in 
Berlin as to what would happen to the economic interests which German 
nationals had in the islands, the Norwegian Government consequently 
answered that it assumed that the German claims could be submitted to 
the Danish commissioner, whether Germany formally adhered to the 
treaty or not. In the latter case the assumption would necessarily be that 
she recognized the treaty. But it was pointed out that Norway could not 
decide a question of this kind on her own.6 The German Foreign Ministry 
now requested a copy of the treaty on the grounds that it could not adopt 
any attitude to the matter before it had an opportunity of studying the 
provisions of the agreement. The Norwegian Government was, however, 
not in a position to grant this request, as the Supreme Council had de­
cided that the treaty should not be published before it was ratified. 
During the spring of 1920 the German Government requested the 
Norwegian Government to work for having Germany allowed to adhere 
to the treaty as soon as possible after its ratification.7 No reason was 
given for this, but it was only natural that Germany should wish to join 
the treaty before land disputes had been settled by the Danish commis­
sioner. German rights would then to a greater extent be guaranteed by 
the provisions of article 6. As the French Government was to invite third 
powers, it could decide the date of Germany's adherence. As far as 
Norway was concerned it was gratifying that the matter should take a 
turn of this kind - that the German Government was in no way inclined 
to oppose the treaty, but on the contrary wished to join it as soon as 
possible. The Legation in Paris was instructed to inform the French 
Government that Norway would like to see Germany invited to adhere 
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to the treaty at an early date after ratification.8 The answer given was a 
favorable one,9 and the German Government was informed of this. But 
it now wished Norway to persuade the Entente to let Germany sign the 
treaty instead of merely adhering to it as a third power.10 The Norwegian 
envoy in Berlin pointed out that this depended on the powers which had 
drawn up the treaty, so that Germany could only join it after its rati­
fication.ll The Norwegian Government was nevertheless favorable to the 
idea, and its legations in London and Paris were instructed to find out 
in what light the matter was viewed in these places. Minister We del 
Jarlsberg conferred with the chairman of the former Svalbard Commis­
sion. But he was of the opinion that it was out of the question that a 
wish of this nature would be granted, and regarded it as imprudent of 
the Norwegian Government to start negotiations with Germany on this 
question.12 In London, too, it was considered pointless to depart from 
the terms of the treaty as far as this matter was concerned.13 Moreover, 
grave objections of a practical nature could be made to the German 
request. A change in the treaty would require the consent of all the 
srgnatory powers, and should a concession be made to Germany, Russia 
might reasonably be expected to make the same claim, and at a time 
when the Soviet Russian Government was not recognized by the signa­
tory powers it would be impossible to accede to a similar demand from 
the Russians. Even though German activity in the Arctic, participation 
in former negotiations and considerations of prestige might speak in 
favor of Germany being included as one of the signatory powers, this 
would not offer any practical advantage or entail greater rights than if she 
merely adhered to it as a third power. Under the circumstances it was 
therefore considered best to stick to the procedure decided in Paris. 
When the negotiations regarding the mining regulations were con­
cluded in the autumn of 1923, and it appeared that the Svalbard Treaty 
could be submitted to the Storting forthwith, Foreign Minister Michelet 
was anxious to sound out the attitude of the German Government. He 
therefore requested the Norwegian Minister in Berlin to hand a copy of 
the mining regulations to the German Ministry, together with a report 
giving a short account of the position. The report concluded with an 
expression of gratitude for the conciliatory attitude which the German 
Government had adopted in this case, and a statement that the Nor­
wegian Government, on the basis of the information received in Paris 
and London, was convinced that Germany would be invited to join the 
treaty immediately after its ratification, on an equal footing with the 
other interested states.14 The Norwegian note was possibly a little un­
fortunate in its wording, being actually in the form of a notification. In 
view of the negotiations which had previously taken place, it was bound 
to be regarded in the German Foreign Ministry as the least favorable 
solution for Germany only to be invited to adhere as a third power, as 
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she had asked to be allowed to join as a signatory power. The German 
Government therefore merely acknowledged receipt of the note, without 
further comment. But by doing so, it seemed at least to accept the views 
submitted by the Norwegian Government.15 
By handing Germany a copy of the mining settlement the Norwegian 
Government had departed from the procedure agreed on in Paris. The 
French envoy in Oslo, therefore, pointed out that it seemed to be France's 
duty to send the documents to the other powers after the treaty had 
been ratified. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry replied that Germany 
had certain interests in the archipelago, and it was therefore important 
to Norway, who was to assume the sovereignty and responsibility, that 
Germany joined the treaty as soon as possible; for that reason the Nor­
wegian Government had regarded it as necessary that the German 
Government should be informed of the provisions of the agreement.16 
Although the French envoy in Oslo showed signs of annoyance at 
the keenness displayed by the Norwegian Government to satisfy Berlin, 
his German colleague was far from pleased. He described the Svalbard 
Treaty as one of the many humiliations which France and her allies had 
forced on Germany, and expressed the hope that the German Govern­
ment would never join it.17 The German Foreign Ministry, however, did 
not seem to take quite such an extreme view of the matter. 
Those who claimed to have rights in Svalbard, were to submit their 
claims through their Governments to the Danish commissioner within 
three months of the date when the treaty came into force. Germany ought 
if possible to join the treaty before the commissioner and tribunal at 
Copenhagen had started work; but time was short, and in the summer 
of 1924 the German Foreign Ministry announced that it had received 
several applications from interested parties, complaining that they would 
not be able to prepare the claims they intended to submit to the com­
missioner because the time limit was too short. The chief reason why the 
German Government wished to have the date postponed was perhaps its 
desire to secure an invitation from France, so that Germany could appear 
before the tribunal in Copenhagen as an adherent to the treaty, and could 
quote its Article 6.18 The Norwegian Government had a means of extend­
ing the time between the ratification and the date by which claims had 
to be submitted to the commissioner. The treaty was to come into force 
simultaneously with the mining regulations, and the date when the latter 
was to come into force was to be decided by Norwegian law. The Nor­
wegian Government now promised that it would fix the date at which 
the mining regulations would come into force at three months after the 
ratification, in order to insure that Germany would have the same rights 
as other states.19 There would thus be six months between the ratification 
and the expiry of the period during which claims were to be submitted 
to the commissioner and there was reason to believe that Germany would 
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receive an invitation to join the treaty in the course of this time. This 
seemed to satisfy the German needs. The Norwegian Government sub­
sequently encountered no further objections from the Germans. 
�orway had shown a willingness to help which bordered on the 
unnecessary, and which nearly caused annoyance among some of the 
signatory powers. But as Norway was in future to be responsible for the 
archipelago, it was of paramount importance to arrive at a satisfactory 
and lasting arrangement with all the interested states in such a way that 
all bitterness was removed. It was this idea which promoted the Nor­
wegian Government's course of action. 
The Soviet Russian Government Protests. 
In the capitals of western Europe speculation was still rife as to 
tile final results of the great revolutions which had taken place in Russia. 
Many people considered, even two or three years after the Revolution, 
that the old regime had a chance of returning to power. The Bolsheviks 
were severely condemned and every effort made to counter their activi­
ties. None of the leading powers considered recognizing their govern­
ment, though they had in fact consolidated their power. The Soviet Rus­
sian Government had had no opportunity to exert any influence in Paris, 
nor, under the circumstances, had the Norwegian Government found it 
advisable to forward any of the documents dealing with the Svalbard 
affair to a government with which there were as yet no diplomatic rela­
tions. In December, 1918, the Legation in Leningrad temporarily sus­
pended its activity. Even though it was vitally important for Norway to 
come to an arrangement with the future rulers of Russia, the Norwegian 
Government could not act in direct contravention to the wishes of the 
other signatory powers, and partly for this reason it chose to "wait and 
see" before proceeding further. 
[t was the Soviet Russian Government which first took action; a few 
days after the signing in Paris it protested to Norway against the treaty, 
declaring that it was not binding in the case of Russia, as it had been 
drawn up without the latter's cooperation. The Soviet Russian Govern­
ment was perfectly entitled to lodge this protest, inasfar as the principk 
"res inter alios acta aliis neque prodest neque nocet" also applies in 
international law, at any rate as a basic principle.! But the matter was 
complicated. Russia was admittedly one of the powers most interested, 
and had participated in all the pre-war conferences dealing with the 
archipelago; but the Bolsheviks had severed the continuity of Czarist 
Russia's foreign policy,2 and their government had not been recognized 
by any of the powers which had signed the Svalbard Treaty, despite the 
fact that it had ruled effectively in Russia for some time, thus satisfying 
the essential demand for de facto recognition. The Russian protest con-
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c1uded with the following declaration: "In renewing its protest against 
the wish of certain powers to settle arbitrarily the fate of other nations 
the Soviet Russian Government reaffirms that any international agreement 
which has been made without its participation has no political or juridical 
force or validity as far as the Russian Government is concerned"3 -
a theory which, however, would be difficult to put into practice. The 
Norwegian Government sent copies of the protest to the other signatory 
powers, but refrained for the time being from entering into any nego­
tiation with the Soviet Russian Government about the matter. 
In the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the opinion seemed 
to be held that the time limit for submitting claims to the Danish com­
missioner had been fixed on May 9, 1920, and to emphasize that it re­
fused to recognize any decision made by the commissioner where Russian 
interests were concerned, the Soviet Russian Government sent a fresh 
protest to Norway at the beginning of May, 1920. This was, however, a 
trifle less categorical than its predecessor, and stated that the Soviet 
Russian Government was bound to renew its protest against international 
questions which in any way affected the interests of Russian workers, 
being decided without the cooperation of the Soviet Russian Government; 
but it had no intention of committing itself with regard to its future 
attitude to the Svalbard Treaty.4 This protest, like its predessor, was 
unanswered. 
As the Soviet Russian Government did not recognize the Svalbard 
Treaty, it was obliged to carry on as though the conditions obtaining 
before the treaty came into being were still valid. But it envisaged the 
possibility of an arrangement whereby the interested states entrusted the 
administraton of the archpelago to one single power. The economic 
resources must be shared impartially and steps must be taken to insure 
that all nations - not only those which had formerly held claims on the 
archipelago - were given the best chance of exploiting its natural re­
sources.5 In fact the Soviet Russian Government recommended a sort of 
mandated government on behalf of the interested states, but otherwise 
the treaty seemed, on the whole, to satisfy Russia's claims. It would prob­
ably have been an advantage if the treaty could have been sent to Russia 
at an early stage of the proceedings; in this way, certain misunderstand­
ings could have been avoided. For instance, in the People's Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs it was believed that the treaty was not open to states 
whiCh had not signed it.6 
It is doubtful whether Norway, according to the policy agreed upon 
in Paris, was at liberty to initiate negotiations on the treaty with third 
powers. The problem was particularly difficult in the case of the Soviet 
Russian Government, which had not been recognized by the signatory 
powers. But in the autumn of 1922, after agreement had been reached 
on the mining regulations, and there was a chance that the treaty could 
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be placed before the Storting in the near future, the Norwegian Govern­
ment had to make an attempt to arrive at some sort of agreement with 
the Soviet Union. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, johan Ludwig 
Mowinckel, decided to request the Soviet Russian Government to make 
a statement to the effect that the Soviet Union would not make any 
objections to the treaty. The head of the Norwegian trade delegation in 
Moscow, johan Fredrik jakhelln, was instructed to point out to the 
People's Cominissariat for Foreign Affairs that Norway had done her 
utmost in Paris to have Russian interests recognized, but that, owing to 
the attitude of the other signatory powers towards the Soviet Russian 
Government, it had proved impossible to include Russia in the nego­
tiations, even though Norway had been in favor of this course. A declara­
tion by the Government of the Soviet Union of the kind envisaged would 
create a good impression in large sections of the Norwegian people and 
contribute to the improvement of the good relations existing between 
the two nations.7 
In the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs attention had been 
drawn to the fact that article 10 of the Svalbard treaty dealt only with 
Russian nationals, and the commissariat were anxious to know what 
would be the status of nationalized Russian ships. Probably it had in 
mind nationalized undertakings of other sorts too, but for the moment 
only ships were mentioned. This question was now submitted to the 
Norwegian Government, and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry came to 
the conclusion that the same rules would have to apply to nationalized 
Russian ships as for the vessels of other states.8 Mr. jakhelln, however, 
received no answer to his request, as the People's Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, Georgy Chicherin, left for Lausanne in order to attend the inter­
national conference there, and Litvinov, who deputized for him, had not 
familiarized himself with the case. 
In january, 1923, jakhelln raised the question once more. His ar­
gument was that Norway, before the war, had always sought to solve 
the Svalbard problem jointly with Russia, and an attempt had been made 
to find an arrangement whereby the status of the archipelago as a no 
man's land was retained, but that this had proved impossible. When the 
question had been raised anew after the war, the Norwegian Government 
found itself obliged to strive for a new solution, viz. that Norway should 
be given sovereignty over the archipelago while allowing the nationals 
of all other states the same economic rights in the territory as Nor­
wegian nationals enjoyed. As none of the West-European states had 
recognized the Soviet Russian Government, it was impossible to secure 
an invitation for the latter to join in the Paris negotiations, despite the 
wishes of the Norwegian Government that all interested states should be 
represented. It was quite understandable that the Russian Government 
had protested before it knew the terms of the treaty; but now, when it 
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was obvious that the treaty made all possible allowances for Russian 
interests, the situation was entirely different. Another consideration which 
had weighed heavily with Norway was that if the question was not settled 
in Paris it would be postponed indefinitely.9 The Soviet Russian Govern­
ment, however, was by no means willing to make a declaration of the 
kind Norway requested. In fact, the head of the Russian trade delegation 
in Oslo, Dr. Jacob Souritz, was instructed to lodge a fresh protest with 
the Norwegian Government. 
The third protest was promoted by the clauses in article 2 of the 
mining ordinance, which might be interpreted as forbidding Russian 
state trusts undertaking mining in Svalbard.10 The Soviet Russian 
Government maintained that the draft did not take into consideration the 
rights guaranteed to Russian nationals in the Treaty of February 9, 1920. 
The note was very strongly worded, and threatened to break off the 
Norwegian-Russian trade agreement. The only just solution of the Sval­
bard question would, in the opinion of the Soviet Russian Government, 
be to establish a juridical arrangement based on a form of agreement 
between all the states which had participated in the development of the 
archipelago's resources. The ratification of the Svalbard Treaty would 
make it more difficult to achieve a solution of this nature.11 It is possible 
that in this well-nigh "undiplomatic" note Deputy People's Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs Litvinov gave vent to some of the vexation which he 
felt at his unsuccessful trip to Norway in 1920.12 
Foreign Minister Mowinckel had probably not cherished any great 
hopes with regard to his request to the Soviet Russian Government, but 
the outcome was undoubtedly worse than expected. The tone of the 
Russian note and the threat of repudiating the trade agreement boded ill. 
In its answer the Norwegian Government once more explained why it 
had not been possible to include Russia as a signatory power, and pointed 
out that by assuring Russia's economic interests in the treaty, the only 
real stumbling block which prevented Russia from adhering at a later 
date had surely been removed. Furthermore it was clear that no clause 
in the mining regulations could conflict with the rules of the treaty 
to the effect that Russian nationals had the same rights as those of the 
signatory powers. It was, therefore, hoped that the Russian Government 
would review the situation and modify the attitude it had adopted in its 
fresh note of protest to Norway.13 With the reply the Soviet Russian 
Government received a copy of the treaty and of the mining ordinance. 
But after what had occurred there was little prospect of arriving at a 
speedy agreement with the Soviet Union. 
It was, however, worth noting that several of the objections made 
by the Soviet Russian Government were due to an insufficient knowledge 
of the treaty and the mining ordinance, a situation which had now been 
rectified. Moreover, Moscow appeared to entertain a fear that, in working 
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out the treaty and the mining rules, an attempt had been made to impede 
Russia's communist economy - a fear that was understandable in view 
of the conditions prevailing in Europe at this time, but which was un­
founded as far as the attitude of the Norwegian Government toward this 
particular matter was concerned. 
A Diplomatic Settlement of Compensation. 
In January 1920, the Entente called off its blockade of the Soviet 
Union. It soon became clear that the desire to do business was stronger 
than the unwillingness to have any dealings at all with the Bolsheviks. 
Already in the winter of 1920 British-Russian negotiations were started 
with a view to initiate some form of trade between the two countries, 
but these were interrupted by the war in Poland. It was not until March 
1921, that an agreement was concluded. Two months later Germany 
followed Great Britain's example. 
Russia had been an important customer for Norwegian fish and 
herring. The so-called Pomor trade had been of great importance to the 
population of North Norway, and it was not in the interests of either 
side that this should be broken off after the revolution. As Norway shortly 
after the war was engaged in a "customs war" with the countries which 
had normally been the largest buyers of split cod, the loss of the Russian 
market was keenly felt. The fishermen of Finmark sent a deputation to 
North Russia in order to effect a resumption of trade, but nothing could 
be achieved. They were merely able to note that there was a great de­
llland for Norwegian fish. 
Already in the spring of 1920 the question of resuming trade with 
Russia was raised in the Storting. In the summer of that year the Com­
merce Department set up a committee to negotiate with Maxim Litvinov 
who had been granted an entry permit to Norway, after some of the 
leaders of the Norwegian Labor Party had worked to this end.! The 
result was negative, principally because the Norwegian Government re­
served the right to accept the representatives whom the Soviet Russian 
Government wished to send to Norway.2 The Minister of Commerce came 
moreover to the conclusion that the Soviet Russian Government was not 
so much interested in trade as primarily anxious to achieve political 
recognition beyond what it had achieved elsewhere, and to have an 
opportunity of setting up a center in ;'\iorway for its political activity in 
Europe.:l 
Among the population of the coastal districts there was a strong 
desire that the Government should resume t r ade with Russia. There was 
also a keenly felt need for representatives in Russia capable of protect­
irg Norwegian interests.' Shortly after Great Britain had concluded an 
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agreement with the Soviet Union, the Norwegian Government, which 
could now quote the British example, took up the matter once more. 
The Liberal Government now in power seemed to have a more con­
structive attitude to the question than its predecessor, and though Litvi­
nov, who had been made People's Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
was disappointed with the result of his journey to Norway and Denmark 
a year before, and was said to have hinted that these countries were 
down on the Soviet Government's black list, it was possible to arrive 
fairly speedily at an arrangement worked out on the pattern of the British­
Russian agreement.5 According to this, trade delegations consisting of 
up to 20 persons should be established in the capitals of the two countries, 
with one or two members authorized as official representatives, who 
should have full access to conferences with the Foreign Minister on 
subjects of importance to the governments, viz. the implementation of 
the agreement, trade, and the protection of their nationals' interests. They 
should moreover be authorized to issue passports and visas. The members 
of the delegation should be under an obligation not to engage in political 
propaganda or to interfere in the domestic affairs of the states concerned. 
The merchant ships of the contracting parties should have the right to 
enter the harbors of the respective countries and to enjoy in these har­
bors the rights generally accorded to seafaring nations. The transit of 
goods to and from other countries should be permitted, and post and 
telegraphic communications should immediately be established between 
the two countries. The Soviet Government insisted, however, that trans­
actions should be based on the assumption that it enjoyed a monopoly 
of foreign trade. The agreement was not to prejudice claims for compen­
sation which the subjects of either power might make of the other.6 The 
last mentioned provision referred to the large claims for compensation, 
lodged by Norwegians, for damage incllrred as a result of belligerent 
operations and the nationalization of private undertakings in Russia. 
In view of the comprehensive nature of the agreement, it might be 
said to imply a de facto recognition of the Soviet Russian Government.' 
This also appeared from an exchange of notes between the Norwegian 
Commerce Department and the authorized representative of the Soviet 
Russian Government,8 even though the Foreign Minister, Or. Arnold 
Rcestad, expressed himself somewhat ambiguously on the question in the 
Storting.9 
The agreement was not universally well received; the conservative 
press attacked it severely, and several institutions protested. Amongst 
these were the Norwegian Bankers' Association and the Norwegian 
Industrial Federation, which sent a joint protest to the Storting. Their 
objections were aimed chiefly at the recognition of the Soviet Russian 
Government's foreign trade monopoly, at the Government's failure to 
obtain recognition of and preference for the Norwegian claims in Russia, 
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assessed at £ 12,000,000 and the failure to include a most-favored nation 
clause guaranteeing Norwegian interests the same treatment as those of 
other nations.lO It was principally the same objections, and a criticism 
of the fact that the agreement implied a de facto recognition of the Soviet 
Russian Government, which were raised in the Storting.!l It is, however, 
probable that the unfavorable reception which the agreement received, 
both in the press and in the Storting, was partly due to the impend ing 
election to the national assembly. 
One of the first results of the agreement was a transaction for the 
sale of fish and herring to the Soviet Union. The firms delivering the 
goods were to grant a credit of which the Norwegian state undertook 
to guarantee about half. The fact that the Norwegian state should in 
this way undertake to act as a sort of guarantor for the Soviet Russian 
state in respect of Norwegian citizens might be regarded as further 
recognition of the new regime in Russia.12 
A number of other factors were also bound to influence relations 
between Norway and the new Soviet state. The relief work of Fridtjof 
Nansen in Russia during the years of starvation was widely admired. 
The attitude of the workers' movements to the Communist Government 
of Russia was also most important: the strong radical trends which were 
felt throughout Europe appeared in Norway as well. At the party congress 
in 1918 power had passed into the hands of the revolutionary element 
in the Norwegian Labor Party, which joined the Communist International 
the following year. It became d ifficult for the social-democrats to remain 
within the party, and after the so-called Moscow clauses, which contained 
a sharp attack on them, had been accepted, they were forced to secede 
and form their own party; but they were in a minority. The Labor Party 
continued during the postwar years to cooperate with the Commintern, 
and some prominent communist leaders visited Norway during these 
years. 
The Norwegian Labor movement, however, found it d ifficult to 
accept the centralized Commintern rule and its militant attitude toward 
the social struggle. A strong opposition group with a syndicalistic trend 
soon made itself felt; and in November 1923, a break with the Co m­
mintern was effected. The minority now formed Norway's Communist 
Party which received considerable support from the younger sections of 
the community. The Soviet Russian Government could continue to reckon 
with a relatively strong communist fraction, but generally speaking the 
course of events within he Norwegian Labor movement must have been 
a d isappointment to the leaders in Moscow. 
The Soviet Government was no less active in the Arctic than the old 
regime, and here friction soon occurred between Norwegian and Russian 
interests. In the summer of 1921 a Russian expedition was sent to Bj0rn-
0ya. Its primary object seems to have been geological stud ies and a sort 
11 
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of display of Arctic activity, but it was also intended to put up a build­
ing on the island. The works manager of the Norwegian mining concern 
protested, at the orders of the company's director, without the matter 
being submitted to the Foreign Ministry. The affair, however, had no 
important consequences. The same summer the geologist Professor Olaf 
Holtedahl succeeded, with the help of Fridtjof Nansen and the Central 
Committee of the Norwegian Labor Party, in getting the Soviet Govern­
ment's permission to undertake an expedition to Novaya Zemlya. 
Apart from Svalbard, sealing in the White Sea created the most 
difficult problems. By a decree of May 24, 1921, the Soviet Russian 
Government declared that it would impose the 12-mile limit for terri­
torial waters and demanded that the White Sea should be regarded as 
an inland sea. In the same year several Norwegian sealers were detained 
by the Soviet authorities and their catches confiscated. The same thing 
occurred the following year. Most Norwegian skippers maintained that 
their catches were taken outside the 12-mile limit. The Government there­
fore found it necessary to send a patrol vessel north to check up on the 
position of the sealers.13 After protracted negotiations an agreement was 
reached with the Russians about a private concession arrangement. 
Now, as under the old regime, it sometimes happened that the Nor­
wegians were sharply attacked in the Russian press for their activities 
in the Arctic.14 The taking over of Svalbard was described as plunder, 
and it was suggested that Professor Holtedahl's expedition was the first 
step towards an occupation of Novaya Zemlya.15 But unreasonable state­
ments of this kind which did not seem to enjoy support'1n responsible 
political circles, were refuted at the instigation of the Norwegian trade 
delegation.16 
Though the Soviet Russian Government had concluded trade agree­
ments with a number of powers, only a few had recognized it de jure, 
and its international position was still weak. The chief aim of its foreign 
policy was therefore of necessity to develop cooperation with foreign 
powers, and to attain full recognition as Russia's legal Government. At 
the conference in Lausanne the leader of the Norwegian delegation, 
1\1inister johannes I rgens, had an opportunity to discuss the relationship 
between Norway and the Soviet Union with People's CoI11missar Chicherin. 
On that occasion I rgens got the impression that the Soviet Russian 
Government would probably be willing to adhere to the Svalbard Treaty, 
provided it was recognized de jure by Norway.1' Here was a sound basis 
for negotiations. But it was not surprising that the Norwegian Govern­
ment hesitated to take a step of this nature and waited to see what the 
great powers would do. Instead it considered the idea of concluding a 
Russo-Norwegian agreement with approximately the same wording as 
the Treaty of February 9, 1920. 
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In March 1923, the conservatives came into power in Norway.ls 
The new government did not wish to continue along the course its pre­
decessor had blazed, as far as negotiations with the Soviet Union were 
concerned. This was in itself natural enough. According to Article 10 
and the concluding provisions of the Svalbard Treaty, it was the intention 
of the signatory powers that Russia would adhere, on the invitation of 
France, as soon as a recognized Russian Government existed. But the 
reason given for the Government's attitude, viz. that the concluding of 
a Norwegian-Russian agreement would automatically entail a de jure 
recognition of the Soviet Russian Government,19 was open to discussion, 
although it appeared possible that the conclusion of an agreement of such 
a scope as the Svalbard Treaty would in fact entail de jure recognition,20 
or at least it would be inconsistent for Norway to conclude such a treaty 
before it was prepared to recognize the Soviet Russian Government 
de jure. 
In the summer of 1923, the peace treaty with Turkey was due to be 
signed at Lausanne. During the negotiations about the Dardanelles and 
the Bosphorus the Russians had also participated; and at the suggestion 
of the French Government the secretary-general of the conference had 
requested the Soviet Russian Government to sign the agreement regard­
ing the Straits. It had possibly been expected that the offer would be 
declined, as the Soviet representatives had made strong objections to 
several of the provisions of the agreement during the negotiations. But 
the Soviet Russian Government signed, perhaps because it was of the 
opinion that the invitation and signature in fact constituted recognition. 
When asked on this matter, however, both the French and the British 
Foreign Ministries denied that the invitation to sign the Dardanelles 
agreement constituted any de jure recognition of the Soviet Russian 
Government.21 This was important as far as negotiations with Russia 
regarding Svalbard were concerned. Foreign Minister Christian F. 
Michelet now suggested that Norway should request the signatory powers 
to agree to Russia being allowed to adhere to the treaty, even though her 
Government was not recognized de jure. But first of all it was necessary 
to find out whether the Russians themselves were willing to accept an 
arrangement of this nature. Moscow was therefore informed that Norway 
was willing to address an official request to the signatory powers plead­
ing that Russia should be allowed to adhere to the treaty, despite the 
provisions of Article 10, if she agreed to this procedure.22 
Should the proposed arrangement be accepted, it was feared in the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry that it might result in both the Soviet Rus­
sian Government and the Czar Russians submitting claims to the Danish 
commissioner in accordance with Article 10 of the treaty. But this was in 
any case a problem which the Norwegian Government was not obliged 
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to solve. The Soviet Russian Government claimed that the decrees 01 
nationalization should apply to Russian property in Svalbard. For that 
reason it would not recognize the sale of Russian coal fields to companies 
in other countries, because it maintained that at the time this took place, 
the properties no longer belonged to their former owners, but to the 
Russian state. The decision of the arbitration tribunal in this question 
would, however, not affect the Norwegian Government, as no Russian 
coal fields had been taken over by Norwegian companies. Later on, more­
over, the Soviet Russian Government abandoned the above-mentioned 
point of view. 
The first task of the Norwegian Government was to get the Soviet 
Union to recognize the mining ordinance. Before the Russians had assured 
themselves that article 2 of this settlement did not prevent Russian 
state trusts from carrying out mining in Svalbard, they were not 
willing to give any definite answer to the Norwegian proposal. The 
question was studied in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry where it was 
concluded that both the treaty and the mining ordinance had to be inter­
preted as meaning that the Russian state as such was not entitled to 
undertake any economic activities in Svalbard, but that the mining regu­
lations presented no obstacle to the activities of Russian state trusts, 
provided these were separate juridical entities working with their own 
capital. The Soviet Russian Government was also of the opinion that the 
three months period laid down in the annexure to the Svalbard Treaty 
would not be sufficient to allow it to prepare the claims which it wished 
to submit at Copenhagen. In reply the Norwegian Government suggested 
the same arrangement which had been made available for Germany.23 
Foreign Minister Michelet was not really very confident that the 
proposal he had made would lead to any result,24 but it was worth trying. 
If the Russian Government rejected it, the Norwegian Government could 
point out that it had tried to find a way out, in order to meet the wishes 
of Moscow - which might prove important to the Government, especially 
during the debate in the Storting on the subjecf.25 If the other signatory 
powers rejected the proposal, the Norwegian Government could plead 
this as one of the grounds for recognizing the Soviet Russian Government 
de jure. The first information which the leader of the trade delegation in 
Moscow received suggested, however, that the Russians would not al­
together oppose the plan, but it was obvious that de jure recognition 
would have been preferred.26 The Soviet Russian Government replied to 
the Norwegian proposal in favorable tones, declaring that it did not 
doubt the Norwegian Government's good will and desire to respect 
Russian interests in Svalbard; the last passage in the note, however, 
stated that "before the Soviet Russian Government could give a definite 
answer as to the proposal it would be glad to know whether the Nor­
wegian Government simultaneously with the settling of the Svalbard 
-165-
question would be willing to discuss other political questions which were 
pending between the two Governments".27 
From the Norwegian point of view, too, there was much to suggest 
that the Russian proposal would be the most reasonable settlement. Trade 
between the two countries had gradually reached considerable propor­
tions. The fact that the Norwegian Government had not recognized the 
Soviet Government de jure was formal rather than actual in its effects. 
A trade agreement had been concluded between the two countries, discus­
s ions were going on about concess ions, and business was being done. 
The trade delegations served in actual fact as Foreign Service posts, 
and it was said with a certain amount of truth that the representatives 
only d iffered from ordinary d iplomats in not belonging to the diplomatic 
corps. The Norwegian Government was probably the only one which had 
stood surety on behalf of the Soviet Union vis-a.-vis its own nationals in 
economic matters. The Norwegian claims in Russia had now been con­
s iderably reduced as a result of the concessions granted to Norwegians, 
and it was hoped to make further progress in this sphere. 
Of the members of the Government, the Foreign Minister was 
strongly in favor of recognizing the Soviet Russian Government de jure. 
He maintained that the question was becoming more urgent by the day 
and could not be postponed. The day when the Soviet Russian Govern­
ment refused to continue under the conditions that obtained and pressed 
for recognition, public opinion would, in his view, demand that such re­
cognition should be given, and then the Government could no longer 
res ist. Moreover, he considered that there was something unnatural in 
going all out to do business with the Soviet Union, without taking the 
step which was the natural consequence of a trade connection of this sort, 
viz. recognition of the Government with which one conferred practically 
every day on friendly terms on a great many subjects concerning the 
supreme interests of the country and the welfare of its citizens. The 
subject of most immediate concern to him was naturally the Svalbard 
Treaty and sealing in the White Sea. For obvious reasons he dreaded 
taking over Svalbard without having arrived at a. settlement with the 
Soviet Union. In the Foreign Ministry the consequences which this step 
might involve were being discussed. If the worst came to the worst, the 
Soviet Government might renounce the trade agreement and the conces­
sions extended to Norwegian nationals. It was also feared that the Russians 
might resort to certain defiant acts in Svalbard. An embarass ing situation 
would also arise if the Soviet Russian Government refused, or was unable 
to forward its claims in the manner laid down by the treaty. But the 
Foreign Minister maintained that the Norwegian Government should draw 
up a program listing important questions, whose settlement it should 
demand when it proceeded to de jure recognition. He imagined that a 
program of this kind would have to include the Svalbard Treaty, sealing 
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in the White Sea, compensation for losses incurred by consular and diplo­
matic representatives during the war, and most-favored nation clauses in 
the case of recognition of old deeds. Michelet was of the opinion that the 
conservative Government would find it easier than any other to obtain 
the sanction of the great powers to carry this matter out, and desired to 
make it known in London and Paris that the settlement of the Svalbard 
question made it necessary for Norway to recognize the Soviet Russian 
Government. Moreover, he expected that the need of the great powers to 
start business dealings with the Soviet Union would gradually increase, 
and they would therefore soon find some excuse or other to take the 
step of recognizing her government. The consistent policy pursued by 
the United States and France had not become general, nor in the opinion 
of the Foreign Minister would it survive in the long run.2S 
The views of the Foreign Minister encountered opposition in many 
quarters. Among those who held a contrary opinion were the leader of 
the trade delegation in Moscow29 and Minister Wedel JarIsberg. The 
question of recognizing the Soviet Russian Government in connection 
with the settling of the Svalbard case was thoroughly discussed in the 
Norwegian press. Both the labor and liberal papers were on the whole 
favorable to the idea, and expressed the opinion that it was necessary 
to arrive at a solution as soon as possible. The conservative press, on the 
other hand, adopted a very reserved attitude.30 
It gradually became clear, however, that the Soviet Russian Govern­
ment would do its best to achieve de jure recognition as compensation 
in return for accepting Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard. Russian 
interests in the archipelago were adduced in order to emphasize what 
great concessions the Soviet Russian Government would be making in 
adhering to the Svalbard Treaty. In an interview with Pravda, Mme. 
Kollontay recalled that Russia had from ancient times interests in Sval­
bard, and had previously always participated in negotiations dealing with 
the political status of the archipelago. The importance of Svalbard as a 
source of coal was increasing from day to day. This coal had been, and 
would continue to be, used in the North Russian harbors. For that reason 
the recognition of Norway's sovereignty by the Soviet Russian Govern­
ment would involve a very real concession.31 At the same time it could 
be said, in extenuation, that the Svalbard Treaty guranteed all states, 
Russia included, complete freedom to exploit the coal fields of the archi­
pelago, even though Norway acquired a certain form of sovereignty. 
Thus the concessions of the Soviet Russian Government would not be 
very great. 
At the beginning of December 1923, Mme. KollontaY:32 came back 
to Norway after three weeks in Moscow. She had now received clear 
directives for negotiations with the Norwegian Government,:l3 It looked 
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as though the Soviet Russian Government desired a speedy settlement 
with Norway. There might be several reasons for this. 
It was encountering great economic difficulties in carrying out the 
vast reconstruction program on which it had embarked. After the victory 
of the Labor Party at the Parliamentary elections in Great Britain in 
December 1923, it looked as though the Soviet Union would emerge from 
the isolation in which it had dwelt so far. A settlement with Great Britain 
might lead to the Russians being granted a loan in London. The ambi­
tious Fascist Government in Italy was also anxious to exploit economic 
opportunities, and Mussolini had hinted that he would in the near future 
recognize the Soviet Russian Government de jure. The latter was there­
fore at this juncture anxious to start the landslide. In these circumstances 
it might be important to achieve recognition, even with respect to a small 
state like Norway. It might be used as an argument both by the Soviet 
Government and the states which were about to grant it recognition. 
Moreover, the very fact that Norway requested the other signatory powers 
to agree to the Soviet Union adhering to the treaty might be an advant­
age to the Russians, especialIy if the request were granted. As matters 
stood, any international concession or recognition might prove an ad­
vantage to the Russians. And the Soviet Government could offer Norway 
the settlement of the Svalbard question, sealing in the White Sea, 
and promises of larger purchases of industrial products in Norway.34 
The Russian approach was very timely, and this was undoubtedly 
realized in Moscow. Agreement had been achieved on the mining or­
dinance, and in December the last of the other signatories ratified the 
treaty. If Norway could reach a settlement with the Soviet Union, the 
Government would be able to submit the Svalbard Treaty to the Stor­
ting for ratification when it assembled after New Year; and in the be­
ginning of January, 1924, the Norwegian Government announced that 
it was willing to start negotiations on alI economic and political questions 
pending between the two states, including a trade and shipping agree­
ment "en due forme".35 But there was still hesitation about taking the 
decisive step. From Minister Wedel Jarlsberg came the request not to 
combine negotiations about the Svalbard Treaty with recognition of the 
Soviet Russian Government. His argument was more or less that the 
latter was not necessary.36 In the Foreign Ministry there were divided 
opinions as to how one should proceed.37 The Foreign Minister realized 
that in Great Britain - not only in the ranks of the Labor Party but 
in other quarters too - voices were raised in favor of recognizing the 
Soviet Russian Government. It was hoped that normal diplomatic rela­
tions would increase British exports to the Soviet Union. In this way 
unemployment figures might be reduced. The Norwegian Minister in 
London was therefore instructed to investigate whether there was any 
c:hance that the British Government, in the event of a de jure recognition, 
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would demand that the Soviet Russian Government recognize older 
treaties, and whether the British Government, in this case, could include 
the Svalbard Treaty, as Great Britain was one of the states most in­
terested in having it brought into operation as rapidly as possible. The 
head of the Nordic Department of the Foreign Office, John Duncan 
Gregory, who was also an expert on Russian affairs, stated the he had 
thought of raising the question of older treaties in the event of a recogni­
tion, and he promised, should the case arise, to find out whether anything 
could be done with regard to the Svalbard Treaty.3s As might be ex­
pected, nothing came of this. Great Britain obviously had enough claim� 
of her own to make, and on February 7, 1924, came British recognition 
of the Soviet Russian Government. 
The Russians now appeared to act with greater selfconfidence. The 
Norwegian Government was informed that, on condition of immediate de 
jure recognition by Norway, the Soviet Union would recognize Norway's 
sovereignty over Svalbard. On the same day that Norwegian recognition 
was formally settled, the Soviet Government would send a written request 
to the Norwegian Government asking Norway to approach the other 
signatory powers with a request that they should recognize the Soviet 
Union's adherence to the treaty,39 and a few days after Mme. Kollontay 
announced that she had been instructed that if the Norwegian Government 
did not immediately accept the Soviet Russian Government's offer, the 
latter would not discuss the settlement of any question before it had been 
recognized de jure by Norway.4o On February 7, Italy followed Great 
Britain's example. In Oslo further delay was now considered imprudent 
and on February 15, Mme. Kollontay and Foreign Minister Michelet 
signed a declaration dealing with the treatment of questions pending 
between Norway and the Soviet Union. According to its provisions, Mme. 
Kollontay the next day, handed over a note verbale, the gist of which was 
that the Soviet Russian Government accepted the Norwegian offer to 
request the other signatory powers to agree to the adherence of the 
Soviet Union to the Svalbard Treaty before its Government was re­
cognized by all the signatory powers; furthermore that the Soviet Union, 
without waiting for a reply from the states mentioned, recognized Nor­
way's sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago, including Bj0rn0ya, 
and as a consequence thereof would make no objection to the Treaty of 
February 9, 1920.41 Thus the last obstacle to Norway's taking over 
Svalbard had been removed, and the Government could now submit the 
treaty to the Storting for ratification. 
It might, in fact, appear that the Russian declaration was more than 
sufficient, for the Soviet Union recognized Norway's sovereignty over 
Svalbard without making any reservations with regard to such encroach­
ments upon the sovereignty, as were contained in the treaty. 
-169-
Owing to the nature of the treaty several of the signatory powers 
could decide the question of ratification by a royal decree,42 while some 
of them, apart from Norway, had to submit it to the national assembly.43 
The Dutch Government deposited its ratification documents in Par:s 
already in September 1920. But because of the longwinded negotiation:; 
about the mining legislation and the difficulty which Norway had in 
reaching an arrangement with Russia nearly five years elapsed before 
all the powers had ratified. 
Only in Norway was the treaty exposed to criticism, but there it 
was rather severe. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting com­
plained that the Government had not undertaken the necessary investiga­
tions into the history of the archipelago prior to initiating negotiations 
in 1907. In fact the Government was accused of having initially lost the 
archipelago owing to insufficient knowledge of Norwegian history, and 
of having failed to establish satisfactory cooperation with the Storting. 
In its report, the committee expressed doubts as to whether it was 
wise and farsighted policy to include Svalbard in the post-war settlement, 
by laying the matter before the Peace Conference - where not all the 
states that had previously taken part in negotiations were represented, 
and where new powers were included - while at the same time giving 
the impression that Norway wished to exploit the favor of the victors. 
These were of course objections that had already been discussed. It had 
always been clearly realized that the course adopted contained some 
weak points, but no workable alternative had been found. And the 
Foreign Affairs Committee was also of the opinion that, out of considera­
tion for important Norwegian economic interests in Svalbard, it was 
necessary to establish a satisfactory legal arrangement there as soon as 
possible. For that reason, and because the matter had now gone so far 
that Norway could not withdraw, it was considered necessary to recom­
mend ratification. Apart from pointing out some of the most important 
encroachments on Norway's sovereignty, the committee refrained from 
discussing the various provisions of the treaty, on the understanding 
that it was pointless, as these could not be amended at this juncture. The 
treaty had to be accepted unchanged or else be rejected.44 In the Stor­
ting the Chairman of the Committee, Carl J. Hambro, gave a somewhat 
brighter picture of the case than the committee's report did. But in the 
ensuing debate, dissatisfaction was expressed both with the way in which 
the Government had handled the matter and with the results achieved. 
To those who at various times had conducted negotiations on the Nor­
wegian side, the assessment of their work as given in the committee's 
report and during the debate in the Storting, might perhaps appear some­
what unfair, even though one of the most doubtful questions, v iz. Foreign 
M inister Ihlen's statement about Norway's attitude to an extension of 
Danish sovereignty over East Greenland, was not mentioned.4•5 
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The matter had now proceeded so far that Norway was abh� to take 
possession of the territory. On that occasion the Norwegian Secretary of 
Justice Paal Berg arrived in the islands, and on August 14, 1925 the 
archipelago was formally incorporated in the Kingdom of Norway. 
A Norwegian administration was set up with headquarters at Longyear­
byen. It was decided to apply the old Norse name of Svalbard, as a term 
denoting the entire territory mentioned in the Treaty of February 9, 1920. 
The Norwegian Government could, however, not regard the case as 
finally settled before the formal adherence of the Soviet Union and 
Germany had been obtained, even though, after the negotiations which 
had been conducted, it could be taken for granted that neither of these 
two powers would create any difficulties. Immediately after agreement 
had been reached with the Soviet Union, Norway submitted a note to the 
other signatory powers, asking whether they had any objections to the 
Soviet Union adhering to the treaty together with other powers which the 
French Government, in accordance with the concluding clauses of the 
treaty, would invite to adhere, when ratification was complete.46 The 
diplomatic representatives were requested to state verbally, when handing 
in the note, that Article 10 did in fact presuppose that Russia was not 
to join until a recognized Russian Government existed, but the Norwegian 
Government assumed that it would be possible to depart from this pro­
vision with the consent of all the signatory powers; an invitation of this 
kind did not appear to contain any de jure recognition. This emerged 
from the fact that the Soviet Union was invited to participate at the 
Lausanne Conference and to sign the convention dealing with the Straits. 
Should it, however, be considered that an invitation of this nature might 
be interpreted as a recognition, it might be possible to avoid this by 
making a reservation on this point in the invitation on behalf of the 
powers which so desired. 
The French Government now proposed to work out a draft protocol 
to the effect that the signatory powers were to state that some of them 
had recognized the Soviet Russian Government, and that those which 
had not done so would not oppose the Soviet Union's adherence to the 
treaty, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10. 
The matter, however, dragged out, and the Norwegian Legation in 
Paris was asked to find out what was being done about it in the French 
Foreign Ministry.47 Shortly afterwards 45 powers, including Germany, 
were asked to adhere to the treaty.48 In the course of the summer the 
German declaration of adherence was deposited in Paris, and the German 
claims in Svalbard were dealt with in Copenhagen.49 There was never any 
question of applying Article 118 of the Versailles Treaty to German in­
terests in the archipelago. The most important German claims, which 
were on Bj0rn0ya were, moreover, taken over by Norwegians in 1924.50 
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The Soviet Union was not one of those invited to adhere. This was 
due to the difficulties that arose as a result of neither the United States, 
France nor Holland having recognized the Soviet Russian Government. 
Negotiations on the question continued for a considerable time without 
producing any result. The difficulty was, allegedly, that agreement could 
not be reached on the designation to be given to the Soviet State in the 
diplomatic documents. The Norwegian Government, which was now keen 
to have the Svalbard question formally settled, requested the State De­
partment to do its utmost in the matter. Despite promises to this effect, 
no favorable result was achieved. Finally it was stated in the State 
Department that the treaty guaranteed Russian interests in Svalbard, and 
therefore it did not seem necessary to modify Article 10 in order to allow 
the Soviet Union to adhere. The Soviet Russian Government, however, 
took the initiative itself, announcing in Paris that it was willing to adhere 
to the treaty forthwith. At the same time the Norwegian Government was 
informed that the Russian Government would regard th� adherence of 
the Soviet Union as formally settled from the date it received an invitation 
to this effect. And the postponement of the Soviet Union's adherence did 
not have any practical significance. The Soviet Russian claims were sub­
mitted via the Danish Government and dealt with by the Svalbard Com­
missioner in Copenhagen.51 
The Norwegian Government let the question of the Soviet Union's 
adherence rest with the binding declarations which the Soviet Russian 
Government had made. Moreover, the Soviet Union confirmed her re­
cognition of Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard in 1926. By Decree of 
April 15, that year, the Soviet Union claimed, on the basis of the theory 
of sectorial division of the Arctic, all lands and islands situated in the 
Northern Frozen Ocean north of the Soviet Union up to the North Pole 
and between the meridian of longitude 32°-4'-35", east of Greenwich 
and the meridian of longitude 168°-49'-30", which were already discov­
ered, as well as those which were to be discovered in the future, and 
which at the time of publication of the decree were not recognized by 
the Soviet Union as the territory of any foreign power.52 The only terri­
tories situated within the said limits, recognized as belonging to any 
foreign power, were a few small islands in the northeastern part of the 
Svalbard archipelago. This was also indicated on Russian maps. It was 
not until December 1934, after the United States had recognized the 
Soviet Russian Government, that the Soviet Union was invited to join the 
agreement. On February 27, 1935, the Svalbard Treaty was discussed 
and accepted by the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, which decided that it should come into force, as far as 
the Soviet Union was concerned, on that date;5� and on May 7 of the 
same year Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin deposited his country's docu­
ments of adherence in the French Foreign Ministry.54 
Summary and Conclusions. 
Turning to the question of first discovery, one will find that it can 
not be answered definitely. Although Svalbard seems to have been visited 
by the Norsemen as early as the 12th century, it was not until the begin­
ning of the 17th century that the archipelago began to play a part in 
international politics. The whaling carried on in its inlets was of very real 
importance to the European economy; and it is little wonder that this 
profitable occupation should result in clashes between the various nations 
and raise the question of sovereignty over the archipelago. 
It was only natural that the first visitors believed Svalbard or Spits­
bergen, which it was named by the Dutch, to be a southern promontory 
of the Norwegian dependency of Greenland, which according to the 
geographical knowledge of the time reached from Davis Strait to the 
northern border of the Moscovy State. Having failed to buy the archi­
pelago from Christian IV, the King of Denmark-Norway, James I of 
England was persuaded by the Moscovy Company in London to agree 
to an occupation, which was based on an alleged discovery of the 
islands by Sir Hugh Willoughby in 1553 and on the fact that the English 
had pioneered whaling in those waters. But this occupation was never 
recognized by the other interested powers. The English whalers them­
selves had to come to an agreement with their Dutch colleagues as to a 
division of the bays. 
Despite William Barents' discovery in 1596 the Dutch Republic 
never claimed sovereignty over Svalbard, but the States General de­
manded free access for Dutch whalers to its inlets, pleading the theory 
of the freedom of the seas, expounded by Hugo Grotius. And the bold 
voyages of the Dutch contributed greatly to the geographical knowledge 
of the archipelago. 
Christian IV of Denmark-Norway claimed sovereignty over Sval­
bard on the basis that the archipelago was part of the Norwegian de­
pendency Greenland. He made diplomatic demarches in the capitals of 
the interested countries, and he tried to take advantage of the tension 
between England and Holland, but with little success. He also tried to 
back his claim by force. But although Denmark-Norway at this time 
was a relatively strong naval power the attempt failed; and the Danish 
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Privy Council came to the conclusion that Danish and Norwegian whal­
ing off Svalbard was not sufficiently important to entitle jeopardizing 
the good relations with England and Holland. Moreover, since the English 
and Dutch whaling took place as a fait accompli it could not prejudice 
the suzerainty of the Norwegian Crown. It seems as though the States 
General at times recognized this suzerainty; and the ships of the Moscovy 
Company allowed Danish and Norwegian whalers to operate in the inlets 
which they had reserved according to the English-Dutch agreement, 
while they turned away all other ships including English not belonging 
to the company. France and Sweden recognized in a vague form the 
Dano-Norwegian King's sovereignty over Svalbard, and the rights of 
their subjects to carry on whaling and fishing in the Svalbard waters 
were laid down in agreements. Towards the end of the 17th century the 
North German city-states were also admitted free right to whaling. 
Although the Dano-Norwegian King was unable to exercise full sover­
eignty over the territory, he did not renounce his right to the land, and 
the archipelago seems by this time in general to have been considered as 
belonging to Denmark-Norway. 
The large scale whaling in the inlets reduced the stock of whales. 
The ships had to go so far out to sea that land bases could no longer 
be used. By the end of the 17th century Svalbard had, therefore, almost 
ceased to have any political importance. 
The Russians did not take part in whaling, and they were never 
involved in the diplomatic negotiations of the whaling period. Their 
occupation was a different one. Having been barred from their hunting 
places in North-West Siberia, the trappers and sealers from the White 
Sea region turned westwards, and from the beginning of the 18th century 
they undertook wintering expeditions to Svalbard which entailed severe 
hardship and required the greatest endurance. Their activity was hardly 
known to the authorities in Copenhagen, and even so, no political inter­
vention could be expected from the Danish-Norwegian King, as during 
the preceding century the practice had been established that the exploi­
tation of the economic resources of the territory should be open to the 
subjects of all interested nations. At the end of the 18th century the 
Russians were joined by Norwegians, who mostly ol;ganized their hunt­
ing as summer expeditions, and by the middle of the 19th century had 
superceded the Russians. At this time Svalbard also became a field for 
Swedish Polar exploration. In the 19th century some writers of geo­
graphy books believed that Svalbard belonged to Russia; but the fact 
is that this power never claimed sovereignty neither to the whole of the 
archiplago nor to any particular island. 
When Sweden-Norway initiated negotiations in 1871 with the in­
tention to acquire the territory, there was uncertainty concerning its 
political status. The exchange of notes clarified the situation. It was 
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ascertained that the archipelago was now a no man's land. According 
to international law a no man's land can be occupied; but the Russian 
Government maintained that, because of the activities of Russian subjects 
on the islands in former times, an occupation would affect Russian 
national feeling. This was respected by Sweden-Norway, which had the 
greatest interests in the area. From now on Svalbard was more or less 
regarded as common territory whose natural resources could be exploited 
by the subjects of all nations, and it could not be occupied or acquired 
by a single power without the consent of the other interested powers. 
But as long as this arrangement was not founded on any international 
agreement, it was unstable. It was not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that the islands might become the object of rivalry among the great 
powers. The Norwegian trappers and sealers, however, had no compe­
titors at the time, and there was no immediate threat to their occupation. 
It was therefore reasonable for the Norwegian Government to regard it 
as most advantageous, for the time being, to avoid the expense and the 
risk which an occupation would, in its opinion, entail. 
At about the turn of the century the great powers began to show 
greater interest in the Arctic. This was due to several circumstances: 
the age was marked by the race between the powers for new territories 
and spheres of interest. There was also a direct link between their ex­
pansion in the Far East and their interest in the Arctic. The Russians, 
who foresaw a war with Japan, took up the old plan of opening a navig­
able sea route north of Siberia which would help to solve the transport 
problems which a conflict in the Far East would create. And their pre­
occupation with a harbor on the Murmansk coast must be seen in the 
light of German naval rearmament, which might easily enable Germany 
to control the Baltic, and also in the light of the Franco-Russian political 
and military rapprochement, since it was quite clear that in a war where 
Russia and France were allied against Germany the sea route to North 
Russia would be of considerable value. All these circumstances contri­
buted to increase the strategic importance of the Arctic. The increase in 
trawl fishing gave added interest to the fisheries off Svalbard and in the 
Barents Sea. The coal mining in Svalbard excited the interest of business­
men and statesmen and created a sharp need for settled legal and social 
conditions in the archipelago. In order to satisfy these needs, the terri­
tory would either have to be handed over to a single power, or else some 
sort of international administration would have to be established. In 1907 
a situation arose which resulted in Russia and Great Britain being willing 
to hand Svalbard over to Norway; but the Norwegian Government did 
not wish to take advantage of this opportunity, partly because it was 
anxious to avoid aggravating the not too good relations between Norway 
and Sweden and partly because taking over the archipelago would not 
be in keeping with the policy of neutrality inaugurated by the Govern-
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ment. It preferred to initiate negotiations for an international settlement, 
which, however, involved great legal and political difficulties. 
The repercussions from the dissolution of the union between Norway 
and Sweden, the increased tension and Illutual suspicion of the great 
powers, and the policy of alliances which pointed towards war, influenced 
negotIations to a very marked degree. Sometimes it appeared as though 
the European great powers were not particularly interested in the case 
itself, but preferred to use the negotiations to further their own policy 
of alliances. Moreover, it was unfortunate that satisfactory cooperation 
with the United States was not established, despite the fact that American 
subjects had undertaken the largest investments in the Svalbard mining 
industry. The result of this was that the U. S. State Department worked 
out its own draft convention. The failure of the 1914 conference was, 
however, primarily due to the fact that the Germans wished to participate 
in the government of the archipelago, while the Russians resolutely 
opposed this. Generally speaking, the difference of opinions was so great 
that one might truthfully say that a satisfactory result would very likely 
not have been achieved by continuing along the road chosen; and this 
was probably realized by many people even though it was agreed to 
make another attempt. 
The decisive change in the relative strength of the powers brought 
about by the war, and the internal trouble which took place in some 
of the states were to influence the nature of the Svalbard question to a 
large degree. It was difficult to believe that representatives of all the 
other interested powers would, within a reasonable period of time, agree 
to gather at the conference table together with representatives of the 
Soviet Union. During the war yearS', moreover, conditions in Svalbard 
underwent a change. The Norwegians acquired control of most of the 
coal mining industry. The Norwegian Government was informed that 
neither in Paris nor in Washington was there any objection to Norway 
seeking to obtain the archipelago by a decision at the Peace Conference; 
but it did not appear anxious to avail itself of this opportunity. In the 
Foreign Ministry it was maintained that Norway would not be able to 
acquire Svalbard without some curtailment of her sovereignty over the 
archipelago, which would involve the possibility of other powers interfer­
ing with Norwegian rule. Norwegian interests would therefore be best pro­
tected by an international arrangement. In principle the Government's 
foreigr. policy was liberalistic, and it was maintained that in the interests 
of Norway's commerce and shipping it would be best if the powers 
pursued a pOlicy which gave everyone access to world markets. In that 
case it mattered little whether a territory belonged formally to one power 
or another; but the objection here was that there was no guarantee that 
the powers would pursue the policy of the open door, even though Nor­
way might want to. Moreover, it was not only a question of trade and 
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shipping interests. On the other hand, objections could undoubtedly be 
made against submitting the Svalbard question to the Peace Conference. 
Several of the powers which had previously participated in the negotia­
tions were not represented at the Paris Conference, and new ones which 
were not particularly interested in the case would have their share in 
the final decision. There were some Norwegians, too, who maintained 
that it was inadvisable to mix the Svalbard question with the post-war 
settlement, as this would be taken as a sign that Norway wished to exploit 
the favors of the victors, and the solution reached might be resented by 
the defeated powers. But it was hardly realistic to assume that the great 
powers would to any real extent allow their decisions to be dictated by 
sentimental considerations, as indeed the subsequent negotiations were 
to prove. And it was a fact that it was particularly important for the 
Norwegians, who had the greatest interests in Svalbard, to have the 
matter settled; it would not be possible for some time to come to convene 
a conference of all the powers, which had participated in the pre-war 
negotiations. The Norwegian Government could not, therefore, relinquish 
the opportunity of having Svalbard dealt with at the Peace Conference. 
And the views expressed in the press could only mean that the great 
majority of the Norwegian people demanded a vigorous policy. Parti­
cularly important was the energetic work done by the Norwegian envoy 
in Paris, Wedel Jarlsberg. 
By the treaty of February 9, 1920, the signatory powers recognized 
Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard, and motivated their action by a 
desire to set up a just government for the archipelago capable of securing 
its development and peaceful exploitation. It would have been more cor­
rect if the Soviet Union and Germany had also been among the signatory 
powers, but everything considered the Svalbard Treaty may be regarded 
as one of the most upright territorial decisions in diplomatic history. 
Quite logically, it would be simpler to explain the treaty if Svalbard 
were not conceived of, at the time when the treay was concluded, as a 
"terra nullius", but as a "terra omnium", which the interested powers 
handed over to Norway for the reason given above. 
Though the decision in Paris went largely in Norway's favor, it was 
by no means an unconditional Norwegian success, and the disagreements 
which subsequently arose with Denmark seemed to indicate that the 
Norwegian Government's statement with regard to East Greenland was 
not well advised. Many Norwegians were disappointed at the great limits 
which the treaty placed on Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard; accord­
ing to international law a state is entitled to reserve the exploitation 
of the economic resources of its territory for its own subjects, and to 
decide what alien it will admit to its territory. The Svalbard Treaty places 
the subjects of all powers which are parties to it - and any state can 
become a party to it - on an equal footing with Norwegians as far as 
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economic activity is concerned. The provisions regarding taxation and 
demilitarization are also limitations of sovereignty; but there is less 
reason to be dissatisfied with them. Owing to the geographical conditions 
it would be difficult and expensive for a small power to create anything 
like an effective defense for Svalbard; and it seems reasonable to assume 
that the fact that Norway is prevented by the terms of the treaty from 
�ortifying the territory would at any rate indirectly place a greater 
responsibility for its security on the other powers which are parties to 
the treaty. Nor does there seem to be any reason for dissatisfaction that 
the taxes and dues payable in Svalbard should only accrue to the archi·· 
pelago. The money can at least be used to pay the few Norwegians who 
are employed in the Civil Service of the islands; and what the Norwegian 
Government and Norwegian diplomats had most energetically striven for 
during the long negotiations, viz. that Norwegian legal principles should 
apply in Svalbard and be exercised by Norwegians, was achieved. 
It should be mentioned, in particular, that what the Norwegians 
feared most was that they might one day be excluded from Svalbard by 
the sovereignty of some other power, and the decision made in Paris 
safeguards against this. From the point of view of national economics 
the mining industry, and large deposits of a vital raw material which 
does not exist elsewhere in Norway, are certainly important; lack of coal 
has played a momentous part in Norwegian foreign policy. Nor should 
it be forgotten that foreign sovereignty over Svalbard might have far­
reaching consequences for Norwegian sealing, whaling, fishing and trap­
ping in the Arctic. Perhaps it should also be mentioned that it was not 
insignificant in terms of national psychology that a small country such 
as Norway should enjoy a measure of success in her foreign policy. 
The acquisition of the archipelago increased, however, the risk of 
disagreement with other powers. This is a factor to which the Norwegian 
authorities have attached a great deal of importance, especially as long 
as Norway endeavored to conduct a policy of extreme neutrality. But a 
certain change occurred in her neutrality policy when Norway adhered 
to the policy of collective security which also found expression in the 
Svalbard Treaty which allows military use of the territory only on behalf 
of the League of Nations. The fact that the subjects of other powers 
enjoy so extensive rights in the archipelago may in this connection be 
regarded from two points of view. It was calculated to lessen dissatis­
faction at Norway's acquisition of the islands; this applies particularly 
to powers which were unable to participate in the decision in Paris. 
But it may also create difficulties for Norway, and contribute to a feeling 
of suspicion and irritation, especially if this factor is not borne in mind, 
and prudence is not exercised in smoothing over the difficulties as far 
as possible. In trying to assess the increased obligations which Norway 
has taken on, one should, however, recall the state of affairs prevailing 
12 
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when the archipelago was a no man's land, and furthermore try to imagine 
the situation which would obtain if it belonged to another power. In view 
of the geographical and economic conditions, Norwegians would at all 
times be bound to have some interests in Svalbard and its surrounding 
waters. 
As far as other interested powers are concerned it can be said that 
the reservations and claims submitted by those which had the opportunity 
to present theirs views in Paris were largely taken into account in fram­
ing the treaty. In the case of the Soviet Union and Germany, these powers 
enjoy the same rights as the signatory powers, as the limitations on 
Norway's sovereignty, which favor the signatory powers, are enjoyed 
by all powers which adhere to the treaty. With a certain amount of truth 
some Norwegians ironically remarked that the Paris Peace Conference 
had made a joint stock company for Svalbard and appointed Norway as 
an unpaid director. With regard to the security and strategic value of 
the archipelago it was at the time universally agreed that neutralization 
and demilitarization was the best solution. 
Judging the decision made in Paris from an international point of 
view, it should, moreover, be emphasized that all interested powers were 
agreed that the conditions obtaining were untenable and had to be re­
medied. It proved no easy matter to find a solution based on international 
administration; and it is most probable that if an administration of this 
nature had been established, it might have become the cause of dis­
agreement and dispute. Government by condominium has not always 
proved satisfactory, and this is the form of government most resembling 
the type of administration which the pre-war conferences endeavored to 
set up. Strong objections could also be raised against a mandate held 
on behalf of the League of Nations. And if we accept the opinion that 
it was necessary to change the existing conditions, and that this could 
best be done by handing Svalbard over to one single power, then one is 
bound to agree that Norway's candidacy was a very strong one. It may 
even well be that the severe limitations made in Norway's sovereignty 
are the weakest spots in the arrangement seen from an international point 
of view - a matter to which some members of the Svalbard Commission 
in Paris drew attention. But they apparently had to be made. 
Looking back in an attempt to identify the forces determining the 
part which this territory has played in international politics, one's atten­
tion is first caught by the fundamental significance of the natural re­
sources on land and in the sea. They have surely been decisive in shaping 
the history of these rugged islands to which only recently the limits of 
human settlement have been extended. But in these inhospitable regions 
the impact of the seemingly ever needed prerequisite, the explorative, 
enterprising and acquisitive spirit of man, too, is perhaps more clearly 
seen than anywhere else. 
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Easily discernable is also the play of such forces as national vin­
dication and prestige, as well as popular sentiment derived from the 
memory of past achievements, although the last mentioned factor has 
hardly been a very important one except in cases when deliberately 
played upon in support of policies whose underlying motives have been 
economic gain, security considerations or matters of private or national 
prestige. But actions in the past, either private or governmental, may be 
considered to give the state concerned certain rights. Apart from those 
rights specifically recognized by international law, the more indefinite 
term "historical interests" has frequently occurred in the language of 
the participating powers, and it has often been considered a duty of the 
governments to vindicate these rights. It is, therefore, clear that the 
attitude and behavior of the powers have been determined, to a consider­
able degree, by the past, and that this fact applies even to states which 
have ceased to have either strategic or economic interests in the territory, 
although the possibility of resuming economic activity may have been 
considered. 
Although a matter of recent importance it would be wrong to omit 
the strategic significance that was, rightly or wrongly, being attributed 
to the archipelago, and which seemed to be determined by such more 
or less varying factors as technology, economic resources, and location 
in relation to the power political groupings of the relevant states, to lines 
of communication, and to centers of production. 
Generalizing broadly one may say that the role which the archi­
pelago has been playing in international politics has been determined by 
three varying and to some extent interactive primary factors, namely: 
the activity in the archipelago and in the adjacent waters, the relations 
between the interested powers, and the internal conditions in these states. 
This is presumably a rule which is likely to apply without too many 
exceptions to international cases of this type. But in this instance where 
we are concerned with an archipelago with few settlements or in other 
words a country which is very limited and surveyable, and where several 
states are involved, it is particularly clear how these three main factors 
have determined and changed the aspects of the subject from one epoch 
to another. 
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llnd Oberlieferungen, in Erman's Archiv fiir wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland, 
IX. 
11 Fridtjof Nansen, Nord i Taakelzeimen, p. 415. If the Norse did any sealing 
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Grumanta, p. 14. 
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3 A. F. Shidlovsky, Spitsbergen v russkoi istorij i literatllrje. 
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A Swedish Plan for Colonization. 
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Tidskrift for Vetenskap, Konst och Industri, 1923, pp. 20-21. 
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187 1. 
Nonvay Adopts a more Active Policy. 
1 The sealing Skipper Nils Ronnbeck seems to have discovered franz Josef 
Land in 1865. Cf. G. Horn, Franz Josef Land, pp. 1 1- 12. 
The first to start sealing and hunting at Novaya Zemlya was the Skipper 
ElIing Carlsen, who visited the archipelago in 1868 after first having made a trip 
into the Kara Sea. G. Isachsen, "Folk, Fangst og f&rder", Norsk geografisk sel­
skaps aarbok 1916-1919, p. 196. 
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6 File P7A l/res. Letter of May 30, 1892 from Lewenhaupt to Konow. 
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11 Ibid. Report of Oct. 5/17, 1896 from the Legation in Stockholm to the 
Foreign Ministry. 
12 The diary of the expedition was published by the Oslo paper Verdens Gang, 
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A German-Russian Episode in the Arctic. 
1 A. Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte, pp. 180-81. 
2 Ibid. pp. 105-06. 
3 The Russian press comments were reprinted in the Norwegian press, cf. 
Morgenbladet, July 12, 1899. 
4 The President of the Deutsche Seefischerei-Verein, Or. WaIter Herwig de­
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der deutschen Seefischerei-Verein, no. 1, 1900, p. 34. 
5 M. Lindman, Arktische Fischerei der deutschen Seestiidte. 
6 Neue Hamburger Zeitung, nos. 190 and 196. 
7 File P7 A l/res. Letter of May 15, 1899 from the Secretary of Interior to the 
Foreign Secretary. 
8 Ibid. Letter of June 2, 1899 from the Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of 
Interior, with report of May 27 from the Berlin Legation enclosed. 
9 Kreutzzeitung, June 9, 1899. 
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to the Interior Department. 
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16 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 24, 1899. 
1 7 File P7 A l/res. Report of May 27, 1899 from the Berlin Legation. 
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19 Kolnische Zeitung, July 26, 1899. 
20 Mittheilungen der deutschen Seefischerei-Verein, no. I, 1900, p. 34. 
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Morgenbladet, Oct. 30, 1906. 
21 Morgenbladet, July 26; Attenposten, July 25 and Aug. 15; Verdens Gang, 
Aug. 3; Dagbladet, Aug. 8, 16 and 20, 1899. 
22 Verdens Gang, Se pt. 20, 1899. 
23 Dagbladet, Aug. 4, 1899. 
24 Sir Martin Conway wrote in The Times, Aug. 12, 1899: "In 1896 a Nor­
wegian company built a small inn on the shores of Ice Fjord, and established a 
weekly summer service of steamers to take tourists up and show them the west 
coast. This line of steamers is, I believe, subsidized by the Norwegian Government, 
and a Norwegian postoffice has been opened at the little inn. Thus, practically, 
Norway has taken possession of the south shore of Ice Fjord . . . . . . . The sooner 
some power strong enough to regulate hunting of birds and beasts in Spitsbergen, 
takes possession of the whole region the better will it be for the world in general; 
whilst that Power should be Norway rather than Russia or Germany must be 
obvious to any person acquainted with the present condition of affairs. " 
25 Goteborgs Handels och Sjotartstidning, Aug. 4 , 1899. 
26 Verdens Gang, Aug. 1 1, 1899. 
27 Nya Dagligt Allehanda, July 21, 1899. 
28 File P7A 1/(£s. Report of Aug. 16, 1899 from the Consulate General at Arch­
angel to the Interior Department. 
29 The Norwegian Government seems to have feared a development in the 
Arctic similar to that which took place in China at that time. 
30 File P7A 1/(£s. Letter of July 3 1, 1899 from the Secretary of Interior to the 
Foreign Secretary. 
31 A British source states that the plan was proposed to Russia which refused 
it. Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section ot The Foreign 
Otfice, No. 36, Spitsbergen, p. 33. 
A New Epoch in the History of the Archipelago .. 
1 Four companies' were formed: Trondhjem Spitzbergen Kul Kompagnie, 
Trondheim; Hammerfest KlIlaktieselskab, Hammerfest; Bergenske KlIlkompagnie, 
Bergen; Bergen-Spitsbergen Kulgrubekompagnie, Bergen. 
2 Described later in this volume. 
3 In 1909, 2 American, 3 British and 4 Norwegian companies had claimed 
land in Svalbard. 
4 File P7 A 1/06. Memorandum of May 9, 1906. 
5 As to a theoretical discussion of this problem see R. Stammler: "Das Recht 
im staatlosen Gebiete". Festschritt tilr Karl Binding ( 1911), I, pp. 333-375. 
6 Adolf Hoel, "Om ordningen av de territoriale krav pa Svalbard", Norsk 
geogratisk tidsskritt, no. 1, 1928. 
7 This occupation gave fairly good results for some years. In the winter of 
1908---09 16 hunting parties totaling 78 men took part in it. 
8 In 1905 the total production was 1666 barrels of oil. Norsk Fiskeritidende 
1905, pp. 2 1-25, 73. The stock of whales was, however, soon reduced. 
Opportunity for Norwegian Occupation. 
1 Attenposten, Aug. 30 and Oct. 25; Morgenbladet, Sept. 21 and Oct. 21, 1906. 
In September it was announced that Roald Amundsen had sailed through the North 
West Passage; about the same time Prince Albert of Monaco's Svalbard expedition 
returned to Norway. These occurrences no doubt contributed to increase the 
interest in the Arctic and to raise the demand for a Norwegian acquisition of 
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Allehanda wrote (Oct. 20) on this occasion that Great Britain now would use its 
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Archangel. 
7 Russian Orange book. Spitsbergcll 1871--1812, note of April 2 1/May 4, 1905. 
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Appendix. 
The President of The United States of America; his Majesty the 
King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond 
the Seas, Emperor of India; his Majesty the King of Denmark; the Presi­
dent of the French Republic; his Majesty the King of Italy; his Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan; his Majesty the King of Norway; her Majesty the 
Queen of the Netherlands; his Majesty the King of Sweden, 
Desirous, while recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the 
Archipelago of Svalbard, including Bj0rn0ya Island, of seeing these 
territories provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure their 
development and peaceful utilisation, 
Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view 
to concluding a Treaty to this effect: 
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed as follows:1 
A r t i c l e  1. 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognise, subject to 
the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty 
of Norway over the Archipelago of Svalbard, comprising, with Bj0rn0ya, 
all the islands situated between 10° and 35° longitude East of Green­
wich and b�tween 74° and 810 latitude North, especially Vestspitsbergen. 
Nordaustlandet, Barents0ya, Edge0ya, Kong Karls Land, Hopen, and 
Prins Karls Forland, together with all islands great or small and rocks 
appertaining thereto (see annexed map). 
A rt i c I e 2. 
Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy 
equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in 
Article 1 and in their territorial waters. 
1 Original text except that the place-names have been replaced by the Nor­
wegian names now applied on nearly all maps. 
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Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures 
to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the 
fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters; it being 
clearly understood that these measures shall always be applicable equally 
to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemp­
tion, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage 
of any one of them. 
Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognised in accordance 
with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 wil enjoy the exclusive right of hunting 
of their own land: (1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, 
stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of devel­
oping their property, under conditions laid down by the local police 
regulations; (2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters 
of their place of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to 
the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article. 
A r t  i c l  e 3. 
The narlonals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal 
liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the 
waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject 
to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there 
without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial 
operations on a footing of absolute equality. 
They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the 
exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial 
enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly 
shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever. 
Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be 
in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or 
coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right 
to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for 
the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo 
going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose. 
It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to ex­
ports, imports and transit traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting 
Parties, their ships and goods shall not be subject to any charges or 
restrictions whatever, which are not borne by the nationals, ships or goods 
which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Nor­
wegian nationals, ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to 
those of the other High Contracting Parties, and not treated more favour­
ably in any respect. 
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No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation of any 
goods to the territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more 
onerous than on the exportation of similar goods to the territory of any 
other Contracting Power (including Norway) or to any other destination. 
Ar t i c I e 4. 
All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established 
by, or with the authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the 
territories referred to in Article 1 shall always be open on a footing of 
absolute equality to communications from ships of all flags and from 
nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down 
in the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912, or in the sub­
sequent International Convention which may be concluded to replace it. 
Subject to interna tional obligations arising out of a state of war, 
owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use 
for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installations, which shall be 
free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving wireless 
stations, including those on board ships and aircraft. 
Art i c l e  5. 
The High Contracting Parties recognise the utility of establishing 
an international meteorological station in the territories specified in 
Article 1, the organisation of which shall form the subject of a subsequent 
Convention. 
Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions 
under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said 
territories. 
A r t  i c I e 6. 
Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of 
nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be recognised. 
Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of land 
before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt with in accord­
ance with the Annex hereto, which will have the same force and effect 
as the present Treaty. 
A r ti c l e 7. 
With regard to me thods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise ot 
the right of ownership of property, including mineral rights, in the terri­
tories specified in Ar ticle 1, Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals 
of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on complete equality 
and in conformity with the stipulations of the present Treaty. 
Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility 
and on payment of proper compensation. 
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A r t  i c I e 8. 
Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 
mining regulations which, especially from the point of view of imposts, 
taxes or changes of any kind, and of general or particular labour condi­
tions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit 
of the State or of the nationals of any one of the High Contracting 
Parties, including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all 
categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, 
moral and intellectual welfare. 
Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the 
said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object 
in view. 
So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the 
Norwegian Government shall have the right to levy an export duty which 
shall not exceed 1 % of the maximum value of the minerals exported up 
to 100,000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be proportionately 
diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season 
by calculating the average free on board price obtained. 
Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the 
draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the Norwegian 
Government to the Contracting Powers. If during this period one or more 
of the said Powers propose to modify these regulations before they are 
applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian Govern­
ment to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be sub­
mitted to examination and the decision of a Commission composed of 
one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall 
meet at the incitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to 
a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first 
meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority. 
Art i c l e  9. 
Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of 
Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor 
to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified 
in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, 
which may never be used for warlike purposes. 
A r t  i c I e 10. 
Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian 
Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian 
nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the 
High Contracting Parties. 
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Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have 
to put forward shall be presented under the conditions laid down in the 
present Treaty ( Article 6 and Annex) through the intermediary of the 
Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend their good 
offices for this purpose. 
T h e  p r  e s e n t T r e a  t y, of which the French and English texts 
are both authentic, shall be ratified. 
Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible. 
Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe may 
confine their action to informing the Government of the French Republic, 
through their diplomatic representatives at Paris, that their ratification 
has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument as 
soon as possible. 
The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations 
of Article 8 are concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the 
signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the same date as the 
mining regulations provided for in that Article. 
Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Re­
public to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall 
be effected by a communication addressed to the French Government, . 
which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties. 
In witness whereof the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Treaty. 
Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one 
copy to be transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of 
Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the French Republic; 
authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other Signatory Powers. 
Printed July 1954. 
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